

5172-

A HAND-BOOK OF

PHILOSOPHY.

100
PAT



BY

V. P. PATWARDHAN, M. A.

Professor of Philosophy,

New Poona College, Poona City

[*Patwardhan scholar and Telang Gold
Medallist, University of Bombay.*]



(All rights reserved by the Author.)



1925



Price Rs. 2 As. 4.

Printed by:—GANESH KASHINATH GOKHALE,
Secretary, Shri Ganesh Printing Works,
495-496 Shanwar Peth, Poona City.

Published by:—V. P. PATWARDHAN,
331, Sadashiva Peth, Poona City.

Preface.

This Hand-Book of Philosophy is the outcome of Notes on Metaphysics, which I prepared for Lectures in that subject as far back as the year 1922. The Hand-Book is meant primarily to be of help, as a handy text-book in Philosophy, to students studying philosophy for the B. A. examination of the Indian Universities. The various theories of Knowledge and Reality and other kindred topics are, therefore, treated here in a *cut and dry* fashion. Secondly, the Hand-Book is expected to acquaint the general reader with the fundamental problems of philosophy, and to show the direction in which their solutions should be sought. In the preparation of this manual, many well-known books have been consulted, the chief of them being (1) A. E. Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics (2) J. S. Mackenzie's Elements of Constructive Philosophy (3) Kulps's Introduction to Philosophy (4) A. Seth Pringle Pattison's Idea of God (5) Rudolf Eucken's Main Currents of Modern Thought (6) May Sinclair's New Idealism (7) H. Sidgwick's Philosophy Its scope and Relations.

My thanks are due to Professor Naralkar, Chairman of the Students' Store, New Poona College, for managing the printing of the book and supplying the Swadeshi paper on which it is printed. The Secretary of Shri Ganesh Printing Works, Poona, has to be thanked for getting the book quickly through the press.

New Poona College,
Poona
20th December, 1925.

} V. P. Patwardhan.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
I Introductory.	1-31
(1) A short History of Methods in Philosophy.	1- 10
(2) The Method of Philosophy.	10- 13
(3) The Scope of Philosophy.	13- 22
(4) Relation of Philosophy to other Sciences.	22- 31
II Epistemology.	32-73
(1) The Criterion of Truth.	32- 37
(2) Conditions and Implications of Belief.	37- 50
(3) Laws of Thought.	46- 49
(4) Theories of Knowledge.	50- 71
(1) <i>Scepticism.</i>	50- 53
(2) <i>Agnosticism.</i>	53- 55
(3) <i>Empiricism.</i>	55- 58
(4) <i>Rationalism.</i>	58- 61
(5) <i>Dogmatism.</i>	61- 62
(6) <i>Criticism.</i>	62- 64
(7) <i>Pragmatism.</i>	64- 69
(8) <i>Intuitionism.</i>	69- 70
(9) <i>Mysticism.</i>	70- 71
(5) The Doctrine of Degrees of Truth.	71- 73
III Ontology	74-114
(1) Monism.	74- 78
(2) Dualism.	78- 80
(3) Pluralism.	80- 83
(4) Materialism.	83- 92

(5) Spiritualism.	92- 96
(6) Subjective Idealism.	96- 99
(7) Abstract Idealism.	99-101
(8) & (9) Realism and New Realism.	101-104
(10) Absolute Idealism.	104-110
(11) Objective Idealism.	110-114
IV Philosophy. (In the narrower sense).	114-155
(1) The Absolute and the Finite Individual. The Conception of Self. The Problem of Creation and Freedom etc.	114-127
(2) Arguments for the existence of God.	127-136
(3) The Nature of God.	136-146
(4) The Problem of Evil.	146-148
(5) The Problem of Immortality.	148-149
(6) Evolution.	149-151 ,
(7) Theories of the relation between Mind and Body.	151-155 ,
V Appendix "A"	156-162
(A short Account of the Important Categories.)	
(1) Substance.	156-158
(2) Qualities and Relations.	158-160
(3) Space and Time.	160-162
(4) Causality.	162-163
VI Appendix "B"	164-171
I Some noteworthy classifications of Sciences.	164-168
II Some important divisions of Philosophy.	168-171

A HAND-BOOK
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

A Short History of Methods in Philosophy.

Philosophy is essentially thinking things out in a systematic way. If thinking has no system it can hardly deserve the name. It is with a full recognition of this, that the great thinkers of the world have had a system of their own in carrying on their investigation into the ultimate problems of the Universe. The method of investigation adopted by one Philosopher may not be endorsed by another or it may even be in conflict with another's, yet every great thinker has recognised the importance of having a method. In fact, unless we have a method of investigation, we shall not know where to begin in our search into the depths of reality, nor shall we be able to make any headway if we start at random. The field that philosophy wants to investigate is immensely vast and can only be traversed in a cautious and guarded way. There are bogs and pitfalls in the field and the beginner is bound to receive good help by knowing the way in which his predecessors have gone ahead. It is with this view that a short study of the methods of investigation that have been followed in the past by some of the great thinkers, is bound to be instructive and interesting. To such a short historical study, therefore, we must turn our attention.

Broadly speaking there are six methods that strike us as original. They may be thus named:—

- (1). The early Dialectic of Zeno and Plato;

(2) The Genetic method of Aristotle with which may be classed the later Evolutionary method of Spencer.

(3) The Mathematical method of Descartes and Spinoza.

(4) The Psychological Method of Locke and his School;

(5) The critical method of Kant;

(6). The later Dialectic method of Hegel.

1 Zeno's Dialectic was mainly a procedure of destruction. He made no new contributions to Philosophic thought. He did not advance the thought of his illustrious predecessor Parmenides but he appeared rather as the master of logical argument in defence of his predecessor by tearing to pieces the arguments of his opponents. His interest lay in proving the absurdity of magnitude, multiplicity and motion. There were two features to his method. He took for granted the adversary's premises and deduced from those either an absurd conclusion or two inter-contradictory conclusions. It was in the first way that he proved the absurdity of motion and in the second the unreality of magnitude. His paradoxes have become famous. "The flying arrow rests," he maintained; because at any one moment, he argued, it was in one particular place and not in another. So also he maintained that the Achilles could never overtake the tortoise even with a ten-fold speed of the latter, if the tortoise was in advance at the start; so also he denied reality to magnitude on the ground that if it were real, a line for instance, being infinitely divisible it would be infinitely small or infinitely large, which are contradictory

statements. The fallacies involved in Zeno's contention are now a petent fact but what we have to emphasize is the strictly logical way in which he argued. He had a method and he stuck to it logically.

Plato's Dialectic is a decided advance over that of Zeno. It differs from the latter in having a constructive side. Whereas Zeno's Dialectic took the adversary's premises for granted, Plato's Dialectic questioned the authenticity of the premises themselves and proceeded by gradual clearing up of ideas to substitute others for them. Plato's Dialectic went on by destroying the hypothesis of the adversary, replacing it by another and subsuming this again under another. Thus he advanced from one hypothesis to another. The method of Plato is no doubt worth much but the question is whether one could know things so well as to be able to pass with certainty from one proposition to another. Hasty generalisation was thus the weak point in Plato and Aristotle recognised his master's defect. Aristotle valued Dialectic but with him it only meant probable reasoning. Aristotle's Dialectic manifested itself in his well-known logic. He was almost the first man to feel that there must be a science of the methods of Science. It is a misfortune that only one side of Aristotle's logic was cared for by the school-men, but it would be a wrong notion to suppose that Aristotle concerned himself only with the deductive side of Logic. It must be understood to the credit of Aristotle that he also paid attention to the establishment of the premises from which deductions are to be made. Aristotle recognised that we must use the method of induction in our search for them, only his point of departure from Plato was that he maintained these premises

arrived at by generalisations from our experiences did not carry absolute certainty but were only of the nature of the probable. It is for these reasons that Aristotle laid more emphasis on the Genetic method than on the Dialectic. Let us see what this Genetic method was.

2 Aristotle's Genetic method is seen in his hierarchy of matter and form. Aristotle clearly saw that Plato made the mistake of dividing the Universe into two parts which had no inter relation but stood quite apart viz the conceptual Being and the Perceptual fact. Aristotle wanted to establish a close relationship between these two. And the linkage between the two he proclaimed to be development. The conceptual Being and the Perceptual facts exist together in a linkage or relationship that is teleological, purposeful and that is the linkage of development. The clearest statement of this fundamental principle can be made in the terms of Evolution and thus Aristotle can be said to have been the distant forerunner of modern Evolutionists. The principle amounts to this—True reality is the essence which unfolds in phenomena. The word "unfolds" signifies the movement in an upward or more strictly speaking in the cyclic direction. Aristotle applies this principle to Physics and says *that the individual phenomena get a reality through their development from lower to higher types*. The elements in their separateness produce nothing but in their combination produce everything. Aristotle's illustrations show how far this theory was akin to the modern theory of evolution. He said everything was matter for a higher thing and form for a lower thing. At one end there was pure matter which was not being but always becoming and at other end was pure form which he chose to call

God The elements, as described, in their combination produce the things such as plants and herbs They form food this food is the matter for and therefore turns into the menstrual blood which in its turn becomes the body of the child The body is matter for its soul soul is the matter of the Nous which is the matter of God Thus there is a rising from the lowest to the highest It was not, however in plain terms that Aristotle preached this evolution from one class of things to another In truly Greek fashion he confined himself to showing the development in the individual thing itself-the boy becomes a man, the seed becomes a flower and so on The difference, therefore, between the Genetic method of Aristotle and the later evolutionary method of Spencer will now be quite clear With Aristotle there was no evolution in the sense of progress There was no evolution from genus to genus Indeed any variation of the individual from its type was considered a defect in all Greek thought Spencer's evolution is from one type of life to another and a higher type of life There is progress in the real sense of the word and according to Spencer this is visible not only in the different phases of life but in all human institutions It was Spencer, therefore, who brought the Genetic study of Institutions into vogue He tried to explain phenomena by tracing them back to their origin and sources In the Kantian sense, however, this is not true explanation, yet the historical method in human affairs along which goes the Genetic method is very useful by letting us know how something came to be what it is, in showing the direction in which it will further move and in thus enabling us to predict the future to a certain extent It was thus by the principle of continuity

and of development that Aristotle in ancient and Spencer in modern times tried to explain the Universe and it is an indisputable fact that both succeeded considerably well in their undertaking

3 Unlike ancient modern philosophy began with the attempt to formulate a method. Bacon deserves distinction for such an attempt. But as Bacon only discussed the nature and validity of methods and did not proceed to have a philosophical construction of the Universe to which he applied it, we need not concern ourselves with his treatment of methods. The chief attempt for a method with a view to a philosophical construction was made by Descartes who definitely set himself to the problem of finding some truth which it is impossible to doubt and then using this, as the basis for the construction of a philosophical system. In doing this he was guided to a large extent by the method of mathematics. His method may thus be called the Mathematical method. Though Descartes began by doubting everything he came to a position which he dogmatically asserted and then deduced everything from it. This shows how scepticism and dogmatism are essentially two aspects of one and the same attitude and Kant rightly called the Cartesian method as the dogmatic method as distinguished from his critical method. The Mathematical or dogmatic method of Descartes has been supposed to be identical with the Deductive Method but Descartes never identified them thus. In his opinion there were three stages which constituted this method viz. Intuition Deduction and Induction. According to him self consciousness was an Intuition from which could be deduced in order the existence of God and the existence of Nature and from

these *Inductively* the fabric of the Universe could be established. The Mathematical method was still more ardently resorted to by Spinoza. Both Descartes and Spinoza had observed the success with which this method operated in the field of Physics and *the way in which it had brought about great scientific discoveries*. 'Why should then the same method not do good in Philosophy?' they contended. They aspired to mathematise Philosophy and thus put it alongside the positive sciences. On taking up Spinoza's work, one finds Philosophy treated exactly as Euclid treated his geometry. Beginning with a number of definitions and axioms there are deduced, step by step propositions with corollaries appended. This was the Mathematical Method of Philosophy. How far it was serviceable in explaining the complex relations involved in the structure of the Universe, we shall have occasion to see afterwards.

4 The Empirical or Psychological methods. Locke may justly be called the founder of these methods. Though, in fact, the two methods are not identical (for if the Psychological method can only study individual consciousness the Empirical Method applies to our apprehension of the outside Universe), they were co-extensive for Locke. Locke too, laid emphasis on Descartes' "Cogito" but he did it in an altogether different way. He tried to scan the contents of the mind or consciousness. He states that his design was "to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge". He found that there were simple and complex sensations and sensations brought together by association. The study of the contents of consciousness carried on by Berkeley led to Solipsism and in Hume culminated in

utter denial. The whole School, speaking generally, investigated into the inner workings of the mind to the total disregard of the outside world.

5. The Critical method. This was the method of Kant. Kant called it the Critical Transcendental method, as opposed to the 'Dogmatic method' of Descartes, and as opposed to the empirical method of Locke. Against Locke, Kant said that a study of the origin and growth of anything is not its true explanation. What is the critical method? It is a study of the nature of the reason itself. It is an examination of the 'pure reason' to see if its judgments have in any instance a Universality beyond human experience and yet are necessary to human experience. The judgments must be applicable to the world of things. The method being transcendental, such judgments are transcendental; not because they transcend our experience but because they are necessary to experience. The critical method is the finding of conditions that are indispensable to knowledge. Evidently the critical method consists in the science of Epistemology. There are four chief points about this:—(i) According to it, our knowledge must begin with experience though it does not originate in it. (ii) The knowledge begins with the experience of the world; not with the experience of the self as the Empirical school seemed to emphasise. We see thus how Kant emphasised the objective nature of knowledge (iii) This experience with which we begin is absolutely valid, because it is subjected to 'Forms' of perception which are time and space and to the 'a priori' categories. (iv) Lastly, the knowledge is not only valid but also objective. Objectivity has reference beyond itself, it implies necessity.

6 The later Dialectic or the "systematic" method of Hegel.—Hegel devised a systematic method by which all the categories or thought determinations could be *evolved* or *arranged*. This method was to some extent a revival of the old Greek method of Dialectic. Here, as there, we go from one hypothesis to another through the ashes of the first. But Hegel's method was much more systematic than its earlier prototype. Zeno's method was purely destructive, Plato's was destructive and constructive but the constructive side was vague and unsound, while Hegel's method was pre-eminently constructive. Its main idea was that by starting with the simplest and most rudimentary conception — that of mere Being — it was possible to advance in a regular order to all the more complex conceptions and ultimately to the Absolute Idea by the simple expedient of bringing out the inner contradictions involved in the simpler conceptions when taken by themselves. We begin, he held, by the affirmation of some rude and one-sided conception of the character of what is: the very imperfection of our concept then forces us on to affirm its opposite as equally true. But the opposite in its turn is no less one-sided and inadequate to express the full character of concrete reality. Hence we are driven to negate our first negation by affirming a concept which includes both original affirmation and its opposite as subordinate aspects. The same process repeats itself again at a higher stage with our new category and thus we gradually pass by series of successive triads of categories, each consisting of the three stages of affirmation, negation and negation of the negation from the thought of mere "Being" to the Absolute Idea. Hegel called these stages Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis, and

he maintained that the principle of contradiction was a real one and was required for the real interpretation of the Universe. It was in his opinion the task of abstract Metaphysics to exhibit the successive stages of this process as systematic orderly advance. The categories thus systematically arrived at, were not simply determinations of the individual consciousness but were the general determinations of reality and with a consistent working out of such determinations there would be no longer the Kantian thing in itself that could not be grasped by thought. There are two different views held of this method of Hegel, one laying emphasis on the evolution of categories, the other on the Systematic arrangement of them. In what sense the method has been of more use we shall see when we come to determine our own method of investigation. Suffice it here to say that in the first sense the method had better be termed the later Genetic or Evolutionary method. Equipped with knowledge of the different methods of investigations brought into practice in the past and with the knowledge of their relative success and failure we shall be better able to adopt a method for ourselves. We shall, therefore, try to fix on one by discussing the merits and demerits of those we have already indicated.

The Method of Philosophy.

positive For, it is easier to show that any given point of view is more or less incoherent than that a thoroughly coherent one can be reached It can hardly be denied that, in the hands of its most notable recent representative, Mr Bradley, it has something of the same tendency towards scepticism Thus any attempt at constructive philosophy which is necessarily opposed to a sceptic attitude cannot reach its goal wholly by this Dialectic method Nevertheless, the very great advantage of this method in rising from the incoherent mass of partial experience to a coherent system of universal experience, cannot be overlooked, and we shall be guided by this method in reconciling two or more inter contradictory partial experiences

As regards the Genetic or Evolutionary method, the guidance of it cannot be overestimated With all Kant's criticism of it, it remains true for all time that the study of the growth of our knowledge of reality is likely, more than any other study, to enable us to arrive at the truth It may be objected that in metaphysics we deal with what is eternal, not with what is in process and hence a method which concerns itself with a study of growth cannot be the Metaphysical method But this objection can be removed if we agree with Hegel in thinking that the process of the growth of our apprehension of reality corresponds to the process of revelation of its essence by the eternal Reality The eternal Reality is not changing but it is simply unfolding its essence by stages By such a supposition we also avoid the scepticism that was the outcome of the Psychological method That is because we do not apply the Genetic method to the pheno-

mena of the mind or consciousness only apart from the apprehension of objective reality but apply it to our objective experience and the elements in the growth of such an experience

The Dogmatic or Mathematical method too failed to achieve what is desired because it aspired to achieve too much. The value of this method lies in searching out some definite conception and then bringing out by definition and analysis all the implications involved in such a conception or conceptions. The fault of the champions of this method lay in assuming too much. For it is pretty certain that no one conception can account for our wide experience in its concrete completeness, nor can the different ultimate conceptions be arrived at one from another, in the very easy way in which the Mathematician-philosophers thought themselves justified in proceeding. It is not so easy even to define the philosophical conceptions like Self Substance and Cause as to define the Mathematical conceptions like line point and others. Thus the method in itself possessing certain valuable elements will fail if it is carried too far.

We shall, therefore combine all the salient points of the above discussed methods in order to arrive at a sound method for our own investigations. Thus our method will be Genetic Critical and Analytical. The Genetic aspect of our method will in the first instance bring home to us the necessity of discussing the growth of human knowledge (which we have supposed to correspond to the gradual unfolding of the essence of Reality). Evidently such a discussion will lead to an examination of the conditions of valid knowledge and its limits and the conditions will be found to have their ultimate source in the

nature of objective Reality Thus we start with Epistemology proceed through Ontology and stop with Cosmology. But before doing that, it is necessary to allude, by way of preface to our study, to two general topics, viz the scope of Philosophy and the relation of Philosophy to other Sciences,—Natural and Normative

The Scope of Philosophy.

It is, indeed, very difficult to define Philosophy or to indicate clearly the scope of it. The word itself has undergone a variety of meanings and we can only give out in what sense we are going to understand it. The subject matter of philosophy is hard to define because it has not a special subject matter of its own as many of the other sciences have. In fact philosophy is said to have for its subject matter all that the other sciences have and it is sometimes called 'the science of all sciences'. Now it is clear that it is not a science of sciences in the sense that it is the sum total of all these. There would be no meaning in that and it would then hardly be a science itself. Philosophy is a 'science of all sciences' in the sense that it concerns itself with the ultimate nature and reality of notions that are simply taken for granted by the special sciences. By discussing the fundamental principles underlying the different sciences, which these sciences themselves do not discuss, Philosophy takes upon itself the noble task of co ordinating these various sciences. Thus it deals with fundamental principles and may more appropriately be called "The science of first principles". The special science of Physics, for instance takes the existence of mass and energy for granted and applies these conceptions only to a special field of

objects. But Philosophy discusses the ultimate reality of mass and energy and the reality of Substance, Self, Magnitude and others. So again, Mathematics takes space and time as existing. Philosophy discusses their reality. Geology presupposes matter, Chemistry presupposes change and qualitative distinctions, Biology does not discuss the validity of the theory of Evolution; Psychology takes for granted the existence of soul but the psychological problems of volition, immortality and freedom are, and must be metaphysically treated and therefore James cleverly remarks, "There are holes in the ship of psychology from which metaphysical waters are running inside". Ethics looks upon the existence of God and Immortality as already established facts; Logic gives over the problems of reality, validity and truth to philosophy; and philosophy undertakes the discussion of all these ultimate problems. Thus the problems of philosophy may be summarised in nine pairs, thus:

- (1). Validity and Reality.
- (2). Matter and Force (Energy).
- (3). Quality and Quantity.
- (4). Time and Space.
- (5). Change and Motion.
- (6). Causality and Evolution.
- (7). Life and Self.
- (8). Freedom and Immortality.
- (9). Duty and God.

It is in this sense of giving us the highest principles that praises of Philosophy have been sung up to heaven by so many. Novalis said " Philosophy bakes no bread,

but can give us God, Freedom and Immortality ' In what sense we get these will be seen afterwards. Kulpe metaphorically describes the conflict between the special sciences and philosophy thus — "The Country of science (= knowledge) was at first a monarchy, but in the course of ages monarchy has given place to democracy In the old time Queen philosophy held undivided sway over the special disciplines, settled their differences, gave them wise counsel, and offered freely of her treasure of ideas and methods to satisfy their needs. And they came in brilliant companies, zealous to follow the host of their sovereign, to model their carriage upon hers, to use her wealth for the increase of their portion. Then on a sudden they awoke, as if from an evil dream. The way that had been shown them had led them astray, the treasures they received were but worthless tinsel, and the fair proud form of the Queen herself, the form they had all spied and envied, a lying perfection. So they hurled her from the throne "

" Then followed years of self-reliance, that were years of prosperity and success. But prosperity quickly led to arrogance and impatience of restraint. Soon there was no trace left of the order and system of the old kingdom, anarchy reigned and the sciences were an unruly mob, none regarding its neighbour. In the mean-time the outcast and despised queen had pondered much, she had thrown aside the hollow fruits of Dialectic, and learnt to be careful and accurate in small things and to bow to the constraining power of facts. And when the busy-bodies of her old Court would have laid violent hands upon the abandoned sceptre, and in their blindness chosen the soul-less puppet of materialism to rule over

them, then she stepped forth in the strong armour of *Epistemology* to turn the storm, and with plain wise words send back the rebels to their borders. Since that day, her authority has steadily increased not least because men see that the lust of power has gone out of her. She lives to-day in peaceful intercourse with her former subjects. *By science, with science and for science she works in all her forms as metaphysics, as theory of science and as pioneer of scientific enquiry.* And science on its side is ready to accept the aid of philosophy, with her to serve the cause of knowledge, and for her to gather facts."

The nature and scope of Philosophy will be sufficiently clear from this singular passage. It must be ever kept in mind that the facts or material with which philosophy deals are not essentially different from the material of the other sciences. The distinction of philosophy lies only in the fact that whereas every one of the other sciences deals with a *particular special* aspect of this material, philosophy tries to grapple with the material in all its completeness and forms. Thus only the point of view of philosophy differs from that of any one of the different sciences which in their turn differ from one another in their special stand-points. The subject matter of philosophy may be said to be the whole of experience (the word experience to be understood in its widest sense). It shall, therefore, discuss as shown above the fundamental conceptions underlying our complex experience. It should not, however, be supposed that there will be a *finality* in the conclusions drawn by Philosophy. All it can do is to point out the way in which an explanation of the Universe is to be sought. In Mr. Bradley's words, 'Philoso-

phy always will be hard, and what it promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, in all its complexity and all its unity and worth." Philosophy would thus try to investigate the general structure of the universe and man's relations to it. It is quite clear from the fact of the diversity of personal attitude that there can be no unity of conclusions and hence sometimes we talk of philosophy not as a ready made science but as the product of the activities of so many Philosophers. Still there are conclusions that are common to many Philosophers and the science of Philosophy does not suffer even where they are divergent. Every-body is free to make the attempt.

How and where Philosophy begins is not a very important subject though a few words must be said in that matter. There are in the main two things that make men philosophise. They are either the wonder at seeing the harmony of the world or the vexation at seeing the contradictions on the face of the world. Plato said 'Philosophy begins in wonder'. Man by his very nature is curious to know and systematise things and the sense of harmony that arises in him on looking at the world around leads him to construct a theory of the whole Universe. On the other hand, the origin of philosophy in the vexation at seeing the prima facie contradictions, is no less true. One sees divergences between wish and fact, between expectation and result, between prediction and the actual event. He then tries to think whether these

contradictions can be true and his thought on larger and larger experience results in a theory of the Universe. To add to these two sources of philosophy we may mention (i) uncertainty in political situation, (ii) discomfort in social life (iii) lack of knowledge of natural processes and of the means whereby they can be adapted to human ends

Various objections have been brought against the claim of philosophy to stand as a science. It is said in the first place that philosophy in its very nature is an impossibility because (i) the Philosopher's problems admit of no solution for they are meaningless problems, (ii) all intelligible questions are answered by one or other of the other sciences and (iii) though the problems are real we have no power to answer them. We can meet these objections with the following assertions (i) The problems that are concerned with the Universe and our relation to it cannot evidently be 'meaningless' problems (ii) though the special sciences deal with all intelligible questions philosophy deals with them in a different way; (iii) we cannot a priori give out that we have no power to answer the problems. In the second place it is objected that Metaphysics even if it were a science would be a useless or superfluous science. This is also not true. For Philosophy is necessary to co-ordinate the results of the different sciences and therefore cannot be superfluous. Lastly it is contended against philosophy that at any rate that science is essentially unprogressive. This charge, too, is blind. For the history of philosophy shows that there has been immense advance in the sciences and discoveries made by other sciences are every time changing the philosophical constructions

It is now seen that Philosophy is the science of the first principles and is concerned with the whole of experience with a view to find out its ultimate reality. It is not, however, to be supposed that the word Philosophy has had this meaning ever since man began to philosophise and knew that he had begun to philosophise. The history of the meaning of the words philosophy and philosopher is very interesting and a look at it is likely to profit us in appreciating their present significance.

It is said that Pythagoras was the first to use the word 'Philosophy' to denote a science. But in all probability Herodotus was the first to use the verb "Philosophise" by which he meant 'to love wisdom,' evidently for its own sake. The word 'Philosopher' for a long time meant "the possessor of wisdom" and it was undoubtedly in this sense that the seven wise men—Thales and others were called by the Greeks 'Philosophers'. With Socrates, the meaning again changes. Socrates called himself a Philosopher in the sense of a seeker after wisdom and not in the more ambitious sense of a possessor of wisdom. The idea of philosophy undergoes yet another change at the hands of the Stoics and Epicureans. To them philosophy was an activity that brought about practical results and was helpful in the conduct of life. Thus Cicero, the Roman orator exclaims "Philosophy thou director of our life, thou friend of virtue and enemy of vice, what were we, what were the life of man at all, but for thee? The study of the world as a pursuit for the pleasure of it was not to come in for centuries together. In the meanwhile the physical sciences were making rapid progress with their discoveries and man was struggling to make his life happy. But the necessity for a co-

ordinating science was not without being felt and hence we have the brilliant philosophic constructions of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and others. Even at the present day a 'Philosopher' is not a being much admired. He is looked upon in the general opinion as a man with no feeling for the concerns of the worldly life, a man not caring at all for the ups and downs of his own bodily comforts but a man whose only concern was with the infinite the vague, the worthless. But this is not a true description. The philosopher is what these people describe him but it is not for the reasons they ascribe. The Philosopher is surely indifferent to the world but he is so because he is concerned with the investigation of ultimate reality, underlying the passing show of daily existence. He looks at things from the point of view of the whole and hence does not seem interested in any one part. But it is he who has grasped the meaning of Reality. But even now a philosopher need not be a man of this description. We have learned to draw a distinction between the theoretical side and the practical side of a man's attitude. A highly gifted man does not cease to be a philosopher-if he only gives out a well-thought out system of the Universe and does not deviate an inch from his usual conduct of life before such a construction. It is in this sense that the word 'Philosophy' is now understood. Mr. Balfour is in this sense a Philosopher though his activities are also directed in the Political field. Mr. Bradley is a Philosopher though he may be drawing large salaries out of his office as Professor. These men need not retire from the activity of the work a day world in order to be then only called 'Philosophers'. Philosophy thus means at the present day 'a discussion of the

fundamental principles underlying our experience." Now it must be noted that the word "Philosophy" is also often applied to a discussion of the principles of any particular part of our experience. Hence we meet with such terms as "Moral Philosophy," "Political Philosophy," "Mental Philosophy," "Natural Philosophy," "Philosophy of History." This use, however, soon degenerates and the word comes to be applied even to very narrow and insignificant spheres of the total conduct of life. For example, we may meet with such phrases as 'Philosophy of Hair-dressing,' 'The Philosophy of kissing.' This is no doubt a loose way of saying things and in such cases the word philosophy does not seem to stand for anything more than the theory or more strictly 'a general discussion about' something. We, therefore, restrict the use of the word to a discussion of the fundamental principles of only the very comprehensive spheres of experience. Thus natural philosophy would be physics mental philosophy, Psychology, and the political philosophy, politics. Philosophy as such would try to investigate the fundamental conceptions underlying our experience as a whole. H. Sidgwick has given the following as a final definition of Philosophy. It is "The study in which the principles, methods, and main conclusions of the special sciences and other departments of systematic thought are compared and considered together, with a view of reducing them as far as possible, to a higher Unity of System." But the question arises whether in this sense Philosophy and Metaphysics are identical.

We have so far used the terms 'Philosophy' and 'Metaphysics' interchangeably. But it must be made clear whether their connotation is exactly the same.

The word 'Metaphysics' has an accidental origin. The Editors of Aristotle in arranging his works put his discussions of first principles after his treatment of physics (which Aristotle called second philosophy). Thus they were called Metaphysics (i.e. beyond Physics). The word has however, now come to mean the discussion of the most fundamental conceptions underlying our experience.

It would seem that the special problems of Metaphysics are those relating to the general nature of knowledge and the theory of reality. In a more restricted sense the word "Metaphysics is applied exclusively to the latter viz the theory of reality and a separate science called epistemology undertakes the problem of knowledge". It is thus quite evident that many of the problems of metaphysics can be discussed without any definite theory of man's place in the Universe as a whole which we term "Philosophy" in one sense. Philosophy in this sense may be held to form the last part of metaphysics. But it is better to take the word Philosophy in a wider though necessarily looser sense as including all these. In this wider sense "Philosophy" comprises epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy in its narrower sense. The field of Philosophy will be made more definite still by its relations to the other (that is the special) departments of knowledge being determined. We shall, therefore, turn to discuss the relations of Philosophy to sciences, natural and normative.

Relation of Philosophy to other Sciences.

(N.B. Vide Appendix B at the end of the Book.)

The fine distinction between Philosophy and Metaphysics has been already indicated. It must be now seen in

what way philosophical enquiries proper are related to Religion and poetry and also to other sciences natural and normative

The distinction between philosophy and religion or poetry is not very difficult to grasp. Though both religion and poetry give out fundamental truths, the way in which they do so is essentially different from the way of Philosophy. Religion is not reasoning, it is more or less an intuition. The personal element is more prominent in religion than in Philosophy. Religion is essentially an attitude of faith in a highest principle (it may be called God or no) that is the guide of the Universe and an attitude of reverence towards this guide. Though great founders of religions in the world have given out utterances that are more or less alike to each other still it must be noted that every one has a peculiar attitude of his own. Again there are such things as revelation in religion, there can be no revelation in philosophy. Philosophy travels by slow stages and does never take sudden flights. However, it must be confessed that what Philosophy has been able to achieve after strenuous labour, some of the religions have been able to do at a stroke of intuition. The truths of both are the same. The way of arriving at them differ. Religion may very properly be called the result of philosophy—result in the sense, not of something coming afterwards (for many times religion comes first and Philosophy comes next) but in the sense that it is an attitude of mind towards the highest reality which can be only justified by Philosophical explanation of it as distinguished from the process of arriving at that attitude. Thus religion and philosophy are near allied. The same must be said of

the relation of philosophy to poetry Though poets give expression to the meaning of this world their method essentially differs from the philosophers methods They see things by a flash of intuition not by a slow logical growth of understanding with the result that poets are more likely to err than Philosophers The Philosopher studies in a scientific way, the poet feels his way But the point common to both poets and philosophers is that both are idealistic The philosopher establishes an order into which he is led to believe by the evidence of experience the poet does the same by his inspiration Religion and poetry are thus attitudes of mind rather than a scientific study of facts of experience, they are not, therefore, sciences Let us try to see the interrelation of Philosophy to sciences as such

Sciences or studies of experience with a particular point of view are broadly divided into two classes (i) the natural sciences and (ii) normative sciences We have elsewhere (vide Appendix B at the end of the Book) discussed the various classifications of science or knowledge and have adopted one that seems to be the most satisfactory From it the relation of Philosophy to the "Sciences" will be readily grasped. The natural sciences are descriptive, the normative sciences are explanative of particular aspects of experience and the philosophical sciences (if we mean by them the inquiries viz Epistemology, Metaphysics and philosophy in its narrower sense) are investigations into the highest conceptions and implications of Knowing, Being and Living We have seen how these three investigations are inter-linked It remains to see how they are together related to the natural and normative sciences The natural sciences may be

enumerated as (i) Astronomy, (ii) Geology, (iii) Physics, (iv) Chemistry, (v) Biology, (vi) Physiology, and (vii) Psychology and the normative sciences as (1) Logic (2) Ethics (3) Aesthetics (4) Mathematics; whereas Politics and Economics would belong to border land. As we have defined Philosophy as the science of fundamental principles it will be evident that the normative sciences which discuss principles will be nearer to philosophy than the natural sciences. More particularly it is now a usual custom to call Logic, Ethics Aesthetics and Psychology as Philosophical. Psychology is classed with Logic, Ethics etc. because it raises issue of a far reaching kind and it has a distinct bearing on the nature and conduct of human life.

It is needless to go over the relations of all these sciences to Philosophy. For as we have seen some of them are very distant relatives. Hence we shall confine our attention to the inter-relations with Philosophy of Physics, Biology and Psychology from amongst the natural sciences and Logic, Ethics and Mathematics from the normative ones.

Relations to Physics—Physics may be defined as the science that deals with matter in all its forms and discovers law by which material things are formed from these, the atoms. Thus the special field of Physics is quite limited. It does not deal with the spiritual side of man's existence, nor with ethical or religious aspirations of man-kind. However, it is helpful to Philosophy because Philosophy must discuss the higher conceptions of unity or plurality i.e. whether all material forming the Universe is one or many. Philosophy will also discuss the reality of matter and energy whose existence is presupposed

by Physics The laws of physics will influence the philosophical interpretation of the Universe Thus Physics deals with one important subject of Philosophy though it does so in its own limited way Probably the most generally accepted formula of distinction is that the propositions of Physics are always such as are somehow capable of empirical verification or reduction to sensible experience, that is, such as admit or might admit of being proved or disproved, directly or indirectly by some particular sense-perceptions, some apparently immediate knowledge of the external world, obtained by exercising one or more of the organs of sense, while propositions about matters that do not admit of this are metaphysical

Relation to Biology Biology is the science that deals with a still higher aspect of reality if we choose to call that higher, which is concerned with human life than what is concerned only with "dull dead matter" But even then it does not study life from the side of end or goal but only from the side of the beginning We see the difference here between the two sciences Philosophy tries to interpret life in the light of the highest, in the light of not only what is or what has been but what it is going to be Thus Biology, though it studies life-processes, studies them more or less on the basis of the Physical and chemical laws The teleological cause is not yet present to it It takes the existence of life and the struggle for existence of life for granted but it cannot appreciate the dignity of human life which comes to it by its possession of the higher forms of consciousness It studies, we may say, the lower life of animals the processes of production of the species etc as distinguished from the higher forms of life which are expressed in man on account of

his high ideals. Man, to the Philosopher is not only a biological animal. Thus philosophy studies life from the side of its ultimate goal the perfection it is, in its higher forms, attempting to achieve and not like Biology from the side of its rude beginnings. Yet a biological study of life is sure to shed much light on its future possibilities. Thus the two sciences though dealing with the same subject matter are not quite the same and yet both of them are justified in their different attempts.

Relations to Psychology - In Psychology we are decidedly concerned with the highest form of life viz the human life but even here we are not concerned with the whole of human life but with the inner aspect of it or with the processes of consciousness going on within human beings. The origin and content of the conscious life is the subject matter of psychology. Evidently, therefore, psychology deals with a very important aspect of existence but then it does not consider the relations of this aspect of existence to other forms or types of existence. It has a closed field of operation. Thus the question of the relation of mind and body is not strictly speaking a psychological problem but a metaphysical one. For we have to see what relation would be in agreement with the general structure of reality and only with the particular structure of the human mind. Psychology is primarily concerned with knowledge and its attainment as processes of thought belonging to particular human minds, but Philosophy is primarily concerned with the relations of true or valid belief as they may be conceived to exist for an ideal mind independent, not only of the errors but of the particularities of growth and development of particular finite minds. Again the method of Psychological

study is different from that of the metaphysical. Psychology practises the genetic method alone whereas, as we have seen, the metaphysical method comprises more. Empirical Psychology is mainly concerned with the variable and particular elements of consciousness, whereas Metaphysics aims at determining the necessary or universal characteristics or conditions of mind and Cognition. So again Psychology traces the actual growth of the higher human sentiments but does not discuss how far they are encouraged or hindered by the processes of nature. Thus Psychology has an explanation from the side of the end or goal or ideal. Thus though Philosophy discusses the highest conceptions, the separate science of psychology has its existence justified for the purpose of dealing with minor matters, as for example, the analysis of the emotions, the different stages of mental development, the growth of the apprehension of space and time and others. Thus the two sciences though very closely related in the most important phase of reality are not identical because the latter of them has a wider subject matter and takes a more comprehensive survey.

Relations to Ethics — Ethics is a normative science as it deals with norms or standards of moral value, and having thus a teleological view of human conduct is more nearly allied to philosophy than any of the natural sciences. That in Ethics we are concerned with more real (if we can use that phrase) and higher aspects of reality was recognised more by Spinoza, who calls his philosophical treatise "Ethica" than by any one else. And yet Ethics and Philosophy are not one and the same. Though the science of ethics deals with the consideration

whether nature is conducive to the development of moral life, there are certain considerations which it believes in only because they are necessary for an ultimate interpretation of life. Thus the existence of God, Immortality of the Soul, and Freedom of the Will are unquestioned facts to the moral philosopher though not to the metaphysical philosopher who would require them to be established or at least not contravened by other grounds than the purely moral. Thus Philosophy is a more inquisitive science than Ethics though it would leave the discussion of moral standards, of the significance of moral authority and such others for a treatment by the special science of Ethics. Philosophy discusses only the presuppositions of Ethics.

Relations to Aesthetics. Aesthetics is more decidedly a science concerned with a part of the Universe not the whole. It considers the norms or standards of beauty and discusses whether the Aesthetic standards are purely anthropomorphic. But the science of Aesthetics can only say whether any parts juxtaposed in a certain way tend to have beauty and if so why. The ultimate questions—whether the universe as a whole is beautiful or not and how far beauty is a part of its reality—are questions for the Philosopher. What is clearly applicable to the parts may not be predicated of the whole of which these are the parts. Aesthetics, therefore, leaves that problem to the metaphysician. The Philosopher has to coordinate the three ultimate aspects of reality—the Good, the Beautiful, the True. Aesthetics concerns itself with only one of them and with that, too, not in its ultimate nature but in the more easily apprehensible manifestations.

Relations to Mathematics — The science of Mathematics has the peculiar virtue of being exact but this is due to the definite subject matter. Though it too like Metaphysics is an abstract science there is distinction between the abstractions of the two sciences. The Universals of mathematics are purely abstract, those of Philosophy are concrete Universals. The content of mathematical universals is threadbare while that of the philosophical universals is a solid one. Mathematics deals with conceptions that are the product of the intellect, Philosophy deals with conceptions that arise out of perceptions. Thus mathematics is not concerned with the standards of the true. Again Mathematics takes many forms of existence for granted whereas Philosophy discusses their claims to reality. Thus Mathematics presupposes space Philosophy discusses its reality. Mathematics has nothing to do with the relation of man to the Universe. Philosophy tries to know that relation. Thus the two sciences though in certain ways similar have divergent ends.

Relations to Logic — It is very difficult to define the scope of logic and therefore to define the exact relations between logic and philosophy. For the work of logic has been very differently conceived by different logicians. The logic of Bosanquet is not distinguishable from metaphysics though the logic of Aristotle or Mill are in their own ways. For example, Mill says in one place, 'The grand question of what is called Metaphysics is what are the propositions which may reasonably be received without proof.' Perhaps it would be best not to go in for Bosanquet's conception of logic as concerning itself with the conditions, not merely the intellectual but the objective too, of inference but to accept the view that its task

is with the intellectual conditions of the inferrible and leave the discussion of the objective conditions to metaphysics, though it may very well turn out that the intellectual conditions are dependent on the nature of reality - which supplies the objective conditions. True Logic would be a study preliminary to Metaphysics. Indeed the distinction between reality and appearance can hardly be studied separately from the distinction between truth and error since truth, so far as it relates to what is, has been, or will be, is the representation of reality in thought expressible in words. Thus the two sciences have different fields very close together. Logic is concerned with validity. Philosophy with ultimate validity or truth.

From these discussions the nature and scope Philosophy will be thoroughly understood. We, therefore, turn to the first important field of investigation viz Epistemology or the science of human knowledge. We can make no headway unless we know the potency and capabilities of our weapon - the knowing faculty - or ability to grasp the meaning and implications of reality.

Epistemology.

'What is the criterion of truth?' is the question that will be readily asked. Various answers may be given to this. One may answer that

- (1) Criterion what 'corresponds' to an object is
of truth truth. Another may answer, "what
 gives satisfaction is the truth." A

third one may reply—"that alone is true which is self-consistent." A fourth may question the possibility of knowledge itself and hence there will be no criterion, there being no knowledge. Now these various attitudes give rise to the different theories of knowledge. Whatever else can be said of the criterion as truth, it must at the outset be pointed out that evidently where we are concerned with the knowledge of the whole, the criterion of knowledge cannot have an external one, for nothing can be external to the totality of experience. Thus the criterion is necessarily an internal one. What can an internal criterion mean? It can only mean that our knowledge must justify its existence by its explanatory power. Our knowledge is real, i.e. we know the truth if everything that falls in the Universe is explained by it. Thus self-consistency and comprehensiveness appear to be the criterion of knowledge. For there can be no satisfactory explanation unless there is an internal coherence in it. But the questions arise—"Can I pin out reality out of my self-consistent consciousness? How can I test its comprehensiveness?" Then it would appear that there is a quality of the knowing subject and the known object the correspondence between which is true knowledge. Wa

have above answered such an objection. In the first place the known object is not something outside the totality of things and hence there can be only an internal ultimate standard. Thus the objection would be reduced to saying—"Is the internal coherence one of mind or of the whole? The mind by itself cannot make reality." It must here be stated that the correspondence theory rests upon an avowed dualism. But how can there be such an absolute dualism? In one sense nothing exists outside of consciousness. For in order that something should exist it must be in some way or other connected with consciousness and this is tantamount to saying that there is no absolute Dualism. The standard of satisfaction too it will be seen is not the correct one. Of course the correctness or otherwise, as we said can only be determined by its power of explanation of the totality of things. But it may be asked by a fanatic, "why do you make the power of explanation the criterion of truth? What is your criterion for deciding the criterion of truth? If you have any, what criterion is there again for this your criterion of deciding the epistemological criterion? We call such an objector a fanatic because evidently he would begin nowhere. His questioning would carry us only into a regressus ad infinitum. Yet there is an important truth lying at the back of such a foolery. And it is that if we are not going to be utter sceptics (indeed we shall see that it is impossible to be an utter sceptic) we must ultimately believe in the 'belief of reason in its own power'. For if we say that something is true because, it is reasonable, we shall at once be met with the question "What tells you that it, and not anything else, is reasonable?" We

cannot answer "Reason tells us", for that is no explanation of reason itself. We have therefore to say in the last resort that 'something is reasonable because we believe it, there is no further explanation'.

This believing attitude therefore, is the most certain fact about knowledge and the value of Descartes' method of doubt lies only in this constructive side. Descartes said that he could doubt everything else but he could not doubt that he doubted. We may say it is as well possible that we do not doubt some more things, that we believe them. For to meet Descartes on his own ground if he takes objection to what we say we may point out to him the logical absurdity that if it is possible to cast doubt on any thing, doubt may very well be cast on 'that I doubt' and next on 'I doubt that I doubt and so on. So even the judgment he thought we could not doubt could be doubted. Thus doubt has its value only as a form of belief. The ultimate fact is belief. Without it, it is impossible to proceed. The believing attitude of course may have different stages such as belief, disbelief and doubt. 'What then are the implications of belief? is the most natural next question. Before answering that, however, it will be well if we turn our attention a little to consider how knowledge grows.

About the mode in which knowledge originates there has again been a good deal of controversy. While one school maintains knowledge to be simply empirical and calls the original mind a *Tahula Rasa*, another school maintains that knowledge has nothing to do with experience as such, that it deserves the name of knowledge only when experience has been transformed by reason and a third school maintains that knowledge begins with experience, though it does not originate with it.

in short, it is a combination of a priori and a posteriori elements. The three schools here referred to go by the names of empiricism, rationalism and criticism, respectively. Before dealing with these as Theories of knowledge, we shall speak of the way in which all are agreed in saying knowledge grows though the terminology adopted by them may differ one from another. Thus it is said knowledge begins with sensations. Then come perceptions and then conceptions. It is doubtful whether there is any such experience as one of pure sensation though an approximation to such a state is possible in the confused mass present to the crude consciousness. But the three aspects of consciousness are present in a sensation in a rudimentary form. The sensation comes with a certain feeling-tone and also tends to be reacted upon. Thus there is also some rudimentary unity of consciousness. Sensations are the ultimate data of all knowledge though they will have to be supplemented by perceptions and conceptions. Sensations and conceptions are, in the Kantian language, the warp and the woof of human knowledge.

Perception involves the bringing together of various facts of sensation and the combination of them in definite objects. This implies a certain reaction of consciousness upon the simple material at first presented. The formed object is regarded as the datum, and elements of feelings and activity as its accompaniments. The feelings thus accompanying the presentation of objects are much more complex than those that go with pure sensation. Action also at this stage is much highly developed and begins to be of the nature of adjustment to ends though the actual idea of an end may not be present. The entithesis between

self and not self is also implicitly present. Here there is no blind instinct but learning by experience. The later growths are also implicitly present. For example the ideas of substance and individuality (afterwards present) have their germ in the apprehension of things which is present at the level of preception, the idea of causal sequence is foreshadowed in the apprehension of change, the idea of end and means has its fore runner in the purposiveness in action, and even space and time are apprehended in a crude manner.

But the highest stage is reached in conception. This is the culminating point in the general process of experience. At the level of conception there is not only the presentation of objects but the apprehension of these objects as related to one another in various ways. The content of consciousness becomes a system of relations and in connection with these more developed forms of feeling (sentiments etc) and activity (for example, Voluntary action) grow up. The recognition of the self as a unity is explicitly present. Thus Kant was right in arguing against Descartes that self consciousness came not first but last. With the growth of conception large and ideal constructions of Time and Space, of Ethics and Religion, of Metaphysics are attempted—constructions that often seem to point out to ends of which no possible actualisation is discoverable. The constructions are to be regarded valid in proportion to their utility and explanatory power. All these three stages are continuous. Sensation is connected with perception by what are called the " psychical dispositions " and perception and conception are connected by ' Imagery '. Out of all these three stages it is no doubt the latest and most developed stage

that is metaphysically important. It is only at that stage that the real and the merely apparent come to be distinguished though the two other modes also bring their own quota to the apprehension of reality.

Belief is, as we saw, the most fundamental mode of consciousness at the back of conceptual knowledge. We shall, therefore, pursue the study of belief further in order to understand what it chiefly depends upon.

(2). Conditions and Implications of Belief.

Belief is nothing else than the acceptance of a judgment as true, disbelief is the rejection of any judgment as true, and doubt is neither acceptance nor rejection but merely a state of suspense. Thus belief, disbelief, and doubt are our attitudes towards judgments. But what are judgments? Judgment is a thought conveying a certain meaning. Thus belief is the acceptance of a judgment; i.e. looking upon some meaning as true. The meaning is an objective fact and thus it can be taken as true, false or neither. In order to deny anything we must certainly know what that thing means. Thus meanings are facts with an objective content and may either be accepted, rejected or neither accepted nor rejected. But meanings are not isolated facts. They imply one another and thus bring upon the believer of one meaning the intellectual necessity of believing what is implied in that meaning. Thus one belief leads on to another and the whole forms a closely woven texture. There are also other grounds on which beliefs are entertained and they also have a close bearing upon human action. The two main factors that contribute to the production of beliefs

are the anjective and the objective factors. We accept a judgment when we think it fits in well with some plan or scheme that we have before us. We disbelieve what refuses to fit in and we remain doubtful when we have no fully formed plan or when it is not apparent whether the object with which we are dealing does or does not fit in with it. The ordinary language speaks as if we believe in things. But strictly speaking it will be found that we do not 'believe in things' (for this phrase has no intelligible meaning at all) but believe in the existence of things. We accept the judgment that that thing exists as true. The grounds for such acceptance or rejection of the meaning expressed in a judgment seem to be the following — (1) We may believe something because it appears to be self evident. (2) We may believe something because we have been taught to believe it. (3) we may believe something because it is a valid inference from something else that we believe. (4) lastly we may believe something because it appears to be a necessary assumption for the establishment or explanation of other beliefs. We shall discuss these grounds some what more fully.

In the first place we believe certain things because they appear to be self evident. They are called axioms. Such for instance are the judgments — (1) A whole is greater than its part. (2) Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. It must however, be recognised that beyond certain limits such axioms cannot be applied. Thus it would be wrong to suppose that a chain is necessarily stronger than its strongest link though the latter is a part of the former. The word greater can only be taken in the sense of extensity. So

also the second axiom cannot be carried beyond proper limits. Thus because a certain number of men is equal to carry a load to carry which an ass also is equal, it would be foolish to say that these men are equal to an ass. The equality holds only in one particular item. However, within proper limits the axioms do not require a further explanation.

Secondly, we may believe some things because we are taught to believe those things. This shows the influence of tradition and authority in moulding our beliefs. There are hardly any beliefs which are not shared by more than one man and are held for no other reason than that all share them. Indeed, but for such beliefs human knowledge would not have made rapid progress nay would not have made any progress at all. It is not possible for one man alone to investigate and see every thing for himself. His short span of life would all be spent away in attesting things which his predecessors transmit to him and no time would be left to him for further discoveries. We can safely rely on the truths left to us by our predecessors and it is by standing upon their shoulders that we can penetrate deeper into the at present 'unknown'. Scientific discoveries are made in this way. We know as children what Newton had to spend his whole life to know. But we know it because we believe the tradition, the opinion of foregone people. Again it is neither possible nor desirable that one man know everything about everything. The knowing process is a social process. In it we are helped by our brethren. But for such mutual help life would be intolerable. Again we entertain certain beliefs only because we know that they are held by certain persons whose sagacity and calibre are

a sufficient guarantee for the correctness of their beliefs. Thousands of people believe what the great Seers believe and it is good that they should do so. For different people are endowed with different powers of understanding and what one being can understand with ease, another may not be made to understand even with the greatest labour. Then it is in the interest of the ignorant and also in the interest of truth that they should believe what the wise believe. Of course even then the question as to who is to be called wise will derive its final sanction from universal consensus of opinion. History provides ample examples of such beliefs. Especially many of the religious beliefs entertained by masses have no other ground than that they have been ordained by the Holy Scriptures which are the mouthwords of great prophets. Many times beliefs are held whose grounds though once quite explicitly recognised by ourselves are no longer kept in our memory. Here the beliefs rest on our own authority. It should not, however, be supposed from this discussion that the choice of beliefs for the individual is wholly submerged in the general choice. For there can be no coercion in the entertaining of beliefs. One cannot be made to entertain a belief unless his own will gives the sanction. Indeed beliefs have been held by individuals (and will be held in future) not only independently of the general beliefs but sometimes in open contradiction to them.

Thus in the third place, beliefs are held simply because we choose to hold them. A man may believe that he will succeed in a particular enterprise that he has undertaken, because he very much wishes to succeed though the circumstances lead others to be-

have otherwise. In the language of William James such a man 'wills to believe'. The ground here is mostly subjective though sometimes objective grounds may be mixed up with it. The entertaining of beliefs of such sort depends mainly on the individual temperament. A Napoleon will believe a thing where another and a lesser man may considerably hesitate. Such beliefs many times lead to brave deeds and are thus justified in their existence. They by their own inherent power change the face of the reality. Often, however they result in self-deception. Such for instance is the belief of a drowning man in the potency of a blade of grass to help him to come ashore. Such a man refuses to think of the objective circumstances which would at a glance show him the absurdity of his belief. Our choice to believe is not, however, always confined to such critical circumstances. In ordinary life, our choice, on which depends a particular belief, depends, in its turn, on attention, which is the simplest form of selection. Generally we believe things that we like, and we like things that are pleasant. Thus one man's belief as to the beauty of a certain thing may not tally with another's. Thus belief depends upon choice, choice depends upon interest. We do not choose what does not interest us. But again interest depends upon our scheme of valuations. What we value more we are more interested in. Our valuations, again, are not purely subjective. Truth is one of the things we come to value and truth is certainly objective. It would, therefore, seem that a fully formed belief rests on a deliberate choice, based on the recognition of some sufficient ground, (though beliefs may be held otherwise)

4 Fourthly we may believe something because it is a valid inference from something else that we believe. This forms the most important class of our judgments. We must be said to believe in all judgments that logically follow from the one which we explicitly believe. What are then the laws that guide such inference and to how many sorts of judgments do they give rise? There are at least four sorts of classifications of judgments. (1) Analytical and Synthetical (2) Disjunctive Hypothetical and Categorical (3) Problematical Assertorial and Apodeictic (4) Positive and Negative. Let us see if these distinctions are final even though they may be very useful for logical purposes. The distinction between Analytical and Synthetical judgments is not final. Kant first emphasised this distinction. He pointed out that a judgment of the first type only analyses the notion contained in the subject makes it explicit only. Thus such a judgment does not indicate any advance in knowledge, but a judgment of the latter type connects 'two distinct meanings and thus advances knowledge. As example of the two types he gave the judgments, Bodies have extension and bodies have weight. But the distinction is not final as it merely depends upon the power of knowledge. What to one man is an analytical judgment may be to another a synthetical judgment. For example though extension is implied in a body every one who thinks of a body does not at once realise it. Again with more knowledge 'weight' would come to be looked upon as the essence of a body and thus the judgment body has weight becomes an analytical one. Even the analytical judgments are very valuable because they explicitly bring together two conceptions and thus become synthetical judgments. It

be immortal", "All men *are* imperfect", "God *must* delight in virtue" These distinctions lead to the problem of modality The modality of judgments has been interpreted in three ways The first interpretation distinguishes the degrees of certainty or uncertainty with which we believe the categorical judgments at which these judgments aim This would resolve the above judgments into, "I have some doubt about the immortality of the soul," "I believe that all men are imperfect," "I am fully assured that God *delights* in virtue". Thus on this interpretation judgments imply some state of belief The second, which may be termed the realistic interpretation, throws the modality on reality Thus the three propositions mean according to this view, "The soul is of such a nature as to have the possibility of immortality (though the actuality is not yet known)", "All men are actually imperfect" "God is a being whose nature necessarily implies delight in virtue". Thus this view would look upon reality as having the predicate of possibility, actuality and necessity But evidently this cannot but refer to an objective order which may possess a system of alternatives Thus for a chess player various moves might be possible in a given situation But the nature of the game would decide the possibilities as well as the actualities and necessities The judgments on this view call for a further interpretation which would call attention to the conditions which would turn the possibilities into actuality The third interpretation is the most definitely logical It turns on the suggestion of an implied ground If the ground or condition is in existence, then the result would follow Here, too, however, whether the ground is present or not depends upon the

general structure of reality. Thus if the general structure of reality would make us believe that the soul is a substance, then it is immortal, if it proves the finiteness of man it proves his imperfectness, if it declares the goodness of God, it establishes the proposition that He delights in virtue. Thus the distinction of problematic, assertorial and apodeictic judgments depends upon the structure of reality

The distinction of 'positive' and 'negative' judgments, too, is meaningless unless there is an objective order to which they refer. Thus every positive judgment refers to some objective order and thus gives rise to one or many negative judgments. So also a negative judgment has no value except for the fact that it implies some positive judgment. For example, the objective order of colours gives value to such judgments as, "This leaf is blue", "this leaf is not brown". These judgments can be inferred one from another on account of the objective order to which they refer. The objective order may be a different one for different classes of judgments but these various orders again must form a definite system of reality. Thus in the last resort, all inference depends upon the system of objective reality. For if the characteristics such as the twinkling of stars, from which we infer so many others, were not more or less persistent facts and if there were not many such persistent facts in the world that we apprehend, the whole system of implications would collapse, and there would be no such thing as thought. But thought we can never abandon. We can only see what is implied in it. Thought is guided by certain laws which are called "Laws of Thought". It remains for us to see in what sense they are laws of thought.

(3). The Laws of Thought.

There have been three interpretations of the laws of thought. According to the first interpretation they are psychological laws : i.e. laws of the subjective processes of our thought. Evidently this is not a correct interpretation. For it is true psychologically that our thoughts are not always consistent. Even great minds fall into contradiction. It may be objected that thought that is contradictory is no thought at all. But this simply begs the question. Thus it would seem that the laws of Thought are objective rather than subjective in their character. According to the second interpretation they are to be thought of as 'Laws of Reality'. It is said that nothing that is real is self contradictory. Therefore the laws of consistency are the laws of reality. But this view takes it for granted that reality is self consistent. Certainly we cannot affirm such self-consistency at the outset though it may turn out to be a fact about reality. Again that depends upon the view that we take of Reality. If Reality is to be understood in the sense of simple existence it has been definitely affirmed by some that existences are self contradictory. Even in the sense of actuality as opposed to appearance it does not seem that the actual is always rational. At any rate the coherence and self consistency cannot at once be made clear and there are sceptics who doubt the ultimate self consistency of Reality. Such a view may be wrong but it is not absurd and hence we are not entitled to call these laws, laws of *Reality* at the outset. The tension of opposites is a fundamental aspect of our universe. Fundamental laws of Thought must not, therefore be based on the nature of reality. The third interpretation is that they are ideals or regulative principles. They are neither psychologically neces-

sary nor conditions of reality but they are principles which must be observed if thought is to remain self-consistent. They are like the rules of a game. Those who want to play the game will do well to observe them. The laws of thought are the rules of the game of thought. But the game of thought is played by all. If, therefore, thought which is indispensable is to be carried on, these rules must be observed, otherwise there will be no consistency and therefore no progress in thought.

The four laws of thought may be stated as under — (1) The law of Identity, (2) the law of Contradiction which should better be called the law of *Non-contradiction* (3) the law of Excluded Middle, (4) the law of Sufficient Reason. They seem to be applicable to conception, judgment, inference and belief respectively. The law of Identity is by many applied to a judgment. It is said that a judgment must be of the type, 'A is A'. Evidently this is meaningless. For the two terms of a judgment are not identical. What the judgment does is to bring two concepts into a unity. Another interpretation says that the law of Identity means 'once true, always true'. But this again has reference to time and also points to certain theories of Reality. Thence we cannot adopt it. It seems best to say that the law of Identity holds good in the case of concepts. It means there that a concept must have an identical and definite meaning throughout one Universe of discourse. It is not denied by this law that a concept may have its meaning changed or that the same meaning may be expressed by more than one concept. What it means is that one concept must be permanent in its meaning and definite in its meaning for one universe of discourse. The identity is identity in difference. Now it

it can be made clear here how the law does not refer to Reality. It may be better to have no concepts at all but the law states that if we have a concept at all it must have a definite meaning. The laws of Thought applicable to judgment and inference are the law of Non contradiction and the law of Excluded Middle. The first states that out of two contrary judgments both cannot be true, the latter states that out of two contradictory judgments one must be true, and the other false there is no middle. The two laws may be illustrated thus. We may say of a leaf which is green that 'it is blue' or 'it is red'. Now the statements 'the leaf is blue' and 'the leaf is red' may both be false though both cannot be true. For evidently if the leaf is blue, it is not red. But if the exclusion is made more definite and we say of the green leaf 'it is blue,' 'it is not blue,' the statements cannot both be false, or both be true. One must be true and the other false. True if the statement 'it is blue' is true the other statement is false. Here according to our hypothesis the statement 'it is blue' is false, therefore, the statement 'it is not blue' is true, for 'green' would fall under 'not blue'. Thus the law of excluded middle only makes the contradiction more definite. It must be said about these laws that they have significance when the judgments made refer to some particular order such as that of colour or space or time. It would be meaningless to say that out of the two judgments, 'a box is an inference,' 'a box is not inference' one must be true and the other false for the judgment which is true, viz 'a box is not inference' has manifestly no meaning as there is no definite content for the term not-inference. Thus there must be a definite order under which judgments should be put. Then only the positive content

of the negative judgment will be appreciable. Thus the judgment, 'This leaf is not blue' would lead us to infer that the leaf has one or another of the other colours. Thus inference presupposes some objective order. Lastly, the law of Sufficient Reason is applicable to belief. We have seen that we are entitled to believe on grounds which appear sufficient to warrant the belief. There are intuitive beliefs and beliefs acquired through social intercourse.

5 Lastly, we may believe something because it appears to be a necessary assumption for the establishment or explanation of other beliefs. These beliefs are called Postulates or Working Hypotheses. Such is, for instance, the postulate of the conservation of energy in physical sciences and such are again the Postulates of Freedom, Immortality and God assumed by Kant. These are necessary if a satisfactory explanation is to be given of the physical formation of objects and of the moral life respectively. The human mind has an everlasting activity in the direction of co-ordination of observed facts and has thus to fall upon certain principles that will co-ordinate facts. Thus what fits in well with observed facts and what will explain those facts is itself considered a fact. The belief in Immortality is justified because nothing can explain the proportion of virtue to happiness which we intuitively believe to be kept up. Here our beliefs are closely related to objective orders and thus knowledge is that which will satisfactorily explain the whole.

Thus the whole growth of knowledge may be briefly described as arising out of intuitive elements, elements of

faith and the element of intellectual constructions going on in the individual with the help of other individuals, (forming a society) past and present. The knowledge thus arising cannot be said to be 'not valid' unless it breaks down in the explanation of reality. But if it can explain the whole, it is valid. We may be justified in casting doubt upon the validity of human knowledge but such doubt has its own limits. However, we cannot boast of the validity of human knowledge until we have explained the whole of experience. The validity and limits of human knowledge will be seen afterwards. It suffices here to say that knowledge is knowledge of reality. Thus the different theories of knowledge are or point to theories of reality. Knowledge and reality are inseparable. At every point we touch upon reality. Before dealing with the aspects of reality let us look to the various theories of knowledge which are connected with the various theories about reality. A discussion of these will inevitably lead us to a discussion of the true nature of reality.

(4) Theories of Knowledge.

We may include under this head the various theories about knowledge and of knowledge. It must be kept in mind, as already indicated, that each theory corresponds to a theory of reality. But as far as possible, the chief light will be thrown on the knowledge side. The theories in question may be put down thus,—(1) Scepticism, (2) Agnosticism, (3) Empiricism, (4) Rationalism, (5) Dogmatism, (6) Criticism, (7) Pragmatism, (8) Intuitionism, (9) Mysticism.

(1) *Scepticism* can hardly be called a theory of knowledge at all. For what it does is to deny the possi-

bility and validity of knowledge. Absolute scepticism affirms that it cannot affirm anything. It cannot even say with Socrates that it knows nothing; any claim to knowledge seems to it to be an unjustifiable presumption. The extreme form in which it appeared was that of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrho of Elis advocated the aim of man to be ataraxia or imperturbability to be realised by a total "suspension of judgment". Among the Sophists, Gorgias of Leontini (300 B.C.) gave out the rather paradoxical sayings, "Nothing exists", "If anything exists at all, it cannot be known," "If anything exists and can be known, it cannot be imparted". To the sceptics the best attitude is that of suspension of judgment. In such an attitude one cannot be disturbed by any doubt and hence enjoys the happy peacefulness of mind. But it is not in this extreme form that scepticism has always appeared. There are milder types of it which are less sweeping. Many arguments have been brought forward in the defence of scepticism, the most important of which are (i) relativism and (ii) subjectivism. Relativism declares that our knowledge is relative in two senses. It is relative inasmuch as it is dependant upon the particular circumstances under which we chance to acquire it and thus it is valid if at all, only for a particular place or time. Again it is asserted that our knowledge is relative as it presupposes a relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge and thus there can be no grasp of anything objective, any thing that exists independantly of all relation to ourselves. Of course, this is a far-fetched meaning of "relative". Subjectivism lays even greater emphasis on the part played by the knowing subject in the acquisition of knowledge. It points to the contradic-

toriness of all thought and the contradictoriness between the judgments of one man and of another and declares that knowledge cannot be universally valid but can be valid at most only to the particular individual. We find Hume (in modern times) calling himself and called by others a sceptic. But we must not forget that his scepticism extends only to the peculiar knowledge of reason and that he is by no means concerned to deny the right of the facts of life and of sensible experience to our acceptance.

It is quite plain that scepticism cannot stand. The sceptical stand point cannot be made consistent except by the complete renunciation of the right to judgment or assertion. But this no one has yet been able to do, nor is likely to do in future, nor is there any happiness to be derived even if such an attitude were possible. Scepticism again commits the very fault which it condemns. It is as dogmatic as anything else. When it asserts that nothing can be asserted, it is a dogmatic statement that it is making. Why, therefore, do the sceptics give reasons for their attitude? Reason implies thought and if there is no thought there is no need of reason. In other words scepticism, in its absolute form, is self-destructive. He who holds that nothing is demonstrable will not attempt to demonstrate that he can know nothing. But in spite of all the inconsistencies of the sceptical attitude, it has some practical advantages. Doubt is necessary in the interest of truth. If we were to accept everything that 'occurred' to us we shall surely miss valid knowledge. Hence what Hume called 'academic doubt' is a necessary concomitant of all honest zeal for knowledge. "It prompts to manifold variations of

conditions, to repeated consideration, to unceasing test and trial ”.

(2) *Agnosticism* is the denial or doubt of the possibility, not of any absolute knowledge, but of any knowledge of the absolute. Scepticism denies absolute knowledge (of anything); Agnosticism denies only the knowledge of the absolute. Absolute knowledge means belief that is known with complete certainty to be correct; and knowledge of the absolute means a correct belief with regard to the structure of the universe as a whole. It will thus be seen that though scepticism is unreasonable (for of some things such as $2+2=4$ we have absolute knowledge), agnosticism is a reasonable attitude, because the Absolute or Whole can only be known in parts and may perhaps be never known in its entirety. But though Absolute Reality may be 'unknown' we cannot agree with the agnostics when they say that it is "unknowable". We must have the optimism of thinking that bit by bit Absolute Reality is being known. The antithesis between 'the thing-in-itself' and its sensible qualities cannot be final. However limited and imperfect our knowledge may be, it is so far as it goes a knowledge of reality. Phenomena are not one set of facts and nonmena another. The phenomenon is the noumenon so far as it has manifested itself, so far as we have grasped it in knowledge. It is the noumena or real things *that* we know and phenomena are *what* we know about them. The 'ordinary agnostic supposes metaphysics to be engaged in the hopeless quest of this mythical nonmenon. The more modern form of agnosticism was developed by Comte on the one hand and by Hamilton and Spencer on the other "Thought", says Spencer, "can never express more than rela-

tions, so that from the very nature of our intelligence the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever inconceivable by us' The Absolute is the object of our worship "We shall refrain from assigning any attributes whatever to the object of our worship We shall recognise it as our highest wisdom and duty to regard that through which all things exist as the Unknowable" Spencer's phraseology often betrays the radical inconsistency of the purely agnostic position He describes the unknowable as "the power manifested to us through all existence" This power is an "Energy like our consciousness" "This unseen reality is the cause of the moral order The unknown cause is the producer of our highest beliefs" Thus Spencer's 'Unknown' manifests itself, it is an Energy, it acts and causes and still it is Unknown! Agnosticism is thus a perverse theory of knowledge

Perhaps the most logical form of agnosticism is that represented by Comte's Positivism According to it the attempts that men have made to understand the Universe that they apprehend, fall into three main stages—Religion, Metaphysics and Positive knowledge Comte recognises that there is an order of development in the universe that we apprehend, and the highest that we know is found in Humanity. Therefore Humanity, rather than an Unknowable Absolute, should be taken as the object of our worship and devotion It is a fundamental tenet of the positivist philosophy that our knowledge is only of phenomena and their laws Comte proceeds on the notion that phenomenon and nonmenon are two separable facts, and we can have knowledge of the Phenomena only He says that the metaphysician concerns himself with the quest of transcendent nonmena and the positivist with

the Phenomena and their laws. Comte thus misrepresents the task of metaphysics and also the relation of the noumena and phenomena. The same criticism applies to such positivism as that to agnosticism. Positivism none the less than agnosticism has a 'perverse theory of knowledge'. There is no breach between noumenon and phenomena which the positivists and agnostics take for granted. In England, Hamilton preached the theory of Nescience and Harrison of Positivism

(3) *Empiricism*—Empiricism derives all knowledge from experience and designates the mind or intellect prior to perception a *tabula rasa*. In its extreme form even the existence of any mind may be denied. If it makes the experience mediated by the sense organs primary and all determining it is called sensualism. Empiricism takes up a position based upon the consciousness of the individual. It shows with convincing clearness that the content of this consciousness is not ready-made but is slowly built up from separate impressions under the guidance of environment. In the end knowledge becomes a mere association of sensations and ideas devoid of any inner connection, no attempt whatever is made to throw any light on reality itself. Pure empiricism will hear nothing of a creative reason which is to colligate concepts or intuitions a priori and put the stamp of truth and adequacy upon knowledge.

Continental philosophy has been exclusively rationalistic, English Philosophy exclusively empirical. Empiricism began with Bacon and was supported by Hobbes. But it was Locke who gave the theory its decisive and characteristic form. His attack on all innate ideas or

principle, whether in the field of theoretical knowledge or in the domain of practical moral injunctions, was the first open avowal of disbelief in the competency of pure reason to furnish any sort of certainty. Hume and John Stuart Mill have followed Locke very closely.

Now it is undeniable that there are certain truths in empiricism, but when it becomes dogmatic it leads to a wrong theory of knowledge. It is certainly true to say that knowledge develops in *contact* with experience but wrong to say that it develops *out of* experience. Defining experience as the sole source of knowledge empiricism assumes without further argument that knowledge cannot pass beyond the limits of experience. Empiricism takes its stand upon the undeniable fact that as experience increases all departments of knowledge increase also. But it also tries to explain the necessary character of certain propositions by the nature of the psychological processes involved in their formation. Hume, for example, gives an explanation of this sort for the law of cause and effect. When one process says he, constantly follows another process in consciousness a strong and enduring association is set up between them. There grows up in consequence what we may call a subjective constraint to reproduce the idea of the one process whenever the idea of the other is present in consciousness. This subjective compulsion is the condition of necessity which characterises connection by cause and effect. Undoubtedly such a theory is not adequate. We may point its defects in the following direction — (1) In the first place there is no need to collect a number of repeated experiences in order that we may apply the law of causality to observed phenomena. Even Mill

says that sometimes a single observed sequence will entitle us to call it a consequence whereas a thousand observations of the sequence sometimes cannot enable us to set up a causal sequence. Obviously an association due to frequent experience is not the prime factor in the causal relation. Irrelevant circumstances sometimes may form such an association though certainly there is no causal relation between them and the effect. This can be illustrated from the associations formed by savages.

(2) Secondly, the necessity of the causal connection shows no mark whatsoever of a *Subjective* constraint to the reproduction of ideas. The necessity is not psychological but logical. This may be illustrated from the subjective attitude of the drowning man towards a leaf, which cannot save him from drowning.

(3) Lastly, empiricism cannot explain the universal validity of certain truths or axioms. This is clearly seen in the field of Logic. Empiricists try to derive the law of causality and the law of uniformity of nature from experience. But it is evident that no experience can by itself establish such a law. In fact experience is possible because the laws exist. Similarly the major premise of the syllogism, according to the view of empiricists, is arrived at by experience. But this would lead to the dilemma that then the conclusion must have already been experientially known and thus there would be no need of syllogisms at all. The fact is that certain propositions are universally valid not because everyone recognises their validity, but because their validity is entirely independent of the recognition of any particular individual. The broad distinction between rationalism and empiricism is that the latter does not admit the a priori of any proposition, which is a

fundamental tenet of rationalism. The empiricist means by a *priori* knowledge not knowledge acquired by the particular individual but knowledge handed down by our predecessors. Ultimately, however, every bit of knowledge comes from experience. Rationalists do not mean by innate ideas ideas that are *psychologically* prior but the ideas that are *logically* prior. Locke misinterprets the theory of innate ideas propounded by Descartes and then criticises it. Thus his criticism is beside the mark.

(4) *Rationalism*, on the other hand, affirms that reason, a connate mental faculty, is the fountain of all knowledge, and more especially the sole source and warrant of the two most important attributes of knowledge—necessity and universal validity. The truths of reason, it is maintained, are eternal, universally valid and necessary, their fundamental law is the principle of identity. However, rationalism is an improvement upon empiricism. The relation between rationalism and empiricism is of such a kind that empiricism completely excludes rationalism, but not vice versa. Rationalism asserts the universal validity of reason but only the *relative* validity of experience. It denies that universally valid and necessary knowledge can be obtained from experience. It grants that a great mass of detailed knowledge comes from experience. The principal names on the rationalistic side are those of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Wolff. All these philosophers agree that the best part of our knowledge proceeds from the mind itself. Rationalism declares that the necessity and universal validity of certain propositions is an indisputable evidence of their *a priori* and looks upon Mathematics and mathematical natural sciences,

with their deductive method and array of definitions and axioms, as the models of true science. Against such a purely rationalistic standpoint we may urge the following objections:—

(1) The a priori in the sense of innate dispositions or ideas is no guarantee either of necessity or of universal validity. Mathematics or physics try to rid their results, as far as possible, of any sort of subjective addition and can lay claim to universal validity only on the assumption that their contents are exclusively objective. Moreover, there are universal subjective states or processes which though universal are called "illusions" and are never made the basis of a necessary or universally valid system of knowledge. (2) If the principle of identity is the only principle that runs through the innate "truth of reason," progress in the rational sphere must consist in the development of identical propositions and knowledge in the exercise of formal reasoning. Such a conclusion, however, is evidently in conflict with the facts as well as the desire of our impulse to know. The stream of knowing "rises above its source." (3) Lastly, it is extraordinarily difficult to draw a line of division between the a priori and the a posteriori. All knowledge is one and no sharp distinction can be made in it. Knowledge a priori alone is not possible; whatever is possible a priori is so empty of content that it cannot deserve the name of knowledge which is so full.

Thus both empiricism and rationalism are in themselves inadequate as theories of knowledge. The inadequacy of empiricism becomes obvious as soon as it relies entirely upon its own means. It is so exclusively taken up with a wealth of particulars that it has to say nothing

of their principle "It cannot see the wood for the trees" Hume regards knowledge as formed of distinct and separate impressions But if they are separate, how are they bound together? The empiricist regards the things themselves as producing what in reality our activity has placed within them It is quite clear that no accumulation of mere facts can afford any sort of knowledge On the other hand, rationalism tries to spin out everything from reason itself It regards everything to proceed from thought as the outcome of its self activity On this line, knowledge reduces itself to the complete working out of what is inherent in the rational nature of man To Leibnitz philosophy meant converting the whole of reality into rational equations The world thus tends to become a domain of mere forms and relations Reality threatens to become utterly thin and bloodless Thus whereas empiricism seems unable to give to its limitless material any dominating form, rationalism fails to provide form with a content The former robs knowledge of its scientific character, the latter is unable to provide knowledge with a living content At the same time both rationalism and empiricism represent factors indispensable to knowledge Each of them represents important elements of truth and successfully employs them in attacking the opposite side Rationalism stands for originality, empiricism for actuality. The strength of rationalism lies in its advocacy of the independence for truth of man, the strength of empiricism lies in preserving the determination of knowledge by experience Experience has the two fold significance with regard to knowledge It is an internal limitation and an external determination Experience is indispensable not

only for the relating of life to its environment but for the constituting of this life itself. Then a theory was required which would avoid the excesses of both but would retain the elements of truth contained in them. Kant came forth with his '*Criticism*' to reconcile the above two theories. Before we deal with Kant's theory, let us see what Dogmatism means, for it too came under Kant's criticism.

(5) In a general sense *dogmatism* means anything accepted without an Epistemological foundation. Thus all the special sciences are in this sense dogmatic for the epistemological test is allowed by them to lapse. Kant takes dogmatism in this sense. In his opinion any philosophical system must be preceded by an epistemological enquiry into the certainty and validity of knowledge. More specially the term is used to denote the schools which think it unnecessary to draw a line of division between experiential knowledge and definitions of transcendent objects. If Scepticism sets no limits to ignorance, dogmatism in this sense sets no limits to human knowledge. It is at once the simplest and the most pretentious conception of the capabilities of our knowing faculty. It is accordingly most generally found in connection with rationalism (though empiricism too has a taint of dogmatism and Kant declared that Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers). For if all true knowledge comes from pure reason it has no external or objective limits. The dogmatists, therefore, figured very largely among the Rationalists of the 17th and 18th centuries. The worst of them is Spinoza who does not offer the slightest epistemological justification for his deductive procedure but comes upon the scene with a whole

number of the most dubious definitions and axioms ready made. Dogmatism proper has, since the time of Kant, practically disappeared from philosophy. The modern philosopher, though he may declare his right to dogmatic procedure, would not blink the fact that the definition of the transcendent is incomparably less certain than the results of the special sciences.

(6) *Criticism* attempts to reconcile the opposing claims of both rationalism and empiricism. It explains knowledge as the resultant of two factors—a formal factor deducible from the nature of the knowing intellect and the material factor constituted by sense perceptions. If either of these factors is lacking we can have no knowledge. Thus Kant said that concepts and perceptions were the warp and the woof of human knowledge. Kant who is the founder of *Criticism* distinguishes between the matter and form of knowledge. He is thus able to reconcile rationalism and empiricism and to transcend the older antithesis of understanding and sensibility. The senses are capable of giving real scientific knowledge since they too are ruled by a priori forms. (Kant uses the word a priori in the sense of innate or ultimate subjective dispositions. Modern adherents of criticism have changed the definition to mean simply the part or aspect of knowledge whose validity is independent of individual experience and thus reconcile criticism to empiricism.) These are the forms of space and time which ensure the necessity and universal validity of mathematical propositions. *Criticism* is at one with positivism in the opinion that human knowledge has limits (i.e. in their attack against Dogmatism) and in the opinion that ideas are not self-existent magnitudes but are simply aids to the

arrangement and connection of facts and possess no contents of their own apart from the various perceptions to which they can be applied (i. e. in their attack against rationalism pure.) Hence, it is held, we can never argue from concepts as such to realities; (this is Kant's famous argument against idealism). But beyond this, positivism and criticism have divergent paths. Positivism disputes not only the certainty, but also the possibility or right of existence, of every metaphysics. Criticism, on the other hand, accepts metaphysics as an "irrepressible" need of human reason. Kant's Critique of metaphysics was not intended to prove its total impossibility but to contest the scientific value of its results. For Kant not only recognises an irresistible metaphysical impulse but frequently inclines to admit the possibility of certain metaphysical assumptions and to conduct proofs by purely theoretical methods. Only his metaphysics are ethical. Thus Kant is thoroughly right in his explanation of the origin and development of knowledge. He belonged to the rationalistic side in so far as he energetically sought to raise knowledge beyond the mere association of ideas and make it into a connected whole; but his rationalism received an empirical impress in this sense that he did not represent thought, as giving rise to knowledge through its own pure self-activity; knowledge must always depend upon matter being presented to the mind. But this led him to conclude that thought cannot attain to a world of things, but only to a domain of appearances. It is his absolute dualism of the thing-in-itself and its appearances to which alone our knowledge through thought is confined, that proved fatal to a sound theory of knowledge; and the gulf between

empiricism and rationalism instead of being bridged over became wider still in the further developments of his Philosophy. No doubt Kant's practical philosophy modified this dualism a little but that was on the side of faith. Neither party was satisfied by Kant's verdict. Kant's limitation of thought only to a domain of appearances could not be accepted by the rationalists and on the other hand his fabric of forms which, as he said, made experience possible could not be accepted by the empiricists as something not evolved through experience itself. Thus Kant though thoroughly right in his explanation of knowledge seems to be mistaken in his doctrine of the limits of human knowledge. But this defect can be removed on our theory of knowledge, which is knowledge of the thing-in-itself growing daily. Thus the strangeness between the thought that knows and the world that is known will disappear and we shall have a smooth theory of the growth and validity of human knowledge.

(7) *Pragmatism* or epistemological utilitarianism is a theory that asserts that the true is the useful for human life. The expression, "pragmatism" was first used as a philosophical concept in its present sense by Charles Pierce in the American magazine, "The Popular Science Monthly" (1878) in his article on "How to make our ideas clear". It is in America that pragmatism has become a wide-spread tendency. It has become influential in England, too, chiefly through the brilliant writings of William James who wrote a book on pragmatism in 1907. Schiller is another exponent of the theory. He calls it Humanism and applies it to all social matters. Pragmatism is only a new name for old

ways of thinking and pragmatists claim on their side Protagoras from the ancients and Kant and Mill from the moderns. Protagoras' famous dictum, "Man is the measure of all things" is taken as the beginning of pragmatism whose principal tenet is the relativity of knowledge. So also Kant showed the pragmatistic tendency when he extended the sphere of justifiable beliefs beyond the region of the phenomenal. Truth on the Pragmatistic view is nothing but a bundle of postulates of whatever works well. Schiller's book is named Axioms as Postulates. Speaking of the relationship between pragmatism and other tendencies of thought James says, "Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. It agrees with nominalism in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasising practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, needless questions and metaphysical abstractions". Pragmatism claims credit for being a method and not a system and James says that Pragmatism is consistent with any metaphysical doctrine. It seems, however, that it is allied to a pluralistic conception of the universe. For pragmatism disintegrates truth by reducing it to a crowd of separate truths and claims credit for doing so. The pragmatist's method consists in bringing the pursuit of knowledge into close relationship with human existence and its development. Nothing is to be reckoned true that cannot be justified from this point of view. The true thus becomes a portion of the good. "The true is the name of

reality. In ethics, they are utilitarians and one writer has called pragmatism the new utilitarianism. Secondly they believe in the absolute reality of choice. They are indeterminists. Determinism flies away from them like a frightened night-mare. In metaphysics as already pointed out, they tend towards Pluralism, though they maintain that pragmatism is consistent with any metaphysical theory. The pragmatists believe that truth is the instrument of knowing reality. They value religion only as much as the sciences i.e. only for its practical results. Logic they hold to be a scientific and social problem. In epistemology they maintain that truth is relative and changing and that no truth is absolute. All truths are mere postulates. The criteria of truth, according to the pragmatists, may be summarised as the following - (1) The true must be useful. Thus there is an epistemological utilitarianism. (2) The true must satisfy the emotional needs. It is for this reason that they would admit the existence of God and contemplation of God. (3) Truth must be capable of verification by the senses. Here pragmatism joins hands with radical empiricism. It entertains degrees of truth. (4) Truth is a habit of perception which is biologically immune from change. Here pragmatism forms an alliance with biologism. Truth becomes the property of the brain. (5) Truth is what contributes to social agreement. (6) That is true which gives us the maximal combinations of satisfactions.

It is clear that through pragmatism things are seen in a manner which seems to make them peculiarly simple and easy of comprehension. It is obvious that a great simplification must ensue, because all problems not re-

whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief and good for definite assignable reasons. In pursuance of this line of thought 'Humanism' looks upon truths as products of the human race. 'Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of *ought* than health and wealth do. All these claims are *conditional*.' The influence of this movement laying stress, as it does, on volition is profound. In the question, for instance, between materialism and spiritualism, pragmatism is found on the side of spiritualism. "Spiritualistic faith in all its forms deals with a world of promise while materialism's sun sets in a sea of disappointment." According to pragmatism, the spirit is not a mere witness and reporter of the course of events but is capable of active participation in the same. The religious problem is discussed along the same lines. Instead of dealing with speculative principles the matter is approached from the point of view of human needs. Says James, "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word it is true. Now, whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths."

Pragmatism manifests itself in all the different departments in one way or other. In order to understand it it will be well, therefore, to look at these manifestations. In psychology it asserts itself in its advocacy of Action, Interest, Emotion and Satisfaction. To the pragmatist there is no thought which is bloodless. In the dry bones of thought the blood of purpose is constantly running. Lastly, they hold that true belief squares with

reality In ethics, they are utilitarians and one writer has called pragmatism the new utilitarianism Secondly they believe in the absolute reality of choice They are indeterminists Determinism flies away from them like a frightened night-mare In metaphysics as already pointed out they tend towards Pluralism, though they maintain that pragmatism is consistent with any metaphysical theory The pragmatists believe that truth is the instrument of knowing reality They value religion only as much as the sciences i.e. only for its practical results Logic they hold to be a scientific and social problem In epistemology they maintain that truth is relative and changing and that no truth is absolute All truths are mere postulates The criteria of truth, according to the pragmatists may be summarised as the following - (1) The true must be useful Thus there is an epistemological utilitarianism (2) The true must satisfy the emotional needs It is for this reason that they would admit the existence of God and contemplation of God (3) Truth must be capable of verification by the senses. Here pragmatism joins hands with radical empiricism It entertains degrees of truth (4) Truth is a habit of perception which is biologically immune from change Here pragmatism forms an alliance with biologism Truth becomes the property of the brain (5) Truth is what contributes to social agreement (6) That is true which gives us the maximal combinations of satisfactions

It is clear that through pragmatism things are seen in a manner which seems to make them peculiarly simple and easy of comprehension It is obvious that a great simplification must ensue, because all problems not re-

lated to the maintenance of human life are dropped as unprofitable. At the same time pragmatism does service by providing an entirely impartial standard of valuation for the various assertions, thus enabling the matter in each case to be raised above mere party-strife. Truth in the hands of the pragmatists becomes more direct and fruitful, more plastic and adaptable by being thrown into the centre of the stream of life and called upon to take an active share in the forward movement. The positive side of the work receives essential support from an incisive criticism of the traditional concept of truth. Notwithstanding the stimulating power of such a movement, supported as it is by brilliant and distinguished thinkers we are compelled to regard it, in its ultimate bearing, as an error. The idea of truth is reversed by pragmatism. The essence of this conception of truth and our search after truth, is to be found in the idea that in truth man attains to something superior to all his own opinions and inclinations, something that possesses a validity completely independent of any human consent. On the other hand, when the good of the individual and of humanity becomes the highest aim and guide, truth sinks to the level of a merely utilitarian opinion. All the power of conviction that truth can possess must disappear the moment it is seen to be a mere means. Truth can only exist as an end-in-itself. "Instrumental" truth is no truth at all. Again, pragmatism disintegrates truth into a crowd of separate truths, but can we be sure that these separate truths will dwell peacefully and harmoniously side by side, that there will be no conflict between them? Where is room for arbitration then? Thirdly, what is worth knowing is, on their view, not what is certain but what seems

necessary for the furtherance of life. But can we be so inveterate optimists as to suppose that this life is worth all the trouble and excitement, sufferings and sacrifices? Life, as it is lived, seems to be full of vanity, show emptiness, impurity and hypocrisy. Shall then the quest of truth be made a means for preservation and furtherance of this exceedingly dubious life? A faith in such a life seems hazardous. Efforts must therefore be made not to further this life but to direct it in proper channels. Lastly, pragmatism gives an unsatisfactory explanation of our religious experience. It makes God an instrument of human felicity. Such a conception of God as only a servant of man is extremely provoking to our religious convictions. We shall have to speak more about this in its proper place.

(8) *Intuitionism* emphasises the facts that reality is ultimately known and knowable by intuition alone. This attitude gains strength when the truth of ultimate axioms is questioned. They appear to rest on nothing else than belief or intuition. Intuitionism is at one with pragmatism in its opposition to pure intellectualism. But while the pragmatists appeal to a kind of faith against intellectualism, M. Bergson, the recent intuitionist, appeals rather to intuition. The justification for such an appeal seems to rest mainly on the fact that intellectual activities are dependent on objective conditions which are not apprehended by thought. We can think about colours or about numbers, or about knowledge itself, but the presuppositions of such thought are not reached by thinking, but by the presence of certain ultimate forms in the structure of our Universe of which even unthinking beings are more or less aware. / Thus the three

stages of knowledge, according to Bergson, are instinct, intelligence and intuition. Prof. Bergson, however, carries his criticism of the intellect further and means not only that intellectual activities involve reference to conditions that are not reached by thinking but that the exercise of the "Meddling intellect" tends to distort our apprehension of the structure of reality. It may certainly be admitted that some forms of intellectual activity do have this tendency. We sometimes omit important elements in particular objects - especially in objects that are of the nature of organic wholes, in order to concentrate our attention on special aspects. But this is a defect that thought is able to correct. Hegel sought to correct it by a Dialectic, in which the insufficiency of abstract ways of thinking is brought to light. It is true that this is a difficult process; but it does not appear that there is any real justification for an opposition between intuition and intellectual activity. Bradley and Taylor also uphold a similar attitude. The Absolute of Bradley is experience by which he means immediate feeling. This is of two kinds - sub-relational and supra-relational, between these lies the relational. According to this theory, the relational is thought and the sub-relational and supra-relational is experience. Bradley thus holds a position much allied to mysticism.

(9) Immediacy is the key-note of *mysticism*. There is no impediment between the mind that knows and the object that is known. The whole world becomes one. This is an anti-relational attitude. Thought is based upon the postulate of difference in things. This doctrine is denied by mysticism. Direct immediate contact is the key-note of experience according to mysticism. Royce objects

to mysticism on the ground that infinite experience is not attainable. "The infinite experience of the Absolute is only relative to the human finite experience." It is a contrast effect of the finite experience. Mystics, however, insist on the attainment of infinite experience. Mysticism goes along with a belief in an impersonal highest Being in whom everyone is to be absorbed. This point of view is right in its rejection of the petty human form of existence but this submersion in the bottomless ocean of eternity can satisfy only those who do not recognise new and independent reality in spiritual life, only those who perceive in that submersion a liberation from the toil and confusion of human existence from the narrowness and limitation of the petty ego, but who do not recognise that a new life rises up and can be gained. For out of the very toil and confusion of human existence arises the new life in man.

5, The Doctrine of Degrees of Truth.

The doctrine comes into being to meet the difficulties involved in a monistic interpretation of the Universe. The essence of ultimate reality is thought of as one indivisible, complete in itself. In such a conception of systematic completeness thought finds a certain satisfaction. But difficulties arise when an attempt is made to explain the existence of the finite and particular from the point of view of this absolute one. Bradley, who is a monist, says that the Absolute is completely coherent and self-consistent, but there comes the difficulty as to how any place is left for the incomplete, the incoherent, the contradictory, which yet in some sense exists. He endeavours to get over the difficulty by his conception of degrees of

truth and reality. He explains that the Absolute alone is the truly real and the appearances are only the adjectives of this reality. Thus the greater the reality the greater the truth. The criteria of reality are inclusiveness and harmony and these are, therefore, the criteria of truth. What is more comprehensive and more self-consistent is more true than the less comprehensive, and the less consistent. Our apprehension of things is incomplete as well as fragmentary. When we gain more complete and larger knowledge we certainly are in possession of a larger truth. Take, for instance, our knowledge of the steam arising from water. It must be admitted that our knowledge of steam at the present day is more than what it was some centuries back. As we have come to know the greater and greater capacities of steam-power and its place in the whole of life, the truth of steam has certainly grown. It is in this sense that the doctrine of degrees of truth is valid. Truth is larger in proportion to its self-consistency and comprehensiveness. Degrees of truth does not mean that a thing becomes less or more according as we know about it. The thing is the same. Our knowledge of it grows. Mackenzie misinterprets Bradley's argument and then criticises it. "How can the truth of a thing change?" He asks. A thing is what it is. It does not change. Therefore, the truth of it is unchanging. There cannot be degrees of truth, he argues, but only degrees of correctness or error with which we make judgments. Truth is one: beliefs many. This is exactly what Bradley, too, means though his language is not so clear. Thus the doctrine of degrees of truth and also the doctrine of degrees of correctness of beliefs are both of them correct if they are rightly inter-

preted. It is certainly more correct to say of a heap of a hundred mangoes that they are ninety-nine, than to say that they are ten. It is certainly more correct to say that two and two make five than to say that two and two make fifty, though *the truth* is that two and two are equal to four. Thus the truth is one but the correctness of our beliefs admits of degrees. But as we said above, truth itself admits of degrees in a different sense. Thus the truth of the heap of those hundred mangoes will grow if we know more about the heap, for instance, if we know how much space is occupied by that heap in addition to the simple fact that they form a hundred; so also will the truth grow when we know the place of that heap of mangoes in the totality of things; when, for example, we know the uses to which it may be put. In this sense, there are degrees of truth. It is not meant to say that what was once a heap of a hundred mangoes is now a heap of a thousand mangoes. The number of mangoes remains the same but the truth about them grows. Thus the doctrine of degrees of truth is a correct one; so also the doctrine of degrees of correctness - each in its own sense and the latter is no refutation of the former

there cannot be interaction but only parallelism between the physical and the mental sides, the common source of both being the Infinite Substance

The other sub form of abstract monism is much bolder, taking upon itself to define the unity of mental and material, or as it prefers to say, of the ideal and real aspects. Fichte Schelling and Hegel are its typical representatives. Fichte looks upon the Absolute Ego as the first principle; Schelling regards Absolute Identity as the original existence; Hegel's Absolute appears in the indefinite form of Being which afterwards gets its content and is characterised as having two special forms of nature and mind. For Hartmann the Unconscious is the one primary quality of the Absolute. For Lotze, the Absolute is at once a religious and ethical ideal.

The monistic attitude is no doubt an expression of a deep-rooted human instinct. A desire for unity is in the very nature of the case, unavoidable; for human thought cannot remain satisfied with a state of division. The direct impression we have of an intimate relationship between body and soul, the increasing knowledge of the dependence of the life of the soul upon bodily conditions, the philosophical demand for the unity of reality and finally the fact of art with its weaving together of the visible and invisible, the outer and the inner and its bringing of both into a relationship of fruitful reciprocal action, are all arguments in favour of monism. But even then the following objections may be raised against a monistic interpretation—(1) Concrete monism is without any doubt merely a disguised dualism. It offers no real explanation of the way in which the mental and the mate-

rial hold together; (1) the interpretation which abstract monism has to offer of the inter action of body and mind is neither the easiest nor the most obvious. According to monism the two spheres should be in perfect equilibrium; there should be a psycho-physical parallelism. But granted that one and the same thing has two different sides or modes of manifestation, it does not follow of necessity that these evince precisely parallel changes. A priori, there are two other possibilities: the sides may be altogether independent of each other, or an inverse relation may obtain between them. In fact, it is very difficult to maintain an unbroken parallelism and still say that there is no inter action. As a matter of fact it is not possible to carry out the fundamental idea in detail without emphasising one side more than the other. Spinoza himself, closely studied, is not a true monist. He alternates between spiritualism and materialism. Thus the interpretation offered by monism of the relation of body and mind, or in the larger sphere of the unconscious and the conscious, does not seem to be the indisputable one. More about the weak points of monism in this matter will be said when we come to discuss the theories of the relation of mind and body (3). Lastly, abstract monism also comes into collision with the teachings of empirical natural science. It completely ignores the line of division between the organic and inorganic worlds. The analogy between the human consciousness and the mental processes of other animals will at some point come to a stop. The difference between the reaction of the cell to stimuli and the purely physico-chemical change of one inorganic body under the influence of another is so fundamental that the metaphysics of monism which ignores it, stands convicted of a disregard of facts.

The monistic attitude is consistent either with a materialistic or a spiritualistic interpretation of the universe. For matter in the one case and spirit in the other may be held to be the one principle of reality.

These two types will be discussed under the heads of materialism and spiritualism. Before proceeding to that it is necessary to discuss the rival attitudes of monism, viz. Dualism and Pluralism.

(2) Dualism.

The dualistic standpoint is the most natural and primitive one. It affords a ready explanation of the contradictions that are seen in this world. The contradictions between mind and matter, the subjective and the objective, matter and form organic and inorganic, appearance and reality, the unconscious and the conscious, the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly find an easy explanation in the assumption of two principles that work everywhere. This is an attitude that at once appeals to the average human understanding.

Like all other theories this theory, too, was held by some of the ancient philosophers. Anaxagoras was the most pronounced dualist among the Pre-Socratics. He definitely distinguished *Nous*, the mental principle, from the innumerable ultimate material elements. Mind brings order and movement into what is in itself inert and chaotic matter. The two greatest philosophers of antiquity may also be termed dualists. Plato separates matter from idea, sensible particularity from the real that finds expression in the generic idea. In Aristotle we have a similar antithesis between matter and form, though he

takes care to say that there is no unformed matter, nor pure form except Divinity. Dualism has also played a prominent part in modern philosophy. Descartes may be said to be the first modern dualist with his distinction between two substances; *res extensa* and *res cogitans* which exist independently but are in reciprocal relation to one another. Spinoza tries to introduce unity by calling both, modes of a primary substance, God, but with him, too, the two worlds - mental and physical run parallel - there being no interaction between them. In Indian Philosophy, also, the gulf between reality and appearance is explained by the assumption of Brahman and Maya. Shankar, inclined, as he is, towards a monistic interpretation, says that every real thing is Brahman but an illusion takes place owing to the power of Maya that is somehow attached to Brahman. But he cannot explain the exact relation between Maya and Brahman though he takes great pains to do so. Evidently, the conception of Maya is due to the necessity of explaining the unreal, the evil, the ugly.

The objections to dualism though few are quite convincing. In the first place, all the arguments in favour of Monism, above stated, are, *ipso facto*, arguments against Dualism and Pluralism. The strong tendency in the human breast somehow to transcend differences and see unity can never be annihilated. Secondly, Dualism necessarily preaches a parallelism of mind and body, spirit and matter. There can be no interaction between them on such a theory. But interaction of the two is a fact that is always observed. This is therefore neglected by Dualism only in the interest of a consistent theoretical argument. Lastly, such a parallelism of mind and body

cannot be consistently carried out. There is much truth in Berkeley's dictum 'The *Esse* is *percipi*'. There can be no matter independently of any mind that perceives it. Even Spinoza inclines sometimes towards one side, sometimes towards another. It is very difficult to maintain that the two worlds run parallel, the facts of the one exactly correspond to the facts of the other, and yet to declare that there can be no causal interference between the two. This criticism of dualism will be better understood when we discuss the theories of the relation between mind and body which shall also indicate the relation between spirit and matter. A thorough going materialism on one side and a thorough going spiritualism or rather mentalism on the other is the outcome of the Dualistic interpretation of the Universe.

(3) Pluralism.

The pluralistic attitude is based on the idea of difference between various things or persons that we see. It is usually understood to mean the affirmation of the existence of many independent substances. It is the dualistic tendency carried onwards. Just as the Dualists say that one single principle will not suffice to explain the diversity of objects but two principles will do that, the pluralists take a further step and say that the diversity cannot be explained only on two principles but essentially requires a plurality of principles. No two objects or two persons are exactly alike. The world is in fact a world of individuals each his own master. Just as in the case of monism there are two attitudes, one materialistic and the other spiritualistic, so in the case of Pluralism there can be two such inter-

pretations It may be a materialistic Pluralism or a spiritualistic Pluralism The first is called Atomism, the latter is equivalent to Monadism of Leibnitz Democritus was the exponent of a materialistic pluralism In fact, even the Reconcilers were also pluralists When they saw no one principle such as earth, air, water or fire could account for the origination of the world, they maintained that all these elements were in operation Empedocles, the first Greek Pluralist, said that the variety of the world could be explained only on the assumption of the four elements Anaxagoras went further How could this world of infinite variety be derived only from four elements? We must postulate as many elements as there are qualities The ancient doctrines of pluralism were thus materialistic or animistic The modern ones are spiritualistic Spirits are essentially different Hence we can only talk of a plurality of selves Leibnitz gave currency to this idea through his doctrine of monads which are self-existent entities quite independent of one another They are 'windowless' and yet each of them is a miniature representation of the whole universe Almost on the same lines, the Realist Herbart lays down a distinct pluralism of 'reals' McTaggart and William James are two more modern upholders of pluralism James chafes against a block universe McTaggart emphasises the substantiality of individuals and thus inclines towards Pluralism Prof. Howison another pluralist, in reaction from monism which by making the Absolute the determining agent leaves no place for self-active moral beings, bases his argument for plurality on the notion of the Freedom of the Will He says, "No Being that

arises out of efficient causation can be free. Not even Divine agency can give rise to another self active intelligence by any productive art. He therefore concludes to an "Eternal Pluralism," a "Society of minds" or a "circle of self-thinking spirits." The members of the Eternal Republic have only logical reference to each other. They simply are and together constitute the eternal order.

If even the dualistic standpoint cannot be consistently carried out, much less can the pluralistic one. For we see that there is interaction not only between mind and body but between mind and mind and body and body. Howison's language itself is sufficient to disprove the pluralistic position. He admits the indirect causation of God. He talks of a 'society of minds.' Evidently there can be no society unless the plurality is based upon a deeper unity. Howison's credit lies only in discarding efficient causation and replacing it by the final causation. We daily see how much of a man depends upon his environment. When Howison admits the Divine nature as the final cause of the development which takes place in these finite selves, he virtually abandons the Ontological Pluralism which he champions. In Leibnitz, also, an ontological pluralism is combined with an ideal "Harmony." Dr. McTaggart's pluralism is more consistent and uncompromising. He recognises no central spirit. His universe, therefore, resolves into a number of fragmentary subjective worlds with no provision for their co-ordination and no guarantee that, if pieced together, the result would be a "harmonious system of selves." He accounts for such coherence, therefore, by assuming that all selves are perfect. Each self is eternal and the present imperfections are stepping stones on the way to perfection. Each self is an Absolute

A Seth says of such a pluralism 'Such a heroic multiplication of deities appeals to me rather as a reductio ad absurdum of Dr McTaggart's doctrine of eternal substances than as calling for further discussion. I doubt if individualism has ever been carried further than in this proposal to have as many universals as there are particulars''

The above criticism of the chief English advocates of pluralism is sufficient to show that pluralism cannot stand. An under-lying unity must and always will be found. The pluralism of atoms also is not a consistent theory. What is the principle of their combinations? If it is Love and Hate where do these Love and Hate reside? Spiritual Atomism or Monadism too is a one sided theory. Thus it would appear that monism best explains the universe both on the common sense view and the purely metaphysical view. But Monism may be materialistic or spiritualistic. It remains to be seen which of these is the true theory.

(4) Materialism.

Materialism has been a very widely accepted doctrine in modern times. The developments of modern science with their emphasis on a satisfactory mechanical interpretation and the validity of the laws of motion lend a colour to this doctrine. The indisputable dependence of the life of the soul upon bodily conditions and the advantages materialism possesses of being very simple and easily understood are factors telling in its favour. The individual man is more and more looked upon as the sum of parents and nurse, place and time, air and weather, sound and light, food and clothing. He is made the sport

of every breath of air that plays upon him. Given the physical antecedents it is boasted, anything can be explained as the product of them through the laws of mechanics. Even mind is nothing more than such a combination of physical atoms, according to one extreme school of materialists.

Materialism did not play a prominent part in Greek thought. Certainly there were Atomists like Leucippus, Democritus and the Epicureans but theirs was not a monistic materialism as they looked upon mind as made up of peculiar sorts of atoms. Thus Materialism is monistic or dualistic. The Pluralistic form though exhibited by Democritus was never carried out. Modern materialism has been more radical and therefore is monistic. The Greek Dualistic materialists held the theory that the whole visible universe has arisen by the cohesion of small particles, the atoms. Matter is essentially homogeneous in character and all differences among phenomena are referable to the size, form and relative position of the atoms. The mind, like everything else, is composed of atoms which are in its case very smooth, delicate and round. Lucretius described them as the smallest, roundest and most mobile. Empedocles called them Fire-atoms and he explained the acquisition of knowledge as due to the law of "Like attracts Like". The Epicureans saw the necessity of accounting for contingency in phenomena; hence they held that the atoms by their own motive-power diverge from the straight line. This ancient materialism may be termed dualistic, since it regarded body and mind as composed of different kinds of atoms. Even though Democritus maintained a plurality of atoms, the atoms were divided generally into the two broad kinds

Modern materialism has been monistic. On the dualistic hypothesis there are two kinds of matter, the coarser and a finer, a more inert and a more mobile, on the monistic, there is but one—matter is unitary throughout. But again this form has three subdivisions according as it explains the relation of mind and body. Attributive materialism, Causal materialism, and Epiphenomenal materialism. The first makes mind an attribute of matter, the second makes it an effect of matter, the third looks upon the mental processes as material in their character. Darwin may be considered as a typical advocate of the first type of monistic materialism, Huxley of the second and Hobbes of the third.

Attributive materialism looks upon the life of the soul as a primary instead of a secondary phenomenon, as an attribute of matter from the very beginning and not something which develops subsequently at especial points. It adds soul to the elements as a property along with other properties, without their being thereby essentially different. The mind according to them is an epiphenomenon of matter—only a loose hanging, unnecessary and inactive. One piece of matter is combined with another and along with it the mind stuff is automatically combined too. Thus if A is a matter particle and B a mind particle hanging on it and again, A' and B' are two other such particles, the combination of these, it is said, will result in AA' BB'. The epiphenomenal theory of the relation of mind and body necessarily goes along with this doctrine. Even the most primitive things—the nebulae are possessed of mind particles and as there is a gradual disintegration and integration of the matter, so there is of the accompanying

mind On the second interpretation, the mind is the effect of the matter that works Matter is the reality and mind is only a by-product of its working like the refuse given by corn when ground At most, mind is an accompaniment of matter as the whistle is an accompaniment of the steam-engine Huxley is the exponent of such a theory He says mind is nothing more than the waste-product of the brain's work In fact, originally there was no mind according to this view It is only an accident entering at a later stage Hence it has no active part in the working of the Universe Everything is going on on the laws of mechanical and chemical combinations The mind is at most a static entity, an impartial spectator before whom the dance of the physical atoms is going on whether the mind chooses to look at it or no

On the third interpretation, i.e. of Equative materialism, mental processes are nothing else than material processes themselves viewed differently Hobbes is the earliest of this school He declares that every real occurrence in the universe is movement; even sensations and ideas are, at bottom, nothing else than movements of inward parts of the animal body Thought is a function of the brain Hooke held that memory was a material storage of ideas in the brain substance and he calculated that the number of ideas that can be acquired by an adult during his lifetime would amount to nearly 2,000,000 and says that brain has plenty of room for them all Connections are set up between mental capacity and the weight of the brain, the extent of its surface and the number of its convolutions Mental processes, it is held, can be traced to particular brain ganglia—reason, imagination, space-perception, aesthetic perception, all of

to their separate cells. Buchner allows only 100,000 ideas as the maximum number. By others, reasons are given for calling mind a material process. Since the mind has its seat in the body, it must be extended and therefore material. The things of the phenomenal world are our ideas. As things are extended, ideas must be extended also. And as ideas run their course in the mind, mind must be extended, what is extended must be matter. Therefore, mind must be material. The materialist of the type asserts the unity of force and matter, mind and body, God and the world. Thought is a movement, a recombination of brain substance. It is an extended process as it requires time for its consummation as is proved by reaction experiments. Mind is only the collective expression for the total activity of the brain just as respiration is a collective expression for the activity of the organs of breathing.

The inadequacy of materialism we need not go far to seek. It is evident on the very face of it. In the first place, materialism is itself an abstraction. A physical atom on its own principle cannot be. Is the physical atom further divisible? They answer no. Then certainly they are going against their own fundamental doctrine viz infinite divisibility. Can the atoms interpenetrate? If they are self-sufficient units they cannot and hence there would be no combination in fact of such units. How are they then organized? The answer must be "through some outward agency." But this is tantamount to saying that there is an outside principle of arrangement. Thus the formal cause does not reside in the atoms themselves. There is a force superior to them and hence atoms are not the only realities. Secondly, the laws of the Conservation of energy need not be interpreted only on a materialistic basis.

As Ward has ably shown it is eminently a law of exchange of Values. But the untrustworthiness of materialism is all the more glaring in its treatment of the mind in the wrong psychological analysis to which it leads. On the view of the attributive materialism the soul or mind is a possession of matter. But it must be evident to any plain man that a soul cannot be *had*, it can only *be*. It is said on the side of attributive materialism that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon i.e. a loose, useless hanging. But if so, on the principle of the Evolutionists themselves who preach this kind of materialism, that the useless things have a tendency to become extinct, consciousness would have had no reason to survive up to this time if it had been quite useless. Again, our habits are not automatic as such materialism will have to hold. They are evidently formed under the guidance of man's will and end. Nor is the causation only between the physical atoms so that when they combine the corresponding consciousnesses combine too. This is a wrong piece of psychology. Consciousness cannot be divided into parts thus. It is one whole which exists through and in every particular. The whole mind acts even in the simplest cases of action and not one particular "part" of the mind. Thus such kind of materialism commits the fallacy of composition. Moreover, our consciousness plainly tells us that we as spirits are causal agents. We are conscious of causation at every step. In fact, had it not been so, all hope of bringing about reforms by persuasion would have been at an end and persons no less than things would have looked as automata, machines working according to physical laws. On a radical principle of this sort a man who once begins to eat would never

stop for want of any interference on the part of his will. He will continue to work just as a machine works. But can even the machines go on by themselves? Do they not show tendencies of resistance? And are they not in the end removed by the cleverness of man? Even the existence of machines is an outcome of the human mind in as much as machines are invented with a view to serve human ends. Thus we see that the human mind is a very strong causal power indeed. On a purely materialistic interpretation, the Tragedies of Shakespeare would be nothing more than the black scribbings on a white paper caused by a collection of atoms of blood and bone, technically called the brain of a certain man whose brain was very big, and issued out by physical and physiological laws into the operations by the hand. Now is this a satisfactory explanation of the Shakespearean Tragedies which, in our opinion, are the result not of any physical atom, but the outcome of a transcendent poetic genius? Thus the materialistic interpretation is a far fetched and dogmatic one. Their interpretation of the reality of the rainbow would have similar characteristics. No place would be found in it for the aesthetic experience of the poet or the painter, but the 'dissection and analysis' method of the physical scientist will be applied. Causal materialism commits all the self same fallacies. Both the attributive and the causal materialism preach the epiphenomenal theory of the human mind. But causal materialism adds one more difficulty to those already existent by its emphasis on the sudden emergence of human consciousness. If like produces like, consciousness can no less be due to a prior consciousness than matter is the transformation of original matter. Nor is the psychology

of the last view i. e. of equative materialism comprehensible

If mental processes are material in reality (as the equative materialism holds), we could have seen their identity; but no such identity is seen nor can it be without much hazard speculated. For though the Weber-Fechner laws have done something to set up a correspondence between the magnitude of the stimulus and the intensity of the resulting sensation yet at the same time they have brought to light the principal fact that the psychical does not vary with the physical. If it did, there could hardly be a difference between the mental attitude of two persons who received news of the death, one of his own son, the other of his correspondent's son, i. e. between the sensations to which the following stimuli give rise, "*Your son is dead*" and "*Our son is dead*". And this brings us to the epistemological draw-hack of materialism. On its view, consciousness is only cognitive, it is only an extra spectator, a mirror as it were, of the rich array of matter that is passing before it and by its long and beautiful array delights it. But such a language is inconsistent with itself, if the supposed spectator has no more connection with reality, why, in the name of devil should it take delight in the vision it sees? The spectator at least would be altogether indifferent to the worries and the joys of the passing tide; but is this what happens to our consciousness? Is our consciousness satisfied only with what it sees happening outside? Does it not think of its own self as creating or at least enjoying this outward flow? Is not self consciousness an established fact? Our consciousness, we feel, is not simply cognitive, it is so no doubt, but it is much more. It is an active participator

in the whole of reality and not only a sleeping member of the firm. It is not static but dynamic. This explains the difference of attitude of the savage man and the civilised man towards the things they possess. The civilised man does not so much enjoy the things themselves as *himself* among the things. His thought imparts value to the sensations and shapes it into ideal constructions. Think of the gulf between the savage enjoying the glittering pieces of gold and the "self-conscious" power of the civilised man towards the same. Again, epistemologically, it is wrong to suppose the existence of mind and matter side by side as materialism does. This distinction of mind and matter, subject and object arises afterwards and is not an original character of human experience. A further criticism of materialism is that along with these monstrous views in psychology and epistemology go their monstrous ethics. The materialist's ethics are Hedonism and Egoism. Pleasure in the sense of senseless gratification and this of one self with no thought for others is their ethical ideal but such an ideal is easily controverted by our natural experience. It is not always the strongest that survive but very often the weakest also do. There are altruistic and social instincts in man. There is association and co-operation. Minds do not come together in the way in which particles of matter (an abstract idea itself) do. Mental attractions are quite different from the physical ones and last much longer and produce more tangible results. It is by the co-operation of minds and not by the co-operation of physical atoms that civilisation can advance, and the actual growth of civilisation proves such union of minds. Thus minds have got their separate existence and their separate powers and hence are in no way slaves or

dependents of the physical existence which alone is all in all to the materialists. The materialists have also the irreligious tendency of denying life after death. When the body is reduced to ashes nothing remains behind and hence nothing survives. This is the famous atheistic Charvaka doctrine in Indian Philosophy. But such doctrines need no refutation beyond pointing to our deep-seated and very powerful beliefs. The ethics based on them have immoral tendencies. But it has always been recognised and will be recognised more and more in future that, after all, mind is more powerful than matter and thus to make it hang on matter is nothing more than to make a hollow show of unsubstantial things like the so-called material world.

(5) Spiritualism.

If materialism starts from matter, spiritualism (an attitude that is diametrically opposed to materialism) starts from mind, from the human consciousness. If materialism looks upon reality as compounded of physical atoms according to the laws of mechanics, accompanied at most by their epiphenomena of mind, spiritualism, on the other hand, looks upon reality as compounded of mental atoms, by their own force and accompanied at most by their material epiphenomena. The spirit is the reality, matter is only a senseless accompaniment. Spiritualism is thus one but an extreme form of idealism. Plato is an idealist but he does not deny the reality of matter. He only says that the Idea of the Good is the highest reality. Plato may also be considered as a Realist. Spiritualism was not a great force in ancient thought. In modern times, however, there have been very many able exponents of spirit-

alism Leibnitz with his monadism takes the supreme position. Herbart too looks upon his 'Reals' as incorporeal existences which were indefinable in their simple quality. The relation between the reals was of self preservation and disturbance. Lotze looked upon individuals as modifications of the Absolute whose unity is dependant on mental quality. He thus tried to reconcile Monadism and Realism. Wundt says in trying to reconcile science and psychology, that on the side of science the ultimate reality is the atom, on the psychological side it is will; therefore he concludes 'the essential unit of existence is will-atom.' Schopenhauer, too, may be ranked on the side of spiritualism in its conflict with materialism. He takes up the Kantian idea of the thing in itself and calls it will, the phenomena are the ideas. Thus the Universe consists of will and its ideas. Clifford puts mind behind every inorganic particle and thus gives rise to a theory which has been called Pan psychism.

We shall deal with Leibnitz's Monadism and Clifford's Pan-psychism in detail and what holds good of them does so of others that are only modifications of these theories. The most important motives underlying Monadism was to find a way of escape from the complete determinism of the materialistic scheme. The monadist starts from human consciousness and goes on on the principle of continuity to attribute consciousness in a less and less degree to lower animals and ultimately to physical atoms which in his opinion in coming together show an affinity towards one another - the same characteristics of action from within. On this theory the organic vesture of the spirit and its environmental conditions are reduced to quasi spiritual centres, and the objective world

becomes simply the appearance of these souls or monads to one another. The atom (monad) is considered as psychological in essence, a feeling and responsive centre after the analogy of our own existence, in however remote a degree. The monad is not a physical atom which is further divisible, nor a mathematical unit which is unreal. It is a metaphysical unit and is both indivisible and real. Leibnitz starts from substance which he defines as that which has force and self activity. There is an infinite number of monads. They differ also in the degree of their psychological content. Some are sleeping monads, others dreaming, others awake. They are impenetrable. They are windowless. How then do they combine? By their own inherent pre-established power. There is an affinity between certain Monads that is due to their pre-established harmony. Each Monad represents in a miniature the whole universe. It is a microcosm, a mirror of the whole universe. Thus the monadist spiritualises the universe to its tiniest particle and thus crushes down materialism. "Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants or a pond full of fishes. There is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance."

Clifford, the pan-psychist, holds an essentially similar position. Behind every inorganic particle he places a particle of mind-stuff so that when the mind particles combine and form a mind, the accompanying matter-particles combine and form a body. Mind on such a view is a complex of which simple feelings are the elements which can exist independently. "Mind-stuff then is the reality which we perceive as matter." Berkeley treats the material world as a system of signs which have no exist-

ence have as intermittent experience in the minds of individual knowers and as continuous divine purpose of acting according to certain rules. Pan-psychists put forth their theory of monadic soul at the back of every material appearance, as an alternative to Berkeleyan theory. The fixed laws are the result of the action and re-action of these psychical individuals.

Evidently, spiritualism is a one-sided theory like materialism. The hypothesis of spirit any where and everywhere is an abstract and arbitrary hypothesis. Just as all is not matter, all is not spirit too. It is very difficult to maintain with the spiritualist that the inorganic life is a form of spiritual life as yet undeveloped in consciousness. The only point in favour of such a doctrine is the unity and continuity asserted. But continuity need not be at daggers drawn with breaks or stages. The unity may be a teleological unity. In fact, continuity of process and the emergence of real differences are the twin aspects of the cosmic history. Continuity may be inconsistent with 'breaks' if we define a break as a 'chaos' or an alien influx into nature. But if it means actual increments or lifts in the process when quantity may be said to pass into quality, the statement of Prof. Wallace, "All development is by breaks and yet makes for continuity" is quite intelligible. Thus no harm is done to unity or continuity if the stages of inorganic, organic, unconscious and conscious, mechanical and teleological are asserted. Nature as a realm of inviolable law appears to be the necessary condition of the life of intelligence and reasonable action. Nature and man are, in short, organically connected. Thirdly, some monads are beings which have only external relation to one another. How does, then,

their behaviour to one another differ from a case of mechanical interaction? Fourthly, the idea of small pieces of unconscious mind stuff combining independently into minds is a psychological monster. It creates the same fallacy as was committed by materialism viz of looking upon the mind as divisible, as having compartments which can exist one without another. Fifthly and lastly, this philosophical animism is a theory difficult to reconcile with our commonsense attitude towards natural things. On the hypothesis of pan-psychism what becomes of such things as food, clothes, and our bodies? When we eat food are we in reality eating minds? When we put on clothes do we wear minds? Is our body also a form of mind? This is absurd. It is as externalities that they function in our life, not as other selves, if we were to treat them as other selves their characteristic being would disappear. We, therefore, conclude that matter and mind are not independently separate facts but necessary elements of a single system. This is Idealism. It means the interpretation of the world according to a scale of values or in Plato's phrase, by the idea of the Good. The philosophical interest of consciousness lies in the ideal values of which it is the bearer, not in its mere existence as a more refined kind of fact.

(6) Subjective Idealism.

The four forms into which Idealistic explanations can be divided are (i) Subjective Idealism (ii) Abstract Idealism, (iii) Absolute Idealism and (iv) Objective idealism. It will be seen that the last view appears to be the most correct.

Subjective Idealism has not been very consistently carried out, but Berkeley is looked upon as a great apostle

of that doctrine Solipsism is a word that cannot be applied to Berkeley's theory, for solipsism means "I and my state alone exist." Though this was at first asserted by Berkeley, he afterwards corrected himself and posited the Divine consciousness to which things, not present to our consciousness, must be present. Thus God relieves poor Berkeley out of his Solipsism. Schulz has called Berkeley's theory by the name of "Mentalism" and we may adopt that name if Berkeley's theory do not deserve to be called Idealism. Berkeley proves that things cannot exist in the knowledge relation without implying a mind or ego and that we cannot say anything about them except as known. "The Esse is Percipi." Subjectivism says that there is no reality out of my experience and goes on to say that reality is constituted out of my experience. The one argument alleged for subjectivism is the existence of differences of individual opinions with regard to one and the same thing. Therefore, not the thing outside but my idea alone are real. It is said, "We can catch ourselves only in an act of perception." Thus Realism and Subjectivism are two poles asunder. Mentalism is also distinguished from Absolute Idealism by its neglect of the purposive or teleological aspect of experience which is emphasised by the Absolutists like Bradley. Berkeley regards experience as absolutely passive. Ideas, he maintained, have to be imprinted on us. The order of presentations is given by God who is an active spirit. Berkeley thus comes to hold an "unconscious occasionalism." But a difficulty arises. Are our Presentations, presentations to God? If they are, who guides their activity? If they are not, God is ignorant. Berkeley gets

over this difficulty by correcting himself and saying that presentations must be active whether they be the representations of God or man. If the things of the mentalists do not exist for human consciousness their being consists in their presence to a Universal Consciousness the all-knower, who, by knowing them, maintains them in existence. Berkeley introduces God to fill the intervals between finite perceptions. Now, the fact that things cannot exist for knowledge without a mind does not at all prove that they do not exist out of the knowledge relation, it cannot prove Berkeley's thesis that being-in-that-relation constitutes their existence. In fact, being known makes no difference to the existence of anything real. Again, if knowledge means the same thing, the existence of a thing would no more depend on God's knowing it than mine. Thus the idea of the All knower does not really help Berkeley. Sometimes Mentalism (for example, that of Fichte) says that it is not the knowing that constitutes the object, but the act of self externalisation or outhering of itself supplies the object to be known. But this amounts to acknowledging a reality which is known but not made by the ego. Berkeley's identification of the object and the sensation rest on the ambiguous word 'Idea' which may mean the act of knowing or the object known. The word 'Idea' has changed its meaning diversely. At first it meant a form, then it came to mean a Universal, then the universal as apprehended by a conscious centre and lastly, anything that is apprehended by a conscious centre. Plato is an Idealist in the second sense of the word idea, Berkeley in the last sense. Moreover, the psychology from which Subjective Idealism derives

its chief support is a wrong one. It maintains that self-consciousness in the sense of knowing our own mental states comes directly and all other things representatively through them. But as Kant proved, self-consciousness is a later growth preceded by consciousness of outside things or persons. Again, how can a mental state be its own object? If by self-consciousness the subjectivists mean the experience of a mental state by itself, then there is no self-consciousness. Again, if everything is a mode of my consciousness, other human beings are also modes of my consciousness. Evidently this is absurd. The unity of different individuals' knowledge is not due to other consciousnesses being aspects of my own experience but to the fact that there is a universal consciousness on which individual consciousness is like a ripple, and yet it is not the same for all. We have thus seen that though Subjective Idealism gives one important truth viz. that anything in order to exist must somehow be related to consciousness, yet when it presses this point into saying that existence is identical with knowledge it transgresses logical and psychological principles and cannot give a satisfactory solution of the world-problem. Another attitude which may be called abstract or transcendental idealism is also fruitless in a similar way.

(7) Abstract Idealism.

Ferrier is an idealist of such a type. The Ego-in-relation-to-what-it-apprehends is the one reality. But this Ego is no more than the bare form of consciousness. The unity is arrived at by lifting the Ego out of its living content and setting it like a static eye against its states to which it is related as an abstract unit of refer-

ence The Ego is thus an empty vessel into which the content is packed up If the Everlasting Mind is merely such an abstract point of reference, its existence seems hardly worth contending for Green comes almost to the same position According to him the real world consists of things-in-relation-to-one-another Knowledge of the relations which are somehow real independently of individual knowledge is the unifying principle However, the source of the relations as well as our knowledge of them lies in "the consciousness which constitutes reality and makes the world one Consciousness is the medium and substance of relations" The Eternal consciousness is the spirit for which the relations of the Universe exist William James unanswerably refutes Green's argument for a spiritual principle of Unity "If relations between objects are in any way real they must be represented in feeling like the objects Thus, we ought to say a feeling of 'and,' a feeling of 'if,' 'but,' 'by,' as of blue or cold Indeed we do not require the apparatus of a special principle to constitute and sustain the relations any more than to sustain existence in general" Gesso's Eternal Consciousness is described as if it were an enlarged human mind His account of the spiritual principle is vague The principle of Unity, he says, is "a single, active self-conscious principle — all things in the world are determined by it in the sense that they are determined by each other in a manner that would be impossible but for its equal self-distinguishing presence to them all" The Eternal Consciousness thus becomes a geometrical point, the empty form of the Ego, the dot upon the 'i' which the theory of knowledge exacts A mind that impartially registers facts is hardly worth having Conscious values given by an active mind must be our conviction, and that is the driving

power of the idealistic argument. Of the dissolution of the concrete world into "thought-relations permanently present to a cosmic mind", Bradley talks as "some spectral web of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories... Such an abstract intellectualism strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism". Both Monism and Green's Idealism are theories intended as a demonstration of the Idealistic contention that the ultimate reality of the universe is spiritual. In both cases, however, the stress is laid on the bare form of consciousness. The monadic multiplication of conscious centres is no enrichment of the content of the universe. Nothing is gained by the formal abstraction of Green's theory. The content of the universe — the reality of Infinite Values open to appropriation and enjoyment is alone worth contending for.

(8) Realism.

The word realism has a meaning which has changed from time to time. Plato, Berkeley and Herbert, though they are admittedly never at one in their theories, can be looked upon as realists in different meanings. Plato was a realist, if, by Realism is meant the doctrine of the absolute reality of the Universal or Form. Berkeley may be called a realist in the sense that he too like Plato denied the existence of gross matter and advocated the reality of ideas though in his case the ideas were subjective. If by realism is meant the independent reality of the material substance, then certainly neither Plato nor Berkeley, nor Herbert and Wolff are Realists. It is better to call Plato's doctrine idealism; Berkeley's, subjective idealism and Herbert's, Realism. Thus we are here

concerned with the doctrine of Herbart and his school, who maintained the reality of things independently of any knower. Naïve Realism considers the object as the original, and the idea as its copy. Things are grey or coloured, rough or smooth, the mind adds nothing at all to the reality of the object. The main argument for this attitude is the necessity of accounting for the permanency of the object during intervals of individual acts of perception. It is asked, "Does the table in my room cease to exist when I am away?" Berkeley tried to remove this difficulty by assuming that if a thing is not present to an individual consciousness it must be so to God's consciousness, but apart from some consciousness or other it has no existence. The Realists take up the other alternative and say that things have their own independent reality and have nothing to do with consciousness for their reality. It is pointed out as an additional argument that there are contradictions in human thought and nothing can be real which contains contradictions. Thus Wolff and Herbart take up the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself and say that the thing-in-itself is real while its cognitions by man are contradictory and hence they are the appearances. The desire for a genuine reality and not one that is merely man-made is the actuating power at the back of Realism, to its supporters all the older idealistic views of reality seem like wreaths of early morning mist doomed to vanish before the victorious light of the coming day. Thus Herbart is led to posit a plurality of "Reals" whose various relations give rise to the Phenomenal world.

(9) The New Realists emphasise the objectivity of knowledge and the independent reality not of a few individual, but of the universals. Such terms as Sensation, Per-

ception, Imagination, Conception, Thought, may be used, either with reference to the attitude of the mind towards an object or with reference to the object that is apprehended. The New Realists use them in the latter way. In their language the smell is a sensation, the object is a perception, etc. According to the New Realists not only the primary qualities but all the qualities that we apprehend in connection with particular objects are to be regarded as existing in them. All the characteristics of shape and size that are apprehended by us as belonging to any object are to be regarded as inhering in it. A stick that appears bent, when partially immersed in water, is to be regarded as really bent, in the same sense in which it is really straight out of water.

The criticism of such views is not thorough-going but certainly in certain aspects the views are inadequate. In the first place, how can any object be an object apart from its relation to some consciousness or other? How are we to picture the nature of the object during pauses in perception? Does it sound when no one is hearing or is it coloured when no one is looking? It evidently cannot be right to ascribe to objects, when they are not objects of our idea, the properties we know only by virtue of this idea. We know, for blind persons there are no colours but objects there are. Again, if all qualities, secondary as well as primary, inhere in the things, why do they differ with the degree of illumination etc? All these are variations that we cannot place to the account of the object as such and hence these ideas are different from the thing itself. Again, Realism always goes along with a pluralistic interpretation, but we saw that such an assumption of "Reals" independent not only of a conscious-

ness but of one another cannot be maintained, as on that assumption the coming together of different things and persons cannot be explained. Moreover, Realism cannot give a satisfactory explanation of knowledge. The theory of representative perception which it preaches is erroneous. We do not apprehend pictures of numbers, colours, sounds, etc. Thus Realism cannot explain the cognitive side of human consciousness.

Thus it would seem that a thorough-going Realism is not the final creed though it has the valuable lesson to teach us of the objectivity of the universe and its independence of any particular individual consciousness. Thus it is a potent antidote against Subjective Idealism. But a *via media* seems to be the truth. The idealist contends that without his thought-world the bare concept of a world and a reality would be impossible and that the sense-world derives its content and value entirely from the thought world. Much of reality is in the form of the ideal, the potential, yet it is not a mere sort of embroidery to a world already given and well-established. Thus to avoid the inadequacies of both Realism and Subjective Idealism, an Objective Idealism must be asserted. We have seen the defects of Subjective Idealism, Abstract Idealism and Realism. Let us now turn to a discussion of Absolute Idealism.

(10) Absolute Idealism.

Spinoza's Absolute has been abstract and bloodless because it has been interpreted as equally present in all phenomena. Such an attitude is not possible as there are degrees of value. What we have to deal with is the continuous manifestation of a single Power, whose full nature cannot be identified with the initial stages of the

evolutionary process but can only be learnt from the course of the process as a whole, and most fully from its final stages. Our conception does away with the difficulties arising from relativity of knowledge which proceed from the conception of the world as a finished fact independently existing and unequally independent knower. This latter conception also takes the function of intelligence as purely cognitive, whereas all knowledge has necessarily its feeling-value. But the existence of living centres feeling the grandeur and beauty of the Universe is alone really significant in the Universe. All values are in this sense conscious values. So the sentient and the rational Being appears as the goal towards which Nature is working, viz. the development of an organ by which she may become conscious of herself and enter into the joy of her own feeling.

An attempt of this sort to give a feeling value to experience has been made by Bradley and Bosanquet whose theories may be termed 'Absolute Idealism'. Though Bradley seems at first to make a gulf between Reality and Appearance, his final view seems to be the positive doctrine that reality is revealed in the system of its appearances and that the standards of better and higher which we apply, are themselves based on the nature of reality and dictated by it. The standard or principle of value must be found in the nature of the system as a whole. The object of any particular judgment is a contributory element to this inclusive whole.

Bradley's Absolutism was certainly not to be liked by the Pragmatists. They led a reaction against it. The Personal Idealists, the fore-runners of the Pragmatists,

criticised Bradley's way as "a way of criticising human experience not from the standpoint of human experience, but from the visionary and impracticable standpoint of an Absolute Experience", or in Schiller's more drastic phraseology, "his inhuman, incompetent, impracticable intellectualism". It behoves us, therefore, to see what Bradley's Absolutism meant.

Bradley's criterion is "inclusiveness and harmony". The reality possesses an inclusive harmony. "The Reality must be a single Whole beyond which there is nothing". "The Absolute is an Individual and a System (a hierarchy)" "Perfection of truth consists in positive self subsisting individuality" "Internal harmony and all inclusiveness' are the marks of individuality and therefore of reality. The *concrete* (that is why Bradley is to be marked out from the Abstract Idealists) nature of the system of reality is given in Bradley by the sentient experience. The Absolute is one system and its contents are nothing but sentient experience. It is a single all inclusive experience which embraces every partial diversity in concord. The idea of the Absolute is had thus. We have primitive experience of felt unity. This is combined with the later experience of known diversity of relational thought to form the idea of a higher experience in which, will, thought and feeling may all once more be one. Bradley says we have no direct knowledge of such an experience. We are ignorant *how* the bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity is harmonised and its contradictions reconciled in the Absolute. But it must *some how* be at unity and self consistent. "Certainly in the end, to know *how* the one and the many are united is beyond our power. But in the Absolute *some how*, we are convinced, the problem

is solved " We may remark, "Unless we have at least some knowledge of the *how*, the knowledge claimed for the is by Bradley is not knowledge at all in the ordinary sense, but a postulate, or if you like, a belief, an inextinguishable faith "

Again, the criterion of inclusiveness and harmony is an empty, formal and abstract principle. It is filled with content only when it is applied to specific experience and then it receives its character from the concrete material in which it works itself out. The principle itself gives no guidance as to the mode by which the harmony is realised. It is an inversion of truly philosophic method to try to define the Absolute on the basis of the empty principle and from that definition to reason down to the various phases of our actual experience and to condemn its most characteristic features, root and branch, as 'irrational appearance' and "illusion". The result of such a procedure is exemplified in Bradley's conclusion that we do not know *how* everything is reconciled in the Absolute: the predicates drawn even from our highest experience are not applicable in this ultimate reference. Thus, "the Absolute is not personal nor is it moral nor is it beautiful or true." It was this barren method of Bradley that provoked the protest of the Pragmatists and Personal Idealists against his way of criticising human experience from the side of an Absolute Experience.

We also find Bradley using non-contradiction, harmony and satisfaction as alternative terms and disposed accordingly to extract from his logical principle much more than it seems capable of yielding. His Absolute is not merely an intellectually coherent whole; it is perfect in

every respect. "If the main tendencies of our nature do not reach satisfaction in the Absolute we cannot believe that we have attained to perfection and truth. Our main wants for truth and life, and for beauty and goodness—must all find satisfaction." In the closing pages of his volume he says, 'We make mistakes, but still we use the essential nature of the world as our own criterion of value and reality. Existence must correspond with our ideas'.

Is the Absolute perfect? Bradley contends that we can only indirectly prove that Reality is perfect. For the mere intellect cannot be self-satisfied if other elements of our nature remain discontented. "Pain, of course, is a fact and no fact can be conjured away from the universe, but the question is as to a 'balance' of pain and it is only necessary to assume that in the Absolute there is a balance of pleasure, and all is consistent." Surely, as an argument to prove the perfection of the Universe, this transition from logical coherence or inference to practical comfort or discomfort is one of the flimsiest bridges ever built by metaphysical subtility. Bradley says (in an article), "There is little desire to insist that what we want must be real exactly so as we want it. Whatever detail is necessary to the Good, we may assume, must be included in reality, but it may be included there in a way which is beyond our knowledge and in a consummation too great for our understanding. On the other side, apart from our belief that the ultimate and Absolute Reality is actually present and working within us, what are we to think of the claim that reality is in the end that which satisfies one or more of us? It seems a lunatic dream. The ideas and wishes of 'fellows such as I crawling between Heaven and Earth', how much do they count in the march or the

drift of the Universe"? Now, is there not a depreciatory tone here? We have to suppose that man is organic to the world. The conviction underlying this supposition is the essential greatness of man and the infinite nature of the values revealed in his life. The man to whom his own life is a triviality is not likely to find a meaning in anything else.

We admit the logical principle of non-contradiction as absolute, as an intellectual necessity of reason. All experience is its progressive verification. But the nature of the certainty of an intellectually coherent system is in a sense an unproved belief. For we have not explored the whole of existence, nor even we do so in the nature of things. Thus the certainty is a postulate of reason, a supreme hypothesis, "a venture of faith"; it will be justified if it is a reasonable faith on the trustworthiness of certain great provinces of our experience.

Prof. Bosanquet also holds the same criterion of individuality. "The supreme principle of value and Reality is wholeness, completeness, and individuality and this is the same as the principle of non-contradiction." Every true proposition is so because its contradictory is not conceivable in harmony with the whole of experience. "The Individual is complete and coherent, and in the ultimate sense there can be only one Individual". The standard is positive non-contradiction developed through comprehensiveness and consistency. Prof. Bosanquet takes the right line. He follows the path from finite experience to the Absolute tracing the organizations of the real wholes, in which, in the concrete material of life, the empty form realises itself, and seeking by critical use of the data thus obtained, to reach some positive determination of the

nature of the ultimate whole. The specific modes in which the consciousness of value is realised must obviously be drawn from experience of the concrete worlds of morality, of beauty, of love, of passion of the intellectual life. "The Absolute," says Bosanquet, "exhibits to us, in their relative stability and reciprocal suggestions of completeness, the provinces of experience which comprise the various values of life, it interprets the correlation of their worth with their reality and of both with their satisfactoriness to the soul. What Metaphysics may do, and in the hands of masters always has done, is, starting from any datum, to point out what sort of thing is in actual life the higher, the more stable, and what is more defective and the more self-contradictory, and to indicate the general law or tendency by which the latter is absorbed in the former." The characteristics of the Absolute we divine in the light of the best we know. "The general direction of our higher experiences is a clue to the direction in which perfection has to be sought. We argue not from the bare idea of a systematic whole, but from the amount of system and the kind of system which we are able to point to as realised in experience. From that we argue to more of the same kind, or at least on the same general lines, although it may be on an ampler and diviner scale, "above all that we can ask or think." However, Bosanquet's view of the relation of his "Absolute" to the finite individual is not quite satisfactory. Before discussing that we may here point out some of the chief features of our Objective Idealism.

(II) Objective Idealism.

Our doctrine is summed up in the formula, "Nature is organic to Man and Man to Nature." Our Idealism is

subjective because it admits the importance of Nature, it is idealism because the principle of the unity of the whole is to be drawn from the highest ideals of the highest Being—Man. There is a continuity of process consistent with different phases of experience. One after another (logically not temporally) there is movement, life, purposive adaptation, sentience, rational consciousness, will etc. The nature of the power at work in any process is only realised in the process as a whole. The intelligent Being is as it were, the organ through which the Universe beholds and enjoys itself.

On our view, even the secondary qualities are objective and not mere peculiarities of our sense-organs. The beauty of colour and tones, warmth and fragrance, are what Nature in itself strives to produce and express but cannot without the help (but only help) of the last and noblest instrument — the sentient mind which alone can put into words what the external world was vainly endeavouring to express. The progressive development of more delicate organs of apprehension means the discovery of fresh aspects of the world of qualities that were too subtle to be apprehended by our previous rude instruments. The organism is developed and its powers perfected as an instrument of Nature's purpose of self-revelation. What is true of the secondary qualities is also true of the aesthetic qualities. The poet and the painter are revealers. All idealism teaches the correlativity of subject and object, they develop *pari passu* inasmuch as the objective world seems to grow in richness as we develop faculties to apprehend it. But all sane idealism teaches that in each advance the subject is not creating new worlds of knowledge and appreciation for himself but learning to see more of the one world, 'which is the world of us all'.

Our theory also sweeps away the wrong conception of knowledge and reality. The whole conception of reality as meaning existence apart from knowledge and the accompanying theory of truth as the correspondence of knowledge with what is by definition unknowable—this whole conception with the agnosticism inherent in its very statement is swept away by our view. The reality of the thing is not the thing apart from knowledge but the thing conceived as completely known. Mind is not condemned to circle round the circumference of the real world: it is in the heart of the world; it is itself the centre in which the essential nature of the whole reveals itself. Nor need a dualism between the ethical man and a hostile nature be present on our view. Man, we say, is the child of Nature and his ethical being is built up in commerce with the system of external things. The ethical predicates must carry us nearer to a true definition of the ultimate Life in which we live than the categories which are applicable only to the environmental conditions of our existence. Nature as a realm of inviolable law appears to be the necessary condition of the life of intelligence and reasonable action. Thus we are not bound to a merely mechanistic conception nor to a merely spiritualistic or mentalistic conception of the universe.

Again, we escape the disjunction between Reality and Appearances present in so many other theories. We maintain that the nature of ultimate Reality is to be read in its manifestations and may be read thereof truly. The most exalted intelligence must read, as we do, in the volume of God's works, to learn this nature. His knowledge may be truer in the sense of being simpler and more adequate but this is only a difference of degree. Each is

true as being an interpretation of the facts accessible at the particular stage. Our conception, as has been already indicated, does away with the difficulties arising from relativity of knowledge, which proceed from the conception of the world as a finished fact independently existing and an equally independent knower. Our intelligence is not purely cognitive. The existence of living centres feeling the grandeur and beauty of the universe is alone really significant in the Universe. The sentient and -rational being appears as the goal towards which nature is working, viz. the development of an organ by which she may become conscious of herself and enter into the joy of her own feeling. The real and practical distinction between reality and appearance is a distinction within our experience, between the first impression of anything and the fuller knowledge of it. But misguided philosophy transfers this distinction to our whole experience as contrasted with an Unknowable and Inaccessible Reality. Hence we contend that in appearances we always grasp the nature of reality and that we can attain to it in no other way.

Our theory is also monistic. But with us the principle of unity is not the unity of a mere collection or of a bare abstraction. It is a unity of system associated with an objective scale of values. The standard of value is to be sought for internally in the nature of the system as a whole and more particularly in its highest stages or ideals of the highest being, man. That is how our theory is an "Idealism."

After this general review let us proceed to see how our theory affects some of the important fields of experience such as the relations of the Absolute and the Finite Individual, the relation of society and the individual, the existence and nature of God, the problem of Evil, of Immortality, of Freedom of the Will and others.

Philosophy.

(*In the narrower sense*)

(I) The Absolute and the Finite Individual.

The conception of Self. The Problem of Creation and Freedom, etc.

Evidently the self cannot be "a substance existing in its own right" The mere individual nowhere exists he is the creature of a theory A self can only exist in vital relation to an objective system of reason and an objective world of ethical observance from which it receives its content Apart from these it would be a bare point of mere existence Historically the individual is organic to society In a still larger philosophical reference the individual is organic to a universal life or world of which he is similarly a focus, an organ of expression He cannot be self-contained in relation to that life as such self-containedness would mean sheer emptiness It is, therefore, absurd to talk of him as existing in his own right" He exists as an organ of the Universe, the Absolute the one Being, and from the same source he draws his rational and spiritual content The individual self does not exist "strong in solid singleness" like a Lucretian atom The currents of the Divine life course through it It is open to all the influences of the Universe, otherwise progress is inexplicable, so also religious conversions and change in Personality

Though Bosanquet admits all this he is grudging in his 'formal distinctness of selves or souls' Though this formal distinctness of immediate experience is inevi-

table, still the monistic tendency of Bosanquet leads him to under-estimate its importance. The distinctness in his opinion is of a precarious and superficial character. At every point we meet with indications that something deeper and more real underlies them. We admit that there is an identity of content in all selves. It is also true that the great supra-individual creations like the structure of a national civilisation and traditions seem real in a sense that transcends the reality of any individual citizen. But on the other hand the universal is an abstraction if it is taken as real independently of the individuals whose living tissue it is. If they realise themselves through it, it realises itself through them. So the fabric of two minds may be so nearly identical that they are duplicates rather than supplements, still they remain two minds, for ever. Bosanquet looks upon the individual *qua* individual almost as a negligible feature of the world and treats the finite self as a transitory phenomenon. Even though Bosanquet objects to the phrase 'numerical identity' and maintains that individuals are not articles turned out by a machine and emphasises the qualitative uniqueness of the individual, still he seems constantly to imply that this is to be conceived as the contribution of an element to a universal experience not as consisting in its own total living reality as a specified incarnation a centre into which the Absolute has poured its own being. According to Bosanquet's theory the finite individual is represented as yielding its contribution like a perfume exhaled in the very dissolution of its private being. Here is a point of contention. We maintain that every individual is a unique nature, a little world of content which as to the systematic structure of the whole constitutes an

expression or focalisation of the universe which is nowhere exactly repeated. Appearances to the contrary are due to superficial observation and want of interest in the object concerned. For example, the sheep in a flock are so many numerical units to a stranger but to the shepherd they are distinct individuals. Similarly though we are likely at some time of depression to look upon mankind as all mass, still a little sympathy will take us into the depths of human souls.

Bosanquet illustrates his attitude by a dog's mind - which is an "extreme case" of the imperfect individual. The dog's mind, he contends, has value but not that distinctness and organisation of content which is expected of anything that is to have a permanent place of its own as a separate member of the system of reality. "The finite self like everything else in the universe is now and here beyond escape an *element* in the Absolute, not a *member* of the Absolute." This view of the self runs from end to end of his system. The too exclusive monism of the system depends on the defective idea of what is meant by a self or by the fact of individuation in general. In strong terms one might almost say that Prof. Bosanquet's theory does not contain the idea of self at all. The world is dissolved into a collection of qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the Absolute. And again just because of the failure to appreciate the meaning of finite selfhood, it is difficult to say whether even the Absolute is to be regarded as a Self or not, that is to say, whether what is called the Absolute Experience possesses the centrality or focalised unity which is the essential characteristic of a self and in the degree of everything that is real.

Bosanquet seems to deny the self to be a substance. But evidently he takes the Spinozistic meaning of the word substance (viz an independent and self-existent being) and then denies substantiality to the self. He argues that the finite individuals are ultimate predicatees of the one Reality. Thus in his hurry he seems to deny substantiality to the self even in the Aristotelian sense (viz a substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything else but of which we predicate the universals). We hold the Aristotelian position against Bosanquet. We appeal to independent 'substances' not in the Spinozistic sense of the self as complete and self-explaining, but to the unique individuality of the self as a centre of immediate experience.

Bradley, also, "merges" these separate centres of immediate experience as adjectives of the one Reality which is the ultimate subject of all predication. This attitude can only hold as a denial of a final and unmediated pluralism. Bradley says, "The finite fact is adjectival on what is beyond itself." This use can only be metaphorical. Things cannot be adjectives of one another though they carry us beyond themselves. Thus shoes are not an adjective of the feet nor son the adjective of father. The adjectival theory only means the denial of unrelated reals. The true view of reality thus is that the universe is an inclusive system of inter-related facts which so included and inter-related are to be regarded as constituent *members* of a single Whole. There is a world of difference between looking upon individuals as elements and as members of the Whole. Thus our conception of the nature and function of individuation is different from what dominates the metaphysics of Bosanquet and Bradley.

Mr Bradley contends that finite centres are mere appearances 'from the side of the Absolute'. But Bradley's argument is an argument in a circle. There cannot be illusion or mere appearance unless souls or finite selves really exist as such to be sustained victims of this illusion. The plurality of finite centres is, therefore, a true appearance, that is the Absolute really does appear or differentiate itself in that way. Bradley's expressions of "blending" and "merging" of the finite selves proceed on the assumption that the selves as such, in their finite integrity, possess no value for the Absolute. Bradley repudiates the view that in the Absolute the finite centres are maintained, only they are ordered and arranged. In his opinion, in the Absolute, the finite things are transmuted and have lost their immediate natures. Bosanquet also tells us that the content of the imperfect individual has to be transmuted and rearranged. If the one (Bradley) talks of the finite self as being embraced and harmonised in the Absolute the other speaks of the expansion and absorption of the self. Bradley speaks of the perfection and harmony of the individual in the Absolute as the complex gift and dissipation of his personality in which "he as such must vanish". Other words in Bradley's "Appearance and Reality," are "merged", "blended", "fused", "absorbed", "dissolved" and the more sinister terms "suppressed", "destroyed" and "lost".

According to such views the contents or qualities of the different selves are shaken up together and neutralise and supplement one another. "A's failing will counteract B's, if A and B could be shaken up in a bag together, they would make a perfect man". The Absolute is a limiting case of such a process. If such an all-pervasive

transfusion is the goal or eternal reality which only our impotence disguises from us, then the existence of the finite centres seems inexplicable and even uncalled for. Why should the blessed harmony of the Perfect Experience be disturbed even in appearance? The whole conception of blending and merging depends on taking an adjectival view of the finite things - on treating them as a bundle of qualities or abstract universals. The concrete existing individual is not a mere complex of abstract universals. Individuals are ultimately differentiated by their content or nature but this should not obscure the fact that each is a concrete existent. The term 'content' engenders the wrong notion that the individual is simply a very complex group of universals. If the individual is not a combination of the abstract universal qualities nor the abstract particular (a mere point of existence) it is neither an intricately mingled group of universals - a highly complex adjective. To treat it thus would be to overlook the unity and centrality which is the characteristic of concrete existence, and is what we mean by individuation. When the whole stress is laid on content, the content comes to be regarded as somehow detachable from the centres and capable of being rearranged and finally shaken into perfect harmony in the Absolute. Bradley's conception of the self as made up of qualities does no more justice to the substantive unity of every existent than did the old Associationist dissolution of self into atomic states or ideas. To use one of his illustrations, the qualities or different elements of content in a centre seem as loose and independent as marbles in a bag and when the string of the bag is loosened the marbles escape as it were into the empty space of the Absolute to group themselves afresh,

or seeing that the bag is ultimately a fiction we ought to speak of temporarily cohering marbles detaching themselves from their groups and being swept into new combinations. But we cannot really speak so of any self or soul or anything actually existing not even of the Absolute itself, if it is to be more than an abstraction, if it is really an *experience* as it is said to be.

The term 'centre of experience or focus' expresses the characteristic nature of the individual or the concrete universal as a self-contained world in which a certain manifold of content acquires an internal unity as a single self or object. The self or object is not anything over and above the content or a mere point of existence to which the content attaches or even as an eye placed in position over against its objects to pass them in review. The unity of a subject simply expresses the peculiar organisation or systematisation of the content. Its content in Bosanquet's phrase has come alive'. The origin of such centres may be termed the creation. In one aspect, the soul appears to be the product of the general system of things, in another aspect it appears to be self-created by its own action, to presuppose its own existence at every stage of its progress so that as it has been said paradoxically, there is no first moment of self-consciousness but only a second. The phrase *focus* however is not quite felicitous. The centre is an active centre of response and not merely a focus in which a certain range of externality reflects itself into unity. Bosanquet's emphasis on the function of environment seems to suggest the idea of such a dead focus. But the mass-points of the physicist are theoretical abstractions. The responsive centre is a practical and living reality. Lotze also recognised the

mystery of creation. It is the partial independence of the finite centres which constitutes the essential mystery of the fact of their creation. If the individuals are simply pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets, as it were, of one fountain, there is no creation, no real differentiation and therefore no mystery. But a self which is merely a channel or mouth-piece of another self is not a self. The essential nature of the self is that it thinks, acts and views the world from its own centre. Each of us dichotomises the universe in a different place. There is no creation if the selves have no kind of independent status. Bosanquet's assertion that "there is no genuine freedom unless the divine will is genuinely one with that of finite beings in a single personality" is a glaring instance of self-contradiction, for it is to deny that there are two Wills at all.

From the above discussion of the notion of the Self, the relation of the Absolute and the finite Individual will be at once decided and the Problem of Freedom solved. Bosanquet appeals to the highest experiences of love, religious consciousness, and social union to show how the selves merge into One. But the same experiences prove the absolute necessity of otherness. It takes two to love and to be loved, to worship and to be worshipped; and many must combine to form a society. The completest identification of interests and aims does not merge the friends into one. Self-hood is not selfishness. It is a fallacy to suppose that with the growth of social solidarity the particular centres tend to be *qua* particular centres, transcended and absorbed. On the other hand, the better the society, the more fully does each member realise and enjoy his own individuality. It is in individual fact that

the common life burns. Thus the relation of society and the individual is also defined. The individual is a unique organ of the society. If he lives in society the society too lives in him.

The religious consciousness shows the same fact of individuation. It shows that there is a real difference between selves. Bosanquet defines the religious consciousness as self-recognition, that is, recognition by the finite of its true being and of its union with the whole. In devotion and worship the self not merely passes beyond itself but consciously and intentionally rejects itself as worthless, because of the supreme value of the object of worship. These phrases imply that reality of difference for which Bosanquet's system in its letter at least appears to leave no room. It is because we have got an independent statue that we recognise our dependence upon something higher. The very self-identification with the Perfect Whole implies the individual difference of the self. Otherwise we are reduced to the lower Pantheism. The selves are not mere telephone-wires along which the Absolute acts or thinks. Spinoza with his Pantheism tends to deny individual freedom of existence. As it has been often remarked, 'the system of Spinoza has no room in it for Spinoza himself'. Man is made a mere automaton. That sublime acquiescence that ardour of self-identification with the spirit of the universe is possible only to beings who are more than 'modes' of a divine substance—whose prerogative it rather is to become the Sons of God and not his creatures.

Modern Absolutism like the ancient Hellenism tends to look upon the ultimate principle as impersonal and to repeat the too exclusively intellectualistic attitude. But

no solution of the problem of God and Man can be reached from a consideration of man as a merely cognitive being. Bare knowledge without a personality whose attitude to the world of action is shaped by it, is an abstraction. The character or spiritual will is the concrete Personality. It is as such a will that man is independent. To be a self is to be a formed will, originating its own actions and accepting ultimate responsibility for them. With freedom of man is linked his responsibility for the actions he does. In moral causation, man is the source of the action. We cannot go behind him and treat him as a thoroughfare through which certain forces operate and contrive to produce a particular result. And yet we do not deny development to man. The person is not certainly a fixed and unchangeable Unit. He is open to moral education and spiritual regeneration. He may change so much as to become a new man altogether. But although he is thus open to all the influences of the universe, these do not act on him like forces *à la extra*. They make their appeal to him but he must give the response. He cannot be driven, he must be drawn. The process of transformation is his own act, his deliberate choice. We may believe in the ultimately constraining power of the Good, but a moral being cannot be commanded, he must be persuaded and the process may be long. Even the Divine importunity will not force an entrance. This freedom belongs to a self-conscious being as such and it is the fundamental condition of the ethical life. Kant argues that the 'ought' implies the 'can'. Without it we shall have a world of automata. In asserting freedom we are not asserting anything additional and extraneous about our experience: we are simply describing its nature as we know it from within. And we are applying in this supreme instance the principle of the reality of appearances.

We now come to a definite assertion about the relation of man and the Absolute. The fundamental structure of the actual world is represented by such individuation, and yet there is that perpetual hope of living for the whole. In Bosanquet's words "The unit asks nothing better than to be lost in the Whole." Nothing is truer. It expresses the familiar paradox of ethical and religious life - dying to live, self-realisation through self-sacrifice, self development through self-absorption in the objective interests and in the currents of the universal life. The individual who would find his end in the culture of his own personality, whether as a moral work of art, or in the wider fields of literature and taste, suffers the same defect as the voluptuary who pursues pleasure for pleasure's sake. But although the individual may not make himself his own End, the world of finite individuals may well constitute the End of the Absolute. How can we ascribe to the Absolute, as many theologians have done the self-centred life, the contemplation of his own glory, which spells moral death in the creature? Is it reasonable to deny the formal life of God that giving of Himself and finding of Himself in others which we recognise as the perfection and fruition of the human life? This would be, under pretext of exalting the Divine, to place it lower than the best we know. More reasonable it is to suppose that the Infinite Reality reflects itself in the finite nature. From the side of the Absolute the meaning of the finite process must lie in the creation of a world of individual spirits. To such alone He can reveal Himself, and receive the answering tribute of love and adoration. These spirits are "elicited" out of the common fund of externality which assumes now an instrumental function to the new world of appreciation, mutual

recognition and spiritual communion which enrich the life from which they spring. The idea that God was friendless and created spirits, "blessed mirrours of his blessedness" should not be regarded as a time-process but as an eternal fact of the divina natura as a self-communicative life.

The foregoing discussions clearly show the relation between the Absolute and man, between society and man and indicate the relative freedom of a self. As we said, in the ultimate sense no constraining power can be exercised on a person *ab extra*. He must reform himself. He is not, however, at daggers drawn with nature or with other persons. He is prone to all the educative influences of nature and society. We assert the freedom on the strength of our actual experience. Self-sacrifice and self-realisation are not two facts, they are the two aspects of one and the same fact *viz* development. Boeaquet seems to concede too much to the demand of society and therefore also of the highest society, the Absolute. He makes it be believed that the society 'absorbs' the individual. But we have seen, the development of society far from absorbing its individual members, is a continual development of that self-consciousness and furnishes no ground for inferring their disappearance as particular centres in the Absolute. If centrality of individuation is a characteristic of everything that is concretely real, we shall not speak or think of the Absolute as 'a vast continuum' of which "finite self-conscious creatures" are "fragments" but rather as the focal unity of a world of self-conscious worlds, to which it is not only their sustaining substance but also the illumination of their lives.

We have already disposed of Pluralism we have now ever to say a little about one form of it here Dr. Rashdall and so also Bradley distinguish between God and Absolute. The Absolute according to them is equal to God plus other spirits God is thus himself a fraction of the Absolute Rashdall's theory conceives of the co-existence of God and other spirits on terms of mutual exclusion "Minds, he says, "are not Chinese boxes that can be put inside one another' But on such a view there is no content or constituent nature for this bare form of personality Again, as we have seen there cannot be transient causation between God and the other spirits There must be immanent causation, and that means that God is not a person apart from other persons God is God only as being creative Even if we apply the term 'personality' to God it is not in this sense of bare self consciousness We mean that the universe is thought of in the last resort, as an experience - one total whole We call God personal because in personality is revealed the highest we know, not because we mean by Him one like our own finite persons, but because it is better to call him so than call Him impersonal The epithet must be taken negatively Again, when the reality is the one systematic whole, it is absurd to draw a distinction (without a difference) between the Absolute and God Bradley speculates that the Absolute enjoys the balance of pleasure distilled, as it were, from the delights and agonies of finite agents Such an idea, however implies a fatal dualism - the idea of a God without a Universe, a pre-existent, self centred and absolutely self-sufficient Being This conception of the Divine, as we shall see, is not true Thus Absolute Idealism is not

our creed in the sense in which it has been proclaimed by Bradley. It is better therefore to call our theory Objective (or Cosmic) Idealism

The solution of the problems of evil and immortality depends much on the way in which the existence of God is conceived. We shall, therefore, deal with the problem of the existence and nature of God before tackling the problems of Evil and Immortality

(2) Arguments for the existence of God.

The arguments for the non-existence of God are of a negative character. They try to refute the arguments for the existence of God but cannot do so successfully. Even Kant who criticised the traditional arguments for the existence of God admitted His Existence on ethical grounds. The atheists are generally ultra materialists and they are and always have been very few in number. Their arguments, as Bacon says, presuppose the existence of God. But in one form or another they resort to an ultimate principle though they object to calling the principle God. Thus we see that much depends upon the individual temperament. But atheism being on the whole a creed of hopeless minority, we are more directly concerned with the views of the Theists or believers in God's existence. We shall see what arguments are brought forward in favour of such an existence and whether there are defects in any of them. The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been three—(1) the Cosmological argument, (2) the Ontological argument and (3) the Teleological argument. The credit of formulating these in a systematic manner belongs to Descartes.

The Cosmological argument is a causal argument. It is the argument from effect to cause, from the empirically verified existence of the world to God as the cause which explains that existence. It is said, "Nothing exists without a cause and the original cause of the Universe (whatever it be) we call God and piously ascribe to Him every species of perfection" The Cartesian argument was, "I have an idea of a Perfect Being. This idea must have an adequate cause. Therefore, God must exist for only He, and no imperfect Being, can be the adequate cause of my idea of perfection" In a similar strain Locke shows that man is a real being, therefore from eternity there has been something. Again, man finds in himself perception and knowledge and since the first eternal being cannot give to another any perfection that it hath not, it necessarily follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter but must be an eternal mind.

Kant ridiculed this argument. He pointed out that it results in an infinite regress or in the notion of an uncaused cause which is contradictory to the causal argument itself. "Again," he asks, "how can we go from the finite and imperfect to the infinite and perfect?" Hegel leads the counter attack. He points out that this being above the source is a fundamental feature of all inductive reasoning. He shows that Kant's criticism of reasoning misreads entirely the logic of religion and the procedure of living thought in any sphere which perpetually carries us beyond our premises. The finite here is not like the solid unchanging foundation of the syllogistic form.

An argument nearly allied to the cosmological argument is the argument from contingency. The argument is not so much, "because the contingent is, therefore the

necessary being is', as "Because the contingent is not therefore the necessary Being is". The finite facts are unstable, changing and self-contradictory, hence the mind seeks to pass beyond them as fragmentary appearances to a reality which it conceives as an abiding and harmonious whole. We shall see that the cosmological argument of the first kind is not tenable on account of its dualism but this revised edition of the argument in the form of the argument from contingency seems a satisfactory explanation. The finite or stepping stone vanishes and is recognised as existing only in and through the infinite. The finite is not merely absorbed. The infinite expresses itself in the finite and the living fact is just this unity - the realisation of the infinite in the finite and the recognition by the finite of its own groundedness in the infinite. This argument a *contingentia mundi* is described by Bossuet as "the essential argument of metaphysics". The necessary is 'the stable, the satisfactory, the spirit of totality working within us, which carries us forward'. The same idea of the spirit of the Whole is the fundamental meaning of Aristotle's great doctrine of the first mover operative in the universe as desire or love. Thus the cosmological argument we accept in this revised form. On that argument God is not the cause of the world in the sense in which a carpenter is the cause of the articles that he produces and that stand apart from him. He is the cause in the sense of the ground - the *raison d'être*. He is not the sum of all things but the principle working in them, not *natura naturata* but *natura naturans*.

The Ontological argument. The essence of this argument consists in passing from idea to existence. It

is an a priori argument to a necessary existent Being who carries the reason of his existence in himself and cannot be supposed not to exist. This argument is of a long standing. Parmenides was the first to say 'Thought is Reality'. To think is the same thing as to be. Plato's God also is the Highest Idea. His position also rests upon the ontological argument. Plotinus also said that thought constituted the essence of reality. In modern times Descartes and Bradley are the greatest exponents of the argument. Hume and Kant criticised it and Hegel criticised Kant. Descartes derives his argument for God's existence out of his formula 'Cognito ergo sum' "If I have in my consciousness any idea as clear and distinct as my idea of myself, it must have existence like myself. My idea of God has just that clearness and distinctness, and therefore God exists." Descartes another argument is the geometrical argument. When I think of a triangle, I must think of it as having its three angles equal to two right angles. Such is also my idea of God, I must think of Him as perfect and existing. He would not be God i.e. a perfect Being if He did not exist. Hume and Kant criticise these. Hume says in his "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion" that existence is not an addition to the content of any idea. "Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. The words 'necessary existence' have no meaning. Moreover if they had any meaning, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being?" Kant also ridiculed the argument. He said if ideas were realities, beggars would ride horses, that a beggar may entertain an idea of a hundred dollars in his pocket but that does not actually bring a hundred dollars into his pocket. He

pointed out that the judgment "God exists" must be either analytic or synthetic. If it is analytic, it is useless. If synthetic it depends upon experience. There is no experience corresponding to the idea of God. Therefore, you cannot assert that God exists; neither can you assert that he does not exist. On grounds of pure reason we can not prove God's existence; only on other grounds of faith we may *postulate* His existence. Hegel criticised Kant's argument by pointing out that Kant confused possession with existence and that a beggar could not have an idea of the hundred dollars unless hundred dollars somewhere existed. Again, Kant confused imagination with idea. Idea meant not an individual fancy but a consistently worked out thought. Revising Descartes' triangle argument - it may be said that God is the cause of the world in the sense in which the three sides of a triangle are the cause of the triangle. Without them the triangle is not.

Hegel pointed out that Kant himself had said, "Mind maketh Nature". The Ontological argument is, therefore, valid in the sense that reality corresponds to consistent thought; for there cannot be consistent thinking without a consistent reality. Even the centaur has existence though in the world of fiction. Bradley states this argument in the following words, "Existence must correspond to our ideas. The possibilities of thought cannot exceed the actuality of being. There is no thought so poor that it has no reality corresponding to it." Such a hypothesis is at the back of all our notions of space, time and others. In thinking we are thinking of reality. If so, there must be an existence corresponding to our idea of God. What Descartes meant by his ontological argument was nothing

more than this. If we have a positive idea of God, God is. Now the idea of God is not positive in the sense that we know everything about God's perfection. We do not rightly know in what Divine perfection consists, but it is something which we feel towards, whose characters we divine along the lines of our own highest experiences. Our idea is approximative. Descartes did not mean by positive idea a clear, precise and adequate idea (which is impossible) but an idea which is not a mere negation, so if, we clap a 'not' before the finite and say that the infinite is what the finite is not. The idea is positive up to the very limits of conception, including all that is real in the finite and infinitely more. But that "more" although it is the moving spirit of life within us, we do not possess in terms of conscious experience of thought till it is revealed to us bit by bit "with the process of the suns" and it may often be, "in the travail of our souls". It must be admitted that the full-orbed conception is beyond our reach. The human idea of God is 'an endless growing idea', one which grows with man's own growth. We are never at the goal but as we move, the direction in which it lies becomes more and more definite.

A third classical argument for God's existence is what is called the argument from Design. Though the sceptic school reviled at the first two arguments, it was so impressed by the orderly arrangement of the Universe that it could not gainsay the argument from Design. Berkeley says, "Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that men need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth, in a word, all these bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world

have not any subsistence without a mind. Hume, in his "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," puts into the mouth of Philo the following statements. "A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless the most stupid thinker and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems as at all times to reject it. All sciences lead us almost insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author". "The existence of Deity is plainly ascertained by reason". Even in the Treatise there are such statements, as, "The order of the Universe proves an omnipotent mind"; "the chief or sole argument for a Divine existence is derived from the order of Nature". The argument from design is an argument from the natural design to a Creator who is similar (but on a grand scale) to the mind of man. Even Kent admitted this argument to be "the oldest, the clearest, and the most popular". Elsewhere he says, "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the longer we reflect upon them *The starry heavens above and the moral law within*". It is evident, however, that we cannot accept this argument as the Design theory presupposes a fatal dualism - a creator and his material. The idea of contrivance prominent in the traditional form of the argument from design implies that God is a contriver, an artificer of the independently existing matter. In Aristotle and Plato the cosmic process is regarded ultimately under the analogy of the plastic artist who finds in the hard material a limit to the realisation of his formative thought. Such a theory leaves us with a Dualism of two independent and eternal principles, the one of which is conceived as hampering and limiting the Divine activity. God is creator, not

artificer . God is not first God and then Creator. As God, He is the Creator of the world; and as the Creator of the world He is God. God does not *become* the Creator of the world but is so from eternity. We can, however, accept the argument from Design in a revised form as the teleological argument. As against the lower argument from Design it was rightly pointed out that the world resembles a living organism more than a machine. Huxley tries to object to this argument on his evolutionary view. He says the universe is not a machine nor has it been perfect from the beginning. "Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout no eternity ere this system was struck out." This is Huxley's famous argument from evolution against Paley and his Almighty Watch-maker. But though the argument holds good against the machine theory, evolution cannot be said to explode the teleological argument. On the other hand, the idea of evolution has broadened the conception of cosmic teleology. The bigger teleological argument therefore lies not in explaining particular phenomena from the design theory but in looking at the systematic unity of nature. Kant says at the end of his 'Critique of Pure Reason', "The agency of the Supreme Being is not to be invoked to explain particular phenomena." This error is avoided if we do not merely consider certain parts of Nature from the point of view of finality but look upon the systematic unity of Nature in a perfectly general way in relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence. The whole aim of this regulative principle (teleology) is to discover a necessary and systematic unity in Nature. The teleological argument is the idealistic argument. We argue not so much from Nature as from human experi-

ence The whole modern teleological argument for God's existence may be summarised thus in the words of Pringle Pattison, 'We must base philosophical conclusion on aspects of human experience and it is a fact that ideals are creative forces in man's experience The ideal is the most real thing Faith or active belief in the reality of the ideal is the very breath by which humanity lives. That is what sustains prolonged literary studies, active service of the country and enables the soldier to die happily for his country. In fact, the power of framing ideals and acting according to them constitutes man's nature as a rational creature and makes him more than an intermittent pulse of animal desire" Whence come these ideas? We must answer with Descartes, from a perfect Being" The idea of a Perfect Being is organic to the very structure of intelligence, knit up indissolubly with self-consciousness which is a foundation certainty of Descartes Descartes says that the idea of the infinite is more real and in a sense prior to self consciousness How could I be conscious of my imperfections unless I had the idea within me of a Being more perfect than myself by comparison with whom I recognise the defects of my own nature? The finite self is not really finite The absolutely finite would have no idea of a beyond and of a higher and lower Man is not finite in this sense He is a finite-infinite being, conscious of finitude only through the presence of an infinite nature within him Our aspirations and capacity of infinite progress are based on the existence of a Perfect Being revealing Himself in our minds Reverence for the moral law, the sense of sin, the attitude of worship and self-surrender are impossible if the subject does not feel himself in presence of a Supreme Reality Religion and

Morality thus give the direct experience of Reality. The Philosopher may criticise the Super-added superstitions but the fundamental facts are true" Thus the existence of God is given us by our religious consciousness which is the highest. Bradley also says, "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. The man who demands a reality more solid than the religious consciousness, knows not what he seeks".

Thus we have examined the three classical arguments for God's existence and accepted them each in a revised form - the causal or cosmological argument, the ontological argument and the argument from Design or the teleological argument. The three arguments supplement each other. The three together may be summarised thus: it is a fact that our lives are guided by purposes (design) and ideals. These ideals if consistent must be true (Ontological argument); and every thing having its cause, (causal argument), these ideals must be coming to us from a Perfect, Infinite Being. Thus we have established the existence of God. Let us now see what is the nature of God, by a discussion of the chief theories held about it.

(3) The Nature of God.

Atheism, Deism, Theism and Pantheism are the chief attitudes concerning the nature of God. Atheism need not be discussed as it is a negation of Theism and is the creed of the fewest. We shall also not concern ourselves with the theory of the unknowable God. We have already shown the radical inconsistency of such a position and the wrong theory of knowledge on which it

is base! In Harrison's words, 'Helpless, Objectless, Apathetic wonder at an inscrutable infinity may be attractive to a metaphysical divine but it does not sound like a working force in the world' "The mathematical form of the worship of the unknowable, would be, "Oh X, love us, help us, make us one with thee' It is difficult to see how an utterly unknowable God is to be worshipped The only good point in the theory of the unknowable God is the infinity of God that it asserts

Deism was the attitude of older Christians It looks upon God as a Creator in much the same way as the potter is the creator of the pots They looked upon creation as an event in the past Some calculated it at 4004 B C God, on this theory, is a purely transcendental being Deism rests upon the theory of physical cause but any thinking man has to pass from that to immanent causes The idea of a special creation represents the universe as in no way organic to the divine life On the contrary, God is conceived as a pre-existent, self-centred Person to whom, in his untroubled eternity, the idea of such a creation occurs as an after thought The inspiration is forthwith put into execution, the world is created by "the word of his power" A Universe is summoned into existence and stands somehow there as shapes and figures might appear at a sorcerer's word of command, or as temples and towers rise like an exhalation before the eyes of a dreamer The act is an accident in God's existence and the product stands somehow independently outside and goes on by itself, so that His relation to the subsequent unfolding of the cosmic drama is at most that of an interested spectator A God so conceived is an Absolute in the old had sense of a Being existing by-itself with no

essential relations to any thing else. But if God is the principle through which the world becomes intelligible, His relation to the world cannot be of this accidental kind. The nature of God must no less be expressed in the universe and understood through it.

Theism takes a step forward and looks upon creation as an eternal act. But even then creation is regarded as an act of bare will, as a separate, externally posited existence. This kind of factual externality could not be long maintained in regard to the spiritual creation. Hence the direct ethico religious relation of man to God made it impossible to treat the Divine and the human as merely cause and effect. Monotheistic transcendence was put an end to. Hence the doctrine of eternal creation as the continual product of the changeless Divine Will becomes an expression of the Divine nature rather than the outcome of will is the essence of choice. On such a general view the idea of creation passes into that of manifestation - the revelation in and to finite spirits of the infinite riches of the Divine life. "The glory of God does not mean self-glorification and display like that of a despot feeding on servile adulation. It is to be interpreted in the sense of self-communion, intensification of life through realisation of the life of others. Just as the conscious being passively receives his fitting from nature and is reduced at once to a bare point or empty focus if we attempt to lift him, as an independent unitary existence, out of the universal life from which he draws his spiritual sustenance, so is the case with God.

Thus by criticism of Deism and Theism we are driven to view God not as "wrapped up in Himself entirely, and in Himself an Absolute" but living and expressing Himself

in and through the Universe. Thus there is no special creation. Hegel's principle of logical implication is no more than this principle of eternal creation. Hence Hegel's polemic against the God of Deism as the unknown God. Just as the finite subjects have no independent existence outside the universal life, so also God becomes an abstraction if separated from the universe of his manifestations. There cannot be efficient causation between spirit and spirit. Spirits are not detached like products from their maker. They are more aptly described as partakers of the Divine nature. There can thus be no ground for a pre-existent Deity. The Infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through the Infinite - this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know it.

Thus we are led to a Pantheistic view, and yet we do not accept the lower pantheism which appears to be the creed of Spinoza and the Occasionalists's school. To the Spinozists, God seems to be the immediate cause of everything. Thus the defects of the lower pantheism are—
 (1) there is no graded scale of values. God is equally the cause of everything. This naturally leads to the abolition of the distinctions of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and disorder, as human prejudices, abstractions of the human imagination due to man's incorrigible habit of judging everything according to his own happiness, (ii) Again, by making men only the "occasional" causes of their actions, they deny freedom to man. Instead of self-determinism, their doctrine is pantheistic determinism. Man becomes an insignificant detail in the machine like universe, he becomes a divine automaton. But as we have already seen, even God cannot dictate to man; He

can persuade. The freedom of man is a very great point at stake. In the words of Armstrong: "The theist may sit gratefully at the pantheist's feet when with fervent eloquence he discourses on the Divine energies which fill the course of the world; he may surrender to him the whole region which he can sweep with telescope or descry with microscope, but he may not surrender the mind of men to the Divine immanence. Here are islands of individual will in the midst of the ocean of the universal will, which will remain unswamped."

The knotty points in the discussion about the nature of God are the conceptions of His immanence and yet at the same time transcendence. The presence and power of the ideal is the solution of the debate between immanence and transcendence. Without the acknowledgment of the ideal, a doctrine of immanence must degenerate into an acceptance and justification of the actuals just as we find them. This is the lower Pantheism which ascribing everything to the direct and immediate agency of God virtually denies the existence of reflective, self-conscious, spiritual centres such as we know them in our experience. Such theory holds literally that individuals are the vehicles of Divine ideas or purposes and self-reference is no more possible to the individual centre than it is to the water-pipe in respect of the water that comes through it. Such a view is false. The individual cannot be the vehicle of a purpose unless he identifies himself with the purpose. According to the lower pantheism, we are all divine automata, with at most a passive sentience of what goes on within us. Immanence so understood reduces both God and Man to meaningless terms, for God

becomes simply a collective name for a world of things' which simply exist. In such a world, there is no room for desire prompted action. If there is no self-reference, there can be no ideals but only bare facts. The reason why the lower pantheism is indistinguishable from atheism is that there can be no true doctrine of God which is not based on a true doctrine of man, and the essence of human nature consists in ideals, in the ought-to-be, as contrasted with the "is". Such a life of ideals and their gradual realisation is explicable only through actual presence within it or to it of the Perfection to which it aspires. This presence of the Perfection is what is really meant by immorance. The only intelligible transcendence of the Divine consists in the infinite greatness and richness of the the Continuing life as compared with anything as yet appropriated by the finite creature. The creation of the Soul is fitly represented by the addition of a child to the family, but it is something more intimate still, for the filaments which unite the finite spirit to its Creative Source are never severed. The Productive Reason remains at once the sustaining element of the dependent life, and the living content, continually offering itself to the soul which it has awakened to the knowledge and the quest of Itself. Thus we preach the higher Pantheism. The immanence and infinity of God are at once emphasised. How individual freedom, the all-pervadingness of God and yet His infiniteness are all to be reconciled may at once be understood by the following striking passage from Fichte's writings which may serve as a finishing stroke to the foregoing discussion. Says Fichte, "God is not a substance, God is the universal moral process, the moral

world order When I find in myself that duty is reality and not this or that crystallized thing I find that God is Universal Duty, Universal moral functioning in which I am participating We are not only part of God We are He The Absolute Ego manifests itself in our poor Finite Ego How dignified our humble lot is made by thinking that in *our* acting, God is acting / We are fighting God a battle and this victory is not won except as we will Duty is the clarion Voice of God, and we are persons so far as we express that Voice It matters little whether I speak of my own duty or the moral purpose of the world They are the same thing "

Before we close the discussion of the nature of God, mention must be made of the argument for the existence and the consequent theory of the nature, of God as conceived by Kant and of the conception of Finite God that has found currency with some of the well known modern philosophers

Kant is an Ethicist par excellence in modern philosophy God is for Kant therefore primarily and essentially the author and maintainer of a moral order The Universe as a moral system is the last word of the Kantian Philosophy Still he does not admit God's existence as scientifically proved He accepts it as one of his three Postulates of Practical Reason He derives his two postulates of Immortality and God from the two aspects of the Summum Bonum - virtue and happiness He says virtue should be accompanied by happiness but very often we see the contrary in this world Hence the balance must be restored in a life after death and that by a moral governor, God But this idea of God is not quite satis-

factory. His God is external: it is a *Denz ex machina* introduced to effect the equation between virtue and happiness. He is instrumental in human happiness; but does this not strike as cold? When with Kant even man is an end and not a means, is it not degrading the nature of God to make Him only a means of human happiness? God, on Kant's view, is the giver of doses of happiness in exact proportion to individual merit. But this idea of virtue also is degrading. Virtue claims no reward for its well-doing, least of all does it keep a moral ledger with a debit and credit account to be evenly balanced. God seems to be introduced in Kant's moral theory by the back-stairs, almost as an after-thought, and He is connected with the Law not as inspirer or author, but in the merely administrative capacity of Paymaster General. Immanence of the Divine is an idea foreign to Kant's whole way of thinking. In ethics he preaches autonomy of the Will, the law as self-imposed; but in religion he talks of the moral laws as commands of the Supreme Being morally perfect and all powerful. Thus Kant's conception of God has a pragmatic tint. But God is not merely of practical interest as only conditioning a future life.

The conception of a finite God is had mainly as a device to explain evil. It is said, even God cannot be unlimited. He is limited by logical laws and laws of the uniformity of Nature. These laws are equally binding upon Him. Moreover, God must be good and will always try to bring about good; why then is there evil? The existence of evil points out that even though God wishes to bring good every where, evidently it is not in his power to remove evil. He is thus limited, i. e. a finite Being.

There have been very many advocates of finite God in recent times. Hume, Comte, Mill, Mo. Taggart, William James and Rashdall are some of the most prominent. William James says, "God worth the name must be finite". Rashdall wants Personality for God and as Personality cannot be infinite, God is finite. We have shown in what sense we really look upon God as Personal. We saw he is Personal in a negative sense, as being not impersonal, as by Person is meant the highest we have. Hume, though he is very often supposed to be an atheist, is not really so. He admits the existence of a finite God. In his "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," he says, "supposing the author of Nature to be finitely perfect though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may be given of natural and moral evil and every untoward phenomenon he explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen in order to avoid a greater; and in a word, Benevolence regulated by Wisdom and limited by Necessity may produce just such a world as the present." The criticism of such a view is easy. If there is limitation to God, it is self-limitation and it need not detract from his infinity. Secondly, our religious aspirations are mortified with a finite God. It is infinity that we adore, never finitude. A technical ground is sometimes brought against the conception of infinite God. It is objected that as this world is finite and there is always a similarity between cause and effect, the cause of the finite world must be itself finite; but evidently this is misreading the relation between cause and effect. If the cause and the effect are exactly similar, they will not remain two but will become identical. Hence some difference must be allowed; and the difference of infinite and finite may be allowed. That infinite can produce the finite though not vice versa.

A perfect carpenter can easily produce an imperfect table. What these objectors do is a confusion between infinite conception and conception of the infinite. We may not have the former; but the latter we can certainly have. Lastly, the existence of evil which is their staple argument can be otherwise explained. In the first place, what so many times appears to be evil is really good; secondly, what is evil to one man may be good to another. Thirdly, evil might be necessary for the good of man-kind. Their exaggeration of evil only indicates their very egoism. Thus we have seen that the conception of a finite God cannot satisfy us. As some one has remarked, the phrase "finite God" is a contradiction in terms.

Comte's view of the God of Humanity is much the same. In order to find concreteness for the object of our worship, Comte introduced the God of Humanity. "Our thoughts will be devoted to the knowledge of Humanity, our affection to her Love, our actions to her service" But ultimately what is meant by humanity? The present imperfect collection of men? or the past run of humanity or a future or ideal humanity? Comte has to glide to the last view—an ideal Humanity. But then it becomes again an abstraction, and nothing is gained. It becomes a fiction and as Caird says, "A worship of fictions confessed as such is impossible." Thus an attitude of worship and devotion cannot be adopted towards an imperfect and finite thing. Thus in all its forms the conception of a finite God is unsatisfactory. As however it is founded mainly on the existence of evil, we must turn to study a little more carefully the problem of evil and try to see whether evil is explicable otherwise than as an impediment to God's

work rendering him thereby an *impotent* Benefactor of mankind

(4) The Problem of Evil.

The problem of suffering or evil in this world always creates a difficulty for explanation. Plato solves the difficulty by saying that the good alone is referable to God, the evil is due to the imperfect material on which God works as an artificer of plastic arts. But we saw that this creates a dualism and again the artificer theory is not a true representation of God's nature. Others try to account for evil by saying that God is benevolent but impotent. But such a conception is firstly degrading. Secondly, on such a conception the moral idea of man becomes purely hedonistic. To Mill the evidence of a benevolent purpose is evidence that the Creator desired the pleasure of his creature. But hedonism cannot be the ethical ideal of man. The question must therefore be approached with the view that evil is there but it is necessary for the moral being and development of man. In the first place, what so many times seems to a man to be evil is good for another man or a covert good for the same man. On the whole, however, the existence of evil cannot thus be explained away. There are two kinds of Evil — (1) Physical Evil and (2) Moral evil. Is physical evil positive or negative? If it is positive why should it be there if God is omnipresent? If it is negative, how is it that it actually gives pain? If we analyse the various kinds of physical evil to which the creation succumbs, there are two kinds (1) inherent and (2) environmental. The suffering due to hunger and thirst, to the decline and emaciation of the body are inherent evils

Earthquakes, cyclones etc belong to the second class; and so do the sufferings proceeding from the law of prey. These seem to be due to natural laws but why they should occur at a particular time and at a particular place is difficult to say. In addition to these, men is liable to the sufferings of thinking of the past and contemplating about the future. There are pains of memory and of anticipation. These are extra zoological pains of man. Moral evil, on the other hand, means sin. If God is merciful and powerful, why should there be sin at all? All these evils can be explained satisfactorily on the view that they are necessary. God is not the cause of moral evil. At most He is the cause of the possibility of evil; but the actuality is men's. Therefore man is responsible for all his deeds, good or bad. Evils, however are necessary. For the end of the universe is not pleasure, it may be satisfaction but satisfaction may be even in the completest sacrifice of self. The universe is not perfect in the sense that it contains nothing but undiluted enjoyment. It would then be a child's paradise. Good can only exist for a finite creature as the conquest of evil. The ideals that are true and fruitful are struck out, or become obvious, in the stress of actual experience, and are only the fundamental structure of reality coming to fuller expression. We look upon evil not only as a training school of moral virtues but as testing with merciless severity man's powers of courage and endurance, and drawing from him thereby the utmost of which he is capable. Life for the individual in each a medium is a series of opportunities, but the use he makes of them depends on himself. Evils are the gates to noble life and stepping stones towards good. No deeper foundations can be laid

aspiration than an established truth. It therefore remains to see in what sense philosophically it appears to be reasonable. In the first place, personal immortality, that is, the living of an individual with the self-same characteristics for very many lives does not commend itself, as such a view is contradicted by the essential feature of everything, viz change. If the individual changes, in what sense is he the same individual living again? So it seems that it is not in person as such that life is continued but it is continued in the form of particular ideals that each man has set forward and as they are carried on by the survivors after the death of the man. Secondly, immortality cannot be interpreted as eternal existence. There must be degrees of immortality. It is all a question of values, values according to their inherent goodness. Thus the ideals of Napoleon may live for three centuries after him, the ideals of Tolstoy may live for ten centuries, the ideals of Christ or Buddha for a still longer time or as long as humanity lives. Such a view affords an impetus to moral action and hence only it is serviceable and worthy of acceptance. Just as the physical life has varying degrees of duration so also the life of ideals. In as much as ideals survive, there is immortality to that extent.

(6) Evolution.

In one sense we have adopted evolution, viz in the sense of the teleological process. The idea, however, is important and deserves to be specially treated. We have already seen when discussing the genetic method of philosophy that Aristotle was the father of evolutionary doctrines. But to him evolution was an individual process,

for idealism than the perceptann of the spirit's power to transmute every loss into a gain 'finding even in the worst of tragedies the means of an otherwise impossible triumph' (Royce), a triumph which but for that evil could not have been Unweariedly creating good out of evil is the very texture of our human experience From the absolute point of view the reality of evil is only its momentary importance in the service of good

(5) The Problem of Immortality.

The sting of evil is averted in one more way It is generally believed that expiation will be made for unmerited evil in the next life This is Kant's chief argument for the postulate of immortality The balance of the equation of virtue and happiness must be rendered in the next life, but such a view detracts from the merit of virtuous life for its own sake Virtue is its own reward However, though not pursued for the consequent happiness it must surely be attended by happiness and if it is not so attended in this life that affords a reasonable presumption for a life after death Arguments of various kinds have been given for the belief in immortality Plato bases it on his doctrine of reminiscence of a past life The physical criterion of 'nothing dies' is also availed of by some to advocate the perpetuality of the soul Plato, again, says that the soul is the simplest element and therefore cannot die as the simplest cannot die, it is not seen to die by its own hands Nor can it die by the agency of others as the soul is the principle of life itself These arguments, however, are not convincing and arguments to show the opposite may also be pleaded Thus the belief in immortality is more an

aspiration than an established truth. It therefore remains to see in what sense philosophically it appears to be reasonable. In the first place, personal immortality, that is, the living of an individual with the self-same characteristics for very many lives does not commend itself, as such a view is contradicted by the essential feature of everything, viz. change. If the individual changes, in what sense is he the same individual living again? So it seems that it is not in person as such that life is continued but it is continued in the form of particular ideals that each man has set forward and as they are carried on by the survivors after the death of the man. Secondly, immortality cannot be interpreted as eternal existence. There must be degrees of immortality. It is all a question of values, values according to their inherent goodness. Thus the ideals of Napoleon may live for three centuries after him, the ideals of Tolstoy may live for ten centuries, the ideals of Christ or Buddha for a still longer time or as long as humanity lives. Such a view affords an impetus to moral action and hence only it is serviceable and worthy of acceptance. Just as the physical life has varying degrees of duration so also the life of ideals. In as much as ideals survive, there is immortality to that extent.

(6) Evolution.

In one sense we have adopted evolution, viz. in the sense of the teleological process. The idea, however, is important and deserves to be specially treated. We have already seen when discussing the genetic method of philosophy that Aristotle was the father of evolutionary doctrines. But to him evolution was an individual process,

the species were limited and eternal in nature; Spencer's evolution was a uni-linear evolution. There were no gaps in the middle from the nebular mass to the mind of man. Nothing stood in the way of this evolution. Differentiation and integration were the processes of evolution. He applied his method everywhere; even in the sphere of ethics, sociology etc. The nebulous mass fell into parts and was solidified. With Bergson there is not a uni-linear but a multi-linear evolution: i. e. evolution simultaneously taking place on different planes. Instinct and intelligence develop *pari passu* on cross section. His illustration is that of the rocket which explodes into many columns. Matter is the waste product of the life course. This is "creative evolution."

One of the chief marks of evolution ought to be that there is emergence of qualitative differences. This is the distinction of modern evolution from Aristotle's. These species are not immutable. This does not mean that there is open door between any two species. There might be blind alleys in Nature. A second characteristic is that the changes that thus take place must be orderly, that is, by slow degrees. The mutation theory believes in the possibility of entirely new products. Bateson is the upholder of this theory. Lastly, all evolution implies a purpose or end towards which the process is directed. There are certain pre-suppositions of evolution. The gaps between inorganic, organic and fully conscious have to be granted. The pre-suppositions of inorganic evolution are matter and force. In the organic sphere, life, adaptation, natural selection and heredity are the pre-suppositions. Lastly, in the mental sphere we have to presuppose mind.

The limits of evolution are that evolution must take place within one individual subject. Evolution is becoming of being. The same is applicable to species. But both the individual and the species must be finite. The Infinite Individual or Absolute cannot evolve as it is the totality of experience.

As has been already shown, evolution supports our philosophical theory by admitting teleological or systematic unity of the whole.

(7) Theories of the relation between Mind and Body.

We have already had occasion to refer incidentally to some well-known theories about the relation between Mind and Body. A special treatment, however, will be useful. The five chief theories are —

(1) Pre-established Harmony, (ii) Occasionalism, (iii) Epiphenomenalism, (iv) Parallelism and (v) Interactionism.

Pre-established Harmony was advocated by Leibnitz. Just as two watches go alike, so do the body and mind. The adjustment of the two has been pre-ordained by God. Occasionalists say that the body or the mind is the occasional cause of any movements of the man. The real cause is God. Such an Occasionalism makes man an irresponsible thoroughfare for Divine actions and thus cannot be maintained if man is to have freedom. The chief advocates of the theory were the French Malebranche, Geulinx and others.

Epiphenomenalism is advocated by physicists generally. The mind is an epiphenomenon of the body, Psychoses are mere unessential loose hangings of neuroses. Very odd similes are expressed. Huxley was an advocate of this theory and said that mind was the refuse given out by the working of the matter. A psychosis is to the neurosis what the whistle of the train is to the engine. Every neurosis is the cause of another without any intervention of the psychosis. The psychosis is like the colour of the pavement. Holbach, Cabanis Voigt in the eighteenth century, were the epiphenomenalists of France, who said that thought was the secretion of the brain as bile of the liver. But history proves that ideas are causally related and again it might be possible, that the neuroses are the epiphenomena of the psychoses. The arguments for this were searched among the observations of automatisms. They thought that thought also is automatic like breathing. This theory aimed at being the triumph of the theory of reflex action. Secondly they said that purposive actions are performed merely by the neuroses where there seemed to be no existence of consciousness. They adduced as examples the movements of decapitated frogs and of somnambulists. A criticism of such a view has already been given. We may repeat it here.

Firstly, if consciousness is a useless extra how is it that it has yet survived if only the useful survive? We see that consciousness has not merely lived but is daily growing in power. Secondly the argument that it is automatic like respiration does not hold on analogy. There is a great deal of difference between physiological reflexes and habitual actions which may be termed mental reflexes. For habit-

forming, consciousness of a high type is required. A primordial deliberate consciousness is required for the inception of habit. Thirdly, self introspection reveals that we can and do possess the power of initiating movement. The primacy of mind over matter is attested to by actual experiences. Fourthly, the purposiveness of consciousness cannot be explained on the epiphenomenalistic theory. There is a great difference between physical attraction and mental attraction that is, between mechanical action and teleological action. Thus epiphenomenalism is not a correct theory.

Another important theory is psycho-physical parallelism. Spinoza, a parallelist, posits a higher unity of neuroses and psychoses. But to have such a unity is to give up parallelism. Stout gives prominence to the mental side. A rigid parallelism looks upon body and mind as two permanently separated. It draws its validity from the doctrine of continuity. No foreign element need come between one mental state and another or between one physical state and another, it also takes recourse to the doctrine of the conservation of energy. On the whole, however, the arguments for parallelism are negative rather than positive. The parallelists try to establish their theory by refuting interactionism. They say that the latter is not correct as it violates the law of conservation of energy, as on the interaction theory, it is supposed, that even a small physical change produces unequally large mental effects and vice versa. But Ward refutes the parallelists' argument against interaction by his new theory of conservation of energy. He says this law is a law of mere exchange. It only means that corresponding to a physical stimulus, there is an exchange of mental

energy, though in their spheres, the two energies are constant. Another argument that is brought against interactionism by the parallelists is that it cannot explain the mode of action or the *raison d'être* of the change. But this is not valid argument. For because the mode is not known it does not mean that there is no such interaction. Interactionism would say that it is the nature of causality to produce qualitative changes as for example, the gun powder added to fire produces an explosion. But whereas the arguments of parallelism against interactionism fail, the arguments brought forward in their turn by the interactionists against parallelism are cogent. In the first place, parallelism has never been consistently carried out. As we saw, Spinoza had to look to a higher unity and this was giving up parallelism. "In fact, an unvarying and precise concomitance without causal connection is a logical absurdity" (Ward). One event invariably follows another and yet there is no causal connection between the two! Secondly, what is the physiological counterpart for the mental experience of $\sqrt{-1} = 1$? There need not always be a corresponding cortical counterpart to every mental phenomenon. The localization though found out in the case of sensory and motor experiences is not determined in the case of intellectual power. Thus all these considerations lead us to adopt the interactionists' view of the relation between mind and body. On that view physical antecedents can produce mental effects and mental antecedents can produce physical effects. This view is also supplemented by our actual consciousness of power. But perhaps the best solution is to say that there is no solution of the intricate problem, as in any concrete experience what is given is neither a brain process nor a mental pro-

case singly. Every experience is a complex of both and produces another complex experience. The two processes are never given in isolation and hence no connection can be definitely laid down. Bradley says that to find the relation between mind and body is like hunting the mirage. However, supposing that the two processes can be found in isolation, interactionism between the two seems to be the most satisfactory explanation of their connection.



Appendix "A"



A short account of the important Categories

(I) Substance.

Aristotle was the first to discuss what Substance meant. According to him there were four tests of a substance. Firstly, substance was that of which other things could be predicated but which could not be predicated of others. Secondly it was not an abstract universal like that of Plato but a concrete individual thing. Thirdly, it is the differentia of the thing that constituted the substance. Lastly, he said that God was the Substance. After Aristotle, the problem was taken up by Descartes and Locke. According to them there were two forms of substance material and spiritual. Spinoza said that God alone was substance with two Attributes. His definition of substance was "that which is by itself and is conceived by itself." We have seen how such a solitary substance is a chimera and how Aristotle's idea was more satisfactory. To Berkeley all substance was spiritual. There was no matter. Hume denied both. Leibnitz said the monad is the substance. Kant said that substance in itself is unknowable. This paved the way for the Agnosticism of Spencer and others. Generally speaking, there are five views about Substance. With some men substance means the primary qualities of things. The primary qualities are the mathematical qualities of mass, extensity and solidity. The secondary qualities are the sensible qualities. We have already seen

that such a distinction (of primary and secondary) cannot be final and the secondary qualities have as much right to be considered the reality as the primary qualities. Secondly, the primary qualities cannot be identified with substance as the substance is said to possess even the primary qualities and not to be the primary qualities. It is, therefore, apart from and above them. A second view is that of Locke according to whom substance is a superfluous luxury. But such a view is opposed to the argument from sufficient reason. We daily look upon things as substances. A third view of substance is Hume's. According to him substance is a complex of primary and secondary qualities. But such a phenomenistic Metaphysics has its counter part in associationist psychology and amenable to the same charge being brought against it. A complex of qualities cannot give us the unity of the substance. Secondly, the qualities are very often potential rather than actual as in the case of poison, so they cannot give us the actuality of substance. A fourth view of substance is that of Hobbhouse. According to him the unity of substance is due to the unity of space that it occupies. This is due to the projection of our own body. Thus ultimately it is the body-consciousness that gives unity to the substance. The last view is that of Berkeley. He regards substance as psychical. The unity of substance is the unity of representation. He says that is the higher kind of substance which reflects larger fields.

The one thing that is characteristic of substance is its Unity. That alone deserves to be called one which functions as a whole. The unity that belongs to a thing is the unity of the teleological structure. Secondly, oneness is a matter of degree and depends upon a particular

interest. In inorganic matter any part may function as one. Thinghood lies in conscious functioning. The human body is made up of cells that function. The human cells are less one than the whole human organism. A tape-worm is made up of innumerable cells. In lowest organismic generation takes place by fission i. e. division into parts. It is, therefore, very difficult to say what constitutes one and many. The particular things of the world seem to be both one and many. But absolute oneness belongs only to the Absolute.

(2) Qualities and Relations.

There are three alternative answers given to the question. (i) One regards that relations can be reduced to qualities, (ii) Another regards that qualities are ultimately relations, (iii) A third view maintains that qualities in relation form reality. We shall see the defects of each successively.

(1) According to the first view reality means qualities. Relations are inordinate to qualities. This view regards relations as due to our subjective modes of apprehension. Relations are subjective, qualities alone are objective. Qualities are given, relations are subsequent functions of the mind. Categories are the relations brought by mind to bear upon the material of unrelated qualities presented in sense. This is Kant's view. But sense and understanding cannot be thus separated. Knowledge is continuous and relations are present in the presentations of sense-manifold. They cannot be super-imposed by mental fancy. Secondly, there would be no order or system in the universe if relations are mere subjective modes of apprehension, but on the ground of sufficient

reason we say that the universe is systematic. Thirdly, we cannot say that qualities are fundamentally relations, as relations might be presupposed in qualities as the relation between father and son etc. The quality of fatherhood is here due to the relation.

(ii) On the second view, relations are the fundamental reality. Reality merely consists of relations. This is the view of T. H. Green. The qualities are dependent on relations. Against this may be urged (i) relations presuppose terms between which the relations are to hold. (ii) The terms could not be regarded as the work of the relations themselves. For it would involve infinite regress. (iii) Thirdly and lastly, the terms so defined have positive characters of their own more than merely serving to mark relations.

(iii) The third view is to hold that reality is constituted neither by qualities singly, nor by relations singly but by qualities-in-their-relations. Against this view also various objections are brought forward. The chief objector is Bradley. To him Reality is super-relational. Let us suppose, he says, that reality consists of $A \in B$ (i.e. A is the relation and A, B the qualities). But the qualities A, B before the relation, are not the same after the relation. If A was A_1 before the relation, it is A_2 after the relation. Thus there are two qualities which again must be related and must presuppose the qualities before the relation. Thus we are involved in infinite regress. Thus reality is supra-relational. Says Bradley, "The relational way of thought gives appearance and not truth. It is a make-shift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary but indefensible." But

Russel, Royce and Stout have criticised Bradley in favour of qualities-in-relation. Russel says, "why should we regard relations as internal to qualities? Why not external? If they be external there would be no infinite regress." But we may object to Russel's objection thus - (1) Where can the relations exist outside the qualities? (2) Secondly, supposing that A and B are not internally connected, A and B must be regarded as at least discriminated, and discrimination is a relation. (3) Lastly, this theory leads us to the Herbartian theory of unworkable, unconnected Reals. Royce and Stout take up a different line of contention. They ask, there is regressus ad infinitum, but what does it matter? An infinite whole must admit infinite regress. Secondly, Stout urges that there is a distinction between an infinite regress which is self-contradictory and which is not. The latter is not an argument against reality. Space also is infinitely divisible, but there is no self-contradiction in that. Thus Bradley's argument of infinite regress is not detrimental to the nature of reality which consists in qualities-in-relation. The uniqueness that belongs to qualities-in-relation is the reality of each object. It may be said against this contentions in favour of Bradley that any analysis of reality into qualities-in-relation, however close, cannot yet bring out the concrete uniqueness of the real thing.

(3) Space and Time

There are various views held regarding our apprehension of space and time. Kant thought of them as forms of perception. Hegel as categories. Newton spoke of time as river. Mill and Spencer resolved space into time. Generally the Empiricists resolve time into space.

Christianity looked upon time as a temporal aspect of Eternity. Space and time are equated with each other even in ordinary talk as for example when we say "Bombay is five hours' distance from Poona". According to Leibnitz, space and time are the dim formulations of the relations between Monads.

(1) There are two kinds of space and time - Perceptual and Conceptual or scientific. The latter is developed from the former. The characteristics of perceptual space or time are (i) They are limited by our power of vision, (ii) They are continuous sensibly, (iii) They have got a qualitative aspect, i.e. the aspect which comes from directions. From this perceptual space or time the conceptual is constructed by three processes (i) The process of synthesis - manifested in three phases: the experience of one sense is conjoined with the experience of another sense, for example, tactual and visual experiences are equated, the different perceptions of one man are systematised, lastly the perceptions of different men are synthesised and universalised and thus we arrive at the conception of infinite space. With time the beginning is the 'now' of one man; then one man's nows are synthesised; then of different men when we get the conception of universal time. (ii) Another process is that of Analysis i.e. division into suitable units. (iii) Abstraction is the third process. We abstract all directions from space and time and thus arrive at conceptual space and time which are infinite. What are the characteristics of Conceptual Time and Space? (i) They are not limited like the perceptual. (ii) They are not sensibly continuous but mathematically so. (iii) They are homogeneous.

being conceived not by one individual but by the whole race. They are not homogeneous like the perceptual space and time. In what sense are the conceptual space and time real? They are not real from the view of the Absolute Experience. To the Absolute or Divine experience everything is "now and here."

(4) Causality.


There are five points to be remembered about the notion of causality. (i). Firstly, the conception of causality is anthropomorphic in its origin. This has been pointed out by Ward and Martineau. Causality in the objective world is derived from our internal experience. We have the notion of cause because we believe ourselves as agents or forces capable of doing work, because we think that we can effect changes in the objective world. (ii) Secondly, the idea of causality is susceptible, to a plurality of elements, though the phrase "plurality of causes" used by Mill is absurd. The cause in essence is a unique one but it may have numerous elements. (iii) Thirdly, the notion is subject to infinite regress. The notion of Causa-sui (self-caused cause) is the only solution out of the difficulty but the solution is contradictory to the idea of causation itself. The cyclic notion again is not satisfactory as it brings in the element of time and leads to the conclusion that causality depends upon succession in time; but real cause must be independent of time. Again, causality involves change but change in something permanent. Thus causality presupposes the notion of substance. The notions of substance and causality are interdependent. (iv). Fourthly, what is efficient cause is merged in the final cause. The human mind tends to imagine that

everything takes place to serve some end. Efficient cause is often not completely known and is thus merged in the final cause. This point has been well brought out by Prof. J.S.Mackenzie. (v) Fifthly and lastly, after all, causality is a working hypothesis or postulate. The pragmatists put forth this view in union with the Nominalists. It is maintained that the human mind for convenience's sake, causally connects one object with another: All laws or axioms are ultimately postulates. The idea of causation is not applicable, as Martineau has pointed out, to the totality of the Universe but only to particular parts of it.


Appendix "B"

Some noteworthy classifications of Sciences.

(1) According to Plato,



(2). Aristotle's classification is not definitely known, but it was something like the following:—




Two things strike us in such a classification. (i) There is no fundamental difference between Physics and Metaphysics both being purely speculative sciences. (ii) Aristotle uses the word science for a branch of knowledge in which there is prediction about the future. Thus Ethics is not a 'Science' according to Aristotle.

(3). Bacon's. With Bacon we have a different point of view altogether. The ancient Philosophers approached the subject from the side of what is known. Bacon for the first time took up a psychological study of the faculties of knowing and thus came to the conception of different sciences as based on the exercise of the different faculties.

According to Bacon,

Faculties of knowledge




166


Each of these three again being { (1). Practical and
(2) Theoretical.

(4). Comte—According to Comte there are three 'stages' of knowledge. They are in this order—(i) Theological (ii) Metaphysical (iii) Positive. According to him there is a going from the Abstract to the Concrete. Thus the following will be the order of growth of the sciences (i) Mathematics, (ii) Astronomy, (iii) Physics, (iv) Chemistry, (v) Biology (vi) Sociology.

(5) In a similar way, Spencer divides sciences thus:-




(6). We may now give a classification of Departments of knowledge which will be generally acceptable:—




II. Some important divisions of Philosophy.


(1) In Wolff for the first time, we find a complete parting of Philosophy from the special Sciences. He proceeds on the basis of the two faculties of knowing and desiring. Hence according to him, -




(2) According to Hegel,




(3) Wandte division is an admirable one
Philosophy



(4) According to A. E. Taylor





(6). So broadly speaking, philosophy in the general sense is divisible into (i) Epistemology or Theory of knowledge (ii) Ontology or Theory of Being and (iii) Philosophy in the narrower sense as equivalent to Rational Psychology and Theology

Errata.

— o —

Page.	Line.	For	Read.
9	6	hypothsis.	hypothesis.
9	25	both	both the
10	21	aflure	failure
11	8 & 9	this this	this
11	20	metaphisics	metaphysics
12	18	Self.	Self,
13	1 & 2	Epistemology	Epistemology,
15	7	philosophy	Philosophy
23	23	way	ways
25	12	issue	issues
32	13	as	of
32	29	quality	duality.
36	6	preception	perception
37	30	actors	factors
48	17	most	must
59	24	prori	priori
76	6	rea	real
91	9	powar	power
91	20	natual	actual
93	17	very	every
131	32	escarter	Descartes
138	1	mind.	mind."
133	22	resupposes	presupposes
136	2	Super-added	super-added
151	1	takepalce	take place